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ABSTRACT
Hargesheimer, Richard S., M . A . , F a l l

1983 History

Democracies and Diplomats:
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American
Foreign Service, 1933-1939 (434 pp.)
..Director:'

Jules A. Karl in

.

The American peoplgjjong have viewed the professional diplomat
through jaundiced lenses.
To the average American, the diplomat
is an elitist, an undemocratic striped-pants boy, and a useless
social ornament when not otherwise engaged in nefarious negotia
tions and Machiavellian intriques.
In part, popular distaste for
the diplomat stems from the nature of diplomacy itself and its
age-old reputation as an unsavory business.
In larger measure,
however, the distaste of American democratic opinion for the dip
lomat derives from the nation's historical experience and its pre
sumably democratic character.
Imbued with an egalitarianism that
favors the amateur over the expert, Americans predictably distrust
the diplomatist whose task requires special qualities not often
found in the ordinary citizen.
Although few Americans pay much
attention to foreign affairs, and fewer still know of the Foreign
Service or have looked upon a diplomat, the American national
experience— the way Americans have looked at themselves and
others— renders popular acceptance of the professional diplomat
tenuous.
Among modern American political leaders, none has personified '
the distaste of democratic opinion for the diplomatist more than
President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
He regarded the career diplomats
as frivolous dilettantes, out of touch with the pulse of the
American public.
As President, he displayed an almost contempuous
disregard for the Foreign Service.
In selecting chiefs-of-mission—
ambassadors and ministers— to guide United States interests abroad,
FDR easily yielded to spoils politics, abundantly displayed his
penchant for haphazard and ad hoc administrative decision-making,
and demonstrated a scant regard for the Foreign Service as an in
strument of United States foreign policy.
Like the majority of his countrymen,
FDR seldom considered
whether a n a t i o n - e v e n a rich and powerful one— could long ignore
the dictates of constructing a sound diplomatic tradition without
peril to its national interests.
For most of its history, the
United States has relied— in peace as well as in war— upon its
commercial and technological prowess to secure its interests over
seas. Whether a good professional diplomatic service is compatible
with the temper of a democratic society is a question Americans
have yet to resolve satisfactorily.
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Diplomacy is a profession that requires
of its votaries a certain amount of
culture and experience in society.
It is natural therefore that the
diplomatic service should he recruited
from that section of society which
possess these qualifications.

Jules Cambon
We look at the world of diplomacy...
we find that there are many places
where a rugged halfback from the
University of Michigan...can do a better
gob than any Phi Beta Kappa who ever
came out of the Ivy League.
2

Congressman Leo W. O'Brien

1

DEMOCRACIES AND DIPLOMATS:
EGALITARIANISM AND ELITISM

Writing in The Foreign Affairs Quarterly in 1955, the
diplomat-scholar George F. Kennan reflected upon "the venerable
and delicate question of the compatibility of a good professional diplomatic arm with the temper of a democratic society."

^The Diplomatist (London: Philip Allen, 1931.
published in 1926 as Le Diplomate), 69.

3

Originally

2

U.S. Congress, House, 86th Cong., 1st sess., July 21,
1959, Congressional Record, CV, 13897. O'Brien served in the
U.S. House from 1952 to 1969 as a congressman from Albany, New
York. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 17741971 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), 1482.
3

"Future of Our Professional Diplomacy," 33 (July 1955),
573. See also Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional
Diplomat," The Wilson Quarterly, 1 (Winter 1977), 148-157.
-1-
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Like others before him, Kennan diagnosed a tension that
strains relations between diplomats and democracies.

4

While

the art of diplomacy "requires a combination of certain
special qualities" that "are not always to be found...in the
ordinary man," the "egalitarian illusions" of democratic
peoples "tempts them to distrust the expert and to credit
the amateur."

5

Kennan wrote with particular vexation of the "chronic
distaste" of American democratic opinion for "the image" of
the professional diplomat.

"There is no criticism of" the

diplomatist "older and more ubiquitous," he stated, "than the
charge" that he is an elitist, removed from the society he
represents, who leans to foreign ways and modes of thought,
and, hence, is unsuitable a=s an agent for the conduct of United
g

States foreign relations.

Although career diplomats in most

democratic countries suffer some popular domestic suspicion,
the American diplomatist, Kennan asserted, bears "some
burdens that are unique in intensity if not in nature."

7

4
Countless commentators have observed a lack of harmony
between professional diplomacy and democracy. Besides Jules
Cambon and Kennan cited above, two of the more prominent are
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America (2 vols.; N.Y.:
Schocken Books, 1970.
Originally published in 1835), I, 273274; Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford University
Press, 1963. Originally published in 1939), 42-54.
~*The material quoted is from Nicolson, Diplomacy, 55,
and his The Evolution of Diplomacy (N.Y.: Collier Books, 1966.
Originally published in 1954 as The Evolution of Diplomatic
Method) ,124.
^"Future of Diplomacy," 573.
7
"Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 149.
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In few nations has the distaste of public opinion for
the diplomatist been more pronounced than in the United States.
Unlike many of their counterparts in foreign lands, American
diplomats have rarely enjoyed the esteem of their countrymen.

8

At best, Americans have displayed benign indifference toward
their representatives abroad.

At worst, Americans have

scorned, vilified and ostracized them.

9

When not damned,

American diplomats have been largely invisible.
Popular distaste for the diplomatist stems, in part,
from the nature of diplomacy itself.^ Defying precise
o
American professional diplomats have been painfully,
even bitterly, cognizant of the lack of public appreciation
for their profession. And there may be no better testimony
to the distaste of American popular opinion for the profes
sional diplomat than the memoirs of the diplomats themselves.
Even after accounting for a natural human tendancy to resent
being unappreciated, the memoirs of American diplomats over
the past fifty years are remarkable for their attention to
the public's lack of esteem of their profession. A cursory
glance at the memoirs of foreign diplomats reveals no such
similar anguish on their part and is, thus, suggestive of the
uniqueness of the strain between diplomats and democratic
opinion in the United States. For example, see Henry Serrano
Villard, Affairs at State (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965), 15.
9
For example, see Gary May, "The 'New China Hands' and
the Rape of the China Service," a review of The China Hands
by E. j. Kahn, Jr., Reviews In American History, 4 (March
1976), 120; Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador:
Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplo
matic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966) , vii; Hugh De
Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign
Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 11, 21.
■^Henry W. Wriston dismisses the argument— most notably
advanced by George Kennan, Jules Cambon, and Harold Nicolson—
that democracy is more hostile to professionals in diplomacy
than other types of government. He attributes whatever difficul
ties exist to the character of diplomacy itself. A university
president, Wriston chaired a committee under the Secretary of

-4-

definition and associated with Machiavellian intrigue and
duplicity, diplomacy easily prompts visions of secrecy and
wickedness.^
Nor is the popular American image of the diplomatist,
himself, without basis in reality.

During the nineteenth

century, when spoils politics held sway, presidents regularly
filled the diplomatic and consular corps from the ranks of
the underserving— unemployed

politicians, political hacks,

and the lazy sons of the rich and powerful.

Even after 1924,

when the United States combined the two corps into a merito
cratic Foreign Service, men could be found in the Service who
possessed few other qualifications than Ivy League educations
and connections in high society.
The roots of the "chronic distaste" of American popular
opinion for the diplomatist largely arV.se, however,

from the

State in 1954 whose purpose was to broaden the base of selec
tion to the Foreign Service to more faithfully mirror American
life. His lecture-turned-book is a rebjuttal to Kennan's
article of 1955 in The Foreign Affairs fQuarterlyf. Wriston,
Diplomacy in
Democracy (N.Y.: Harper?& Brothers, 1956) ,
7-9, 47.
-J

I

■^Writing about 1945 on a proposed, but never completed,
book on diplomacy, the American diplomat Hugh Gibson described
the "general conception of diplomacy...[as] Of an intermediate
state between this world and another, administered jointly by
Santa Claus and the devil and functioning by miracles and
hocus-pocus.
It is secret and slimy and no healthy-minded man
wants anything to do with it. Foreign diplomats are sinister
and astute; ours are idiotic." Perrin C. Galpin, ed.,
Hugh Gibson, 1883-1954: Extracts From His Letters and Anec
dotes From His Friends (N.Y. : Belgian American Foundation,
1955), 27.

-5-

nation's historical experience and democratic culture.

12

In the New World, historical circumstance and democratic
ideology combined to belie the acceptance of professional
diplomacy.

Blessed with geographical security, deeply suspi

cious of foreign political entanglements, and instilled with
a sense of its own special world mission, the young American
republic had no desire or reason to cultivate a professional
diplomatic elite.

13

In advancing its democratic mission, the

United States relied— for most of its history, in peace as
well as in war— upon its commercial and technological prowess,
propelled by a bountiful continent and an egalitarian ethic
that encouraged private individual initiative.

Whenever

diplomatic problems arose, the United States called forth
individual leaders, not diplomatic elites, to resolve them
as circumstances dictated.
Americans early rejected the aristocratic, class values
associated with European society and diplomacy.

14

Convinced

that all elites were inherently undemocratic, Americans empha
sized instead equality, not of status or income, but of
12

Published over 144 years ago, the best work on the
American character remains Toqueville's Democracy In America.
See also David M. Potter, People of Plenty; Economic Abundance
and the American Character (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1954); Arthur M. Schlesinger, "What then is the American,
this new man?" in Schlesinger, Paths To The Present (Boston :
Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 3-23.
13

Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Culture and
Diplomacy: The American Experience (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1977), 4. See also Potter, People of Plenty, 128.
14

Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4-5; Potter,
People of Plenty, 91, 118.
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opportunity.

15

Ensuing expansion across a continent of

enormous economic wealth blurred the real distinctions that
separated Americans, strengthened the ideal of equality of
opportunity, and gave rise to a passionate egalitarianism
espoused by political leaders and citizens alike.

16

Upon the wellspring of American egalitarianism, the
professional diplomat is marked as a natural target of pop
ular opprobrium.

The ideology of egalitarianism promises to

each citizen the freedom and the opportunity to reach the
highest plateaus in society.
superior to anyone else.

No one is considered naturally

And what most Americans regard as

most American— democratic self-government and equality of
opportunity— they also regard as universal models for all
men.

17

''■^Potter, People of Plenty, 91-92.
16 If American political leaders do not share the
egalitarian fervor of the citizenry, they court it and pay
homage to it. Today, the public opinion poll stands as
the shrine to egalitarianism in the United States, where
political leaders genuflect to the tabulated chants of
individual citizens.
See Herbert J. Storing, "American
Statesmanship: Old and New," in Robert A. Goldwin, ed.,
Bureaucrats, Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads?
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980),
88-113.
Storing offers some brilliant insights into the
evolution of American egalitarianism and the subsequent
decline in political statesraanship--from the leadership of
the Founding Fathers based upon their profound concern
over the problematic nature of democracy to the leadership
of modern-day politicians based upon their search for an
elusive consensus among the electorate.
17

Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4.
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By contrast/ the diplomatist is an example of what
egalitarianism is not.*** According to its high priests, sound
diplomacy requires a sophisticated command of the world that
not anyone can acquire.

And diplomacy acknowledges the exis

tence of legitimate, conflicting and divergent interests among
nations.

To accept professional diplomacy is to call into

question the ideology of American egalitarianism.
Bounded by historical experience, American egalitarianism
renders popular reconciliation with professional diplomacy
tenuous.

Although

few Americans habitually pay much attention

to foreign affairs, and fewer still know of the Foreign Service
or have looked upon a diplomat, the nature of the American
experience— the way Americans have looked at themselves and
others— makes public distaste for the diplomatist predictable,
if not inevitable.

Whether aware of the Foreign Service

or not, most Americans hold a view of their democratic heri
tage that contrasts sharply with the portrait of

the diploma

tist periodically painted by popular spokesmen and elected
officials.
18

Twentieth century egalitarianism, with its irresistable
movement toward the broadest possible base of selection, has
outpaced efforts to "dearistocratize" the Foreign Service.

-8 -

I
Americans, more often than not, have cast profiles of
diplomats in pejorative stereotypes.

As unveiled by journal

ists, elected officials, and other conveyers of public atti
tudes, American diplomats have appeared as undemocratic and
unAmerican elitists, as smartly-dressed striped-pants boys
strutting around with affected European mannerisms, as
cookie-pushers catering to ladies of high society, and as
useless social ornaments when not otherwise engaged in nefar
ious negotiations and Machiavellian intrigues.

Alongside

their more sinister and astute foreign counterparts, American
diplomats have been portrayed as lazy and inept.
The public's image of diplomats has reflected hues of
suspicion and disparagement.

Writing in 1931, the self-styled

savant and columnist Robert S. Allen contended that people in
the United States "who have heard of the State Department at
all" know of it as "a social club whose members are selected
from blue-stocking Bostonians, wield their forks with their
left hands, and are no more representative of American life
than the Redskins" who first inhabited the land. 19 Allen
characterized the "typical" Foreign Service officer serving
abroad as "a young man with glasses who has spent all his
life since graduation in the rarefied atmosphere of pink
teas," soiling "his hands at no manual labor more arduous than
^/Robert S. Allen// Washington Merry-Go-Round
(N.Y.: Horace, Liveright, 1931), 139.

bridge."

The Foreign Service, he inveighed, places "a premium

on pink peppermints and protocol" and sympathizes only with
the point of view "of entrenched wealth."

20

Others before and since have echoed similar shibboleths.
Robert Bendiner, a Washington correspondent who began his
career in the 19 20s on the State Department "beat," wrote that
the social backgrounds of American professional diplomats
"tend m

the main to reduce democracy to an abstraction."

21

Another journalist, Joseph Alsop, commented during the 1940s
that "to most people the State Deparment means...a lot of
Anglophiles in striped pants, who have good manners and have
married rich wives."

22

From the perspective of the 19 50s,

court-historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., agreed.

He contended

that "Americans had reasonably regarded" the State Department
"as a refuge for effete and conventional men who adored coun
tesses, pushed cookies and wore handkerchiefs in their sleeves.
20Ibid., 146, 162.
21

The Riddle of the State Department (N.Y.: Farrar &
Rinehart, 1942), 111. See also Bertram D. Hulen, Inside the
Department of State (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 76-78; Warren
F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States,
1779-1939; A Study in Administrative History (Chicago;
University of Chicago Press, 1961), 225.
22

Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club; The Founding
Fathers of the U.S. Foreian Service (N.Y.: W. W. Norton,
1978), 11.
23
1962.

The Vital Center (2d ed.; Boston; Houghton Mifflin,
Originally published in 1948), 166.
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Public identification of the Foreign Service officer with
the "ugly American" gained wide notoriety upon publication of
24
the popular novel by that name in 1958 .
In The Ugly American/
a pompous, blundering American ambassador destroys United
States credibility in a hypothetical Southeast Asian country
when he loses the support of the local masses to the more
cunning and skillful Communist diplomats.

That the American

ambassador was a politically-appointed amateur envoy, rather
than a trained professional diplomat, hardly mattered.

The

entire Foreign Service was besmirched.
Elected representatives of the American people long
have looked askance upon diplomats.

Addressing his congres

sional colleagues in 1859, a representative from Ohio stated
that he knew "of no area of the public service that is more
emphatically useless than the diplomatic service— none in the
world."

For American commercial purposes, he expounded, "our

consuls discharge all the duties that are required.

The

diplomatic ministers discharge no duties of a commercial
character."

25

Speaking from the same platform several years

later, a senator from New York was even more defamatory.
"The Diplomatic Service," he exhorted, "is working our ruin
24

William Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American
(N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1958). On the publicity and notoriety
that the book lent to the Foreign Service, see Congressional
Record, C V , 13898; Villard, Affairs at State, 6; Nicolson,
Diplomacy, 139-141.
25

Representative Benjamin W. Stanton, January 19, 1859,
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 24-25.
(The quotation is
from the Congressional Globe, pt. 1, 35th Cong. 2d sess., 459.)

-1 1 -

by creating a desire for foreign customs and foreign follies.
The disease is imported by our returning diplomats....They
should...be quarantined/'he concluded, "as we quarantine
foreign rags through fear of cholera."

26

Congress, generally, has viewed the Foreign Service
through jaundiced lenses.

In describing executive reorgan

ization of the diplomatic corps in 1937, a writer for The New
York Times summarized the congressional portrait of American
diplomats:
Their [the diplomats] difficulty has
always been to get Congress to accept them
as anything.better than 'cookie-pushers.1
The average member of Congress,
when he gave the matter any thought at
all, regarded the foreign service [sic]
men as amiable youths from wealthy fami
lies, who liked to dally about the world
with little to do, wearing white spats
and going to teas. Sometimes...Congress
thought these boys ought to pay the
government to let them lead their idyllic
lives.
I Presidents, especially, have regarded diplomats with
skepticism.

"All Presidents I have known," recalled Dean

Achqson, who served under or consulted with most presidents

I

from 1933 to 1968, "have had uneasy doubts about the State
Department...Foreign Service officers seem to them cynical,
26

Senator William E. Robinson, January 10, 1885, Ilchman,
/Professional Diplomacy, 27.
(The quotation is from Congres
sional Record, XVI, 48th Cong., 2d sess., 613).
27

Harold B. Hinton, "Career Diplomats Boosted," July
18, 1937, sec. 4, 7.. That the Foreign Service has never
commanded a visible voting constituency accounts, in part,
for congressional indifference toward diplomats. But it
does not explain the negative image that many congressmen
have of diplomats.

-1 2 -

unimaginative, and negative."

28

Presidents as diverse as Harry Truman and Richard
Nixon have cast aspersions upon the diplomatic establishment.
To Truman, "protocol and
neck."

29

striped-pants" were "a pain in the

While acknowledging that a lot "of extremely bright

people," many "of common sense," worked in the State Depart
ment, Truman found objectionable those officers whom he
perceived "have had very little association with actual people
down to the ground."
simply "those fags."

30

To President Nixon, diplomats were

31

In an earlier era, President Theodore Roosevelt, too,
expressed doubts about diplomats.

He wrote a friend that

"there are a large number" of men occupying United States
missions abroad "who belong to what I call the pink-tea set,
28

Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Depart
ment (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1969), 250.
OQ
Thayer, Diplomat (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 19 59) , 224.
See also Thomas H. Etzold, The Conduct of American Foreign
Policy: The Other Side of Diplomacy (N.Y.: New Viewpoints,
1977), 98; Walter Mills, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (N.Y.:
Viking Press, 1951), 62.
30

Truman to Dave H. Morgan, January 28, 1952, Robert
H. Ferrell, ed., Off The Record: The Private Papers of Harry
S . Truman, (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1980), 235. President John F.
Kennedy's assessment of therState Department and the Foreign
Service was no less charitable.
See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 406-44/1
31 Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger
.
and American Foreign Policy (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1977),
145.
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who merely reside in the service instead of working in the
service." Of course, he continued; "most...embassies and
legations are pink-tea places.
we need real men."

A few are not, and in these

32

II
To some extent, diplomats in nearly every country have
experienced the charges hurled at American diplomats.
Abstact, often mysterious and foreign to the day-to-day con
cerns of the indigenous masses, diplomacy has yielded few
platitudes to its practitioners.

33

Unlike medicine, law, or any number of trades, diplomacy
defies precise definition.

Diplomacy is variously defined as

"the management of international relations by negotiation";
as "the method by which" relations among, sovereign nations
"are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys"; and as
"the business or art of the diplomatist."

Diplomacy "is not

a system of moral philosophy" or the formulation of foreign
policy, but "the application of intelligence and tact to the

32

T. Roosevelt to Richard Harding Davis, January 3,
1905, Elting E. Morrison, ed., The Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt (8 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1951) , IV, 1089-1090.
33

For instance, see Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the
Professional Diplomat," 148-149, and "Future of Diplomacy,"
573-574; Gordon A. Craig, "The British Foreign Office From
Grey toAustin Chamberlain," in Craig and Felix Gilbert, ed.,
The Diplomats: 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1953), 47; Hugh Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1944), 42.

-14-

conduct of official relations" between governments.

34

As an

arcane business, diplomacy is subject to confusion and misun
derstanding on part of

laymen,

if and when they contemplate

the subject at all.
The nature of diplomacy, itself, is unlikely to render
its practitioner, the diplomatist, a figure of honor and
affection among his countrymen.

Serving abroad in foreign

capitals, the diplomatist is separate in time and place from
his native land and,', thus, readily acquires the status of an
outsider.

Functioning as a principal source of understanding

between his government and another, he seeks, ideally, to
reconcile and to accommodate conflicting national interests,
not to impose conformity to his nation's standards or to
achieve victory in any ultimate sense.

35

While representing

his nation's interests, he is sometimes the initiator of
distasteful compromises that appear to be the abandonment of
domestic-political principles.

As a messenger, he is "more

likely-to be remembered as the bearer of bad news than good,"
36
if he is remembered at all.

34

The definitions are taken from Nicolson, Diplomacy,
24, 42, 53-54, 87.
35

For instance, see Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 573574; Cambon, The Diplomatist, 79, 84; Gibson, Road to Foreign
Policy, 42-43; Arthur Andrew, Defence By Other Means; Diplomacy
for the Underdog (Ontario; John Degell Ltd., 1970), 56-121.
36

Andrew, Defence By Other Means, 102.
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The diplomatist also has suffered from diplomacy's
age-old reputation as an unsavory business.

Distrusted as

a matter of course in ancient times, envoys became widely
associated during the Renaissance with the traits of Machiavellian intrigue, duplicity, mendacity, and deceit.

37

Diplomacy,

then, was a more handmaiden for the beginning and ending of
wars than an activity for the maintenance of peaceful relations
among rulers.

Diplomats often richly deserved the distrust

and suspicion cast upon them.
that period concluded,

As a diplomatic theorist of

"It is better to set fire to the house

of one's neighbor than to wait until he sets it to yours."

38

The European diplomat, nevertheless, acquired consider
able social status and public recognition over time.

Despite

his Machiavellian public image, the diplomat remained essen
tial for the management of relations among the European
states.

39

The sheer proximity of one nation-state to another

required diplomacy for the orderly conduct of international
37

For instance, see Nicolson, Evolution of Diplomacy,
45; Villard, Affairs at State, 8; Robert H. Ferrell, American
Diplomacy: A History (3rd ed., N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1975), 4-5.
That Machiavelli has been misread over the centuries has not
mattered.
For a brilliant analysis of Machiavelli's meaning—
which would have not consoled American democratic sensibilities
in any case— see Isaiah Berlin's essay, "The Originality of
Machiavelli," Henry Hardy, ed., Against The Current:
Essays
in the History of Ideas (N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1979), 25-79.
38
Gaspard de Chatillon, comte de Coligny, advisor to the
French King Charles IX, 1571, Albert Sorel, Europe Under The
Old Regime (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1964. The initial chapter of
an 18 volume work, L 1Europe et la revolution francaise.
published between 1885-1904), 18.
39

Cambon, The Diplomatist, 76-78; De Santis, Diplomacy
of Silence, 11.
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intercourse.

In 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, called to

reshape the map of Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars,
European statesmen agreed upon and codified standards of
diplomatic practice.

With the Congress of Vienna, diplomacy

became a recognized, professional branch of public service in
each European country.^
To be a diplomat in Europe came to carry with it a mark
of social distinction.

In England, for instance, the diplo

matic service soon ranked with the army, the navy, and the
church as "a suitable calling for the sons of the aristocracy."
A similar situation prevailed in France, where "the ambition
of every family" was "to have at least one member in the
public service and diplomacy was the special preserve of the
wealthy and titled families."

41

The social recognition accorded the European diplomat
largely flowed from the class structure and class conscious
ness of European society.

Under the Old Regime, individual

sovereigns, ruling by the principle of divine right, and their
agents conducted diplomacy.

Even then— with reason of state

being the rule and aggrandizement the object of statecraft—
the "ideal" diplomat was supposed to be "a man of the world,
40
Nicolson, Diplomacy, 14.
41
Henry K. Norton, "Foreign Office Organization: A
Comparison of the Organization of the British, French, Ger
man, and Italian Foreign Offices with that of the Department
of State of the United States of America," Annals of the
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 142, Supplement,
(May 1929), 51-52. See also Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower
(N.Y.: Macmillan, 1966), 14.
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a gentleman above all things, exquisite in his manners" who
"understands all nuances of speech."

42

Not just any charlatan

was thought to be capable of conducting the affairs of state.
In theory, if not always in practice, Europeans con
sidered diplomacy to be a proper calling for the extraordinary
man.

Diplomacy "is a profession"— its European theoreticians

and practitioners have argued— "that requires of those who
practice it a certain habitude du monde."

43

The upper classes

were assumed to be the reservoir of men who, by virtue of birth
and social breeding, could afford to nurture and cultivate the
cosmopolitanism necessary for the conduct.of diplomacy.

That

the diplomatic service would be filled from the ranks of the
aristocratic elite was generally accepted and recognized by
all strata of society.
Such never became the case in America.

The,European

view of diplomacy, whether as idealized!in theory or basterdized in practice, failed to take root in the so ill of the
New World.

Americans came to judge themselves and others from

a different cultural perspective than that which/characterized
the Old World.

42
43

Sorel, Europe Under the Old Regime, 11, 13.

Cambon, The Diplomatist, 69. See also Kennan,
"Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 152.
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III
The American people early viewed themselves and the
outside world through bifocal lenses.

44

At a distance,

Americans saw a world steeped in corruption, imperfection,
petty wars, and class conflict.

From close in, Americans saw

themselves entrusted with a universal moral mission never
before tried by man.

That mission was to be a model to the

world of democratic, self-government, of the equality of all
citizens and of individual opportunity.

45

At the center of the American model and the American
historical experience was an egalitarian ethic formed and
strengthened by economic abundance.
equal in the eyes of the law.

46

All men were declared

No man was assumed to be

restrained by status to any one station or livelihood.

47

Despite its patent implausibility, the American creed of
equality asserted the existence of a classless society, where
no one was better than anyone else and where merit was the
only recognized ground of distinction.

48

44

This section relies heavily on Heald and Kaplan,
Culture and Diplomacy, and Potter, People of Plenty.
45 Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4,* Potter,
People of Plenty, 128.
Potter, People of Plenty, 91-110.
47

It may be a useful caveat to note today, as John Stuart
Mill did in penning an appraisal of Tocqueville's Democracy
In America, I, xii, in 1835, that "in the American democracy,
the aristocracy of skin, and the aristocracy of sex, retain
their privileges."
48
Potter, People of Plenty, 97.
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The ideal of equality received sustenance from the
seemingly limitless abundance of a fertile land.

Abundance

offered the individual the opportunity to make his own place
in society and to emancipate himself from a system of status,
while the ideal of equality demanded that he try.

49

As the

promise of equality and the reality of abundance diminished
the real social differences and economic disparities that
separated the classes, Americans came to view the existence
of any class distinction or class stratification as doubly
unfair and discriminatory.

50

Having repudiated a status system,

Americans refused to recognize a society, even their own,
where individuals held assigned places.

49

Ibid., 91-92.

~^Ibid., 9 7-99, 103-105, 118. Potter argues that the
boundless American continent enabled Americans to fulfill
the promise of mobility, by which he means universal oppor
tunity to move through a socio-economic scale of many levels.
The promise of mobility is the companion to equality of
opportunity. Potter goes on to suggest that the quest for
equality of opportunity has exacted a heavy psychological
price for the physical comforts it bestows:
"By presenting
an unattainable ideal as if it were a reality, the mobility
drive has created damaging psychological tensions; by elim
inating class diversity without being able to abolish class
distinctions, abundance has only made subjective discrimin
ation more galling, while making objective differentials
less evident....Whereas the principle of status affirms that
a minor position may be worthy, the principle of mobility,
as Americans have construed it, regards such a station both
as the penalty for and the proof of personal failure....The
fierceness of the mobility race generates tensions too severe
for some people to bear, and fear of failure in this race
generates a sense of insecurity which is highly injurious."
Although Potter does not contend that a system of status is
preferable to a system of mobility, he would agree that
American democracy and the psychoanalyst were made for each
other.
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The egalitarian ethic gripped Americans early and exer
cised an immense influence on their attitudes.

Imbued with a

conviction that their nascent nation enjoyed a special destiny
in world history, Americans consciously rejected the models
and mores of the Old World.

Americans identified diplomacy,

as practiced by European nations, with the advancement of
special class interests at the expense of the masses, with
shifting alliances and the immoral balance of power politics,
with unnecessary wars, and with restrictive commercial rela51
tions among nations.
For the United States to fulfill
its special destiny— as a model of human equality— Americans
believed their nation must be divorced from any political
connection with the Old World.

To join other nations in the

management of international relations based upon the tradi
tional techniques of statecraft could only pollute the American
democratic mission.
America's early geographical isolation from the Old World
nurtured the nation's sense of ideological uniqueness.
Bounded by weak neighbors to the north and south, and "nothing
but fish to the east and west" the United States suffered few
challenges to its national purposes during the nineteenth
century.

53

In addition, no great war engulfed Europe from

1815 to 1914, while an increasingly friendly Great Britain

51

Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4-5.

52Ibid., 4-7.
53

Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 9.
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guarded the world's seas.

54

Largely unhampered by foreign

threats to their national security, Americans freely pursued
their "manifest destiny" of continental expansion across a
land of seemingly boundless abundance.
Geographical security and a creed of ideological
purity provided poor soil for the cultivation of a profes
sional diplomatic tradition.

Americans regarded foreign policy

more as an intrusion upon the domestic life of the nation
than an area requiring sustained attention.

Following the

signing of the Treaty of Ghent in 1914, the United States
rarely ventured abroad in the nineteenth century cloaked in
the vestments of traditional diplomacy.

Isolated ideologi

cally and geographically from the entangling intrigues of the
Old World, the United States largely eschewed active involve
ment in international politics.
Diplomacy was a marginal occupation, at best, in nine
teenth century America.

Betraying a minimal interest in

foreign political machinations, the United States neglected
to construct an institutional capacity for the conduct of
foreign policy.

The appurtenances of the foreign affairs

apparatus— the State Department and its offspring, the Diplo
matic and Consular Services— functioned largely independently
of one another and exhibited all the symptoms of atrophy.^
Always the neglected stepchild during the nineteenth century,

55

Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 6,

-2 2 -

the State Department, symbolically enough, occupied a former
orphan asylum for several years following the American Civil

Commerce and moralistic zeal were the principle instru
ments through which the United States approached foreign
relations.

With government encouragement, commercial enter

prises opened foreign ports to American products and exerted
efforts to break barriers to free trade, while missionaries
and other humanitarian groups journeyed abroad to proselytize
the heathen.

In the American mind, the interests of the

United States, in particular, and of humanity, in general, were
synonomous; business entrepreneurs and missionaries, not
diplomats, were the appropriate agents for securing these
interests.

57

God and the policy of the Open Door, not dxplomacy/

characterized United States involvement abroad.
IV
The creation of a professional Foreign Service in 1924
bespoke no abrupt departure in the American approach to world
56
Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 16.
57While disclaiming originality, Potter suggests that
Americans were correct in supposing that they "had a revolu
tionary message to offer" the world but were mistaken in their
concept of what that message was. It was not "democracy
revolutionizing the world," but "abundance revolutionizing
the world " — a message that was not preached or scarcely under
stood by Americans.
"It was not our ideal of democracy but
our export of goods and gadgets...which opened new vistas."
People of Plenty, 134-135.
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affairs.

58

Unification of the diplomatic and consular corps

into a single Service emanated more from a desire to protect
and promote commercial interests abroad than from a conscious
effort to construct an agency for the conduct of diplomacy.
Concurrently, the adoption of merit principles for admission
to the new Service aimed more at democratizing America's
overseas representation than in producing a special group of
trained diplomatic experts.
During the nineteenth century spoils politics had
dictated the appointment of nearly all diplomatic and consular
agents and had given the separate services a poor public
image.

Spoils politics was abhorrent to the egalitarian

sensibilities of Americans who recoiled at anything resemb
ling a process of selection based upon criteria other than
merit and equality of opportunity.

59

Spoils politics became

even more abhorrent as Americans, principally businessmen
and progressives, began to awaken, at the end of the nine
teenth century, to the need for competent representation
abroad to fulfill the dream of democratic-capitalism.
Particularly odious to American egalitarian sentiments
were the diplomats.

While men of lowly stature, however in

competent, could be found toiling in the consular offices

58

The development of the Foreign Service is sketched
more fully in Chapter 2, infra.
59
Cambon, The Diplomatist, 69-76; Kennan, "Foreign Policy
and the Professional Diplomat," 152; Potter, People of Plenty ,
91-92, 97-99, 101, 103, 105, 118.

-24-

abroad, only men of wealth could afford to accept a diplo
matic appointment to a European capital.

And these amateur

diplomats quickly adopted, or so it appeared, the aristo
cratic airs of the Old World elite.
Spoils politics, especially as it applied to the
Diplomatic Service, contradicted the ideal of equality of
individual opportunity.

60

In the public mind, the adoption

of merit criteria for selection to the new Foreign Service
in 1924 did not reflect a preference for the expert over the
amateur.

Instead, it mirrored a belief that all men— regard

less of wealth, family ties, or political connections--should
have the opportunity to compete equally for admission based
upon merit considerations alone.

Americans found the spoils

system repugnant not because it granted access to amateurs,
but because it failed to provide equal access to all amateurs.
j

I To open a career xn the Foreign Service to a

crossJ-secticn of competent, pragmatic citizens would enhance the
expojrt of both American products and the liberal-democratic
experience.

The new career-oriented citizen-diplomat would

represent the United States to the world, and he would ensure
that commercial and cultural expansion continued apace.

He

would also be a beacon of peaceful prosperity, since he would
■share with the masses in other countries a profound aversion

60

By virtue of their lowly status and function of pro
viding direct, tangible assistance to Americans, the consuls,
as compared to the diplomats, appeared to be more democratic.
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to war.

Only a few Americans, mostly among the diplomats

themselves, believed that the creation of the Foreign Service
would spur the development of a professional cadre of expert
diplomatists accepted and appreciated by the public.
The early career diplomats who helped create and shape;'
the Foreign Service shared many of the liberal-democratic
beliefs of their countrymen.

61

They advertised their contri

butions to the expansion of American trade; they held a
liberal-capitalist world view; and they espoused the belief
that trade relations should be conducted apart from interna
tional as well as domestic politics.

Far from being apolo

gists for European power politics, they subscribed to the
ideals of peace, prosperity, and harmony through free enterprise and the rule of law.

62

No less than their fellow

Americans, they desired to avoid dangerous political entangle
ments in international disputes.

Finally, they detested spoils

politics; they wanted to rescue American diplomacy from the
rich socialites and political amateurs who dominated the old
63
Diplomatic Service.
The career diplomats diverged, however, from the senti
ments of the general public in at least one important

61

De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 11-26.

62Ibid., 12, 16, 17, 19.
63Ibid., 12.
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respect.

64

'
.
In the eyes of the diplomats, the Foreign Service

should attract and recruit the "best” individuals in American
society.

The ideal diplomat should be representative, not

of the mainstream, but of the "best" in the country.

Writing

in 1922, Hugh Gibson, one of the first American career diplo
mats, elaborated:
We have no aristocracy in the United
States and don't want it. But we have a
lot of homes with 'tradition.1 Some of
them are simple homes— no butlers or
footmen— but where the boys 'go to col
lege'— the bills are paid— Sunday
observed, good books read, and where a
standard obtains in respect to private
life and publicggolicies....These are the
people we want.
The early careerists believed that diplomacy was a
proper calling for the traditionally prominent.

Many of the

early career diplomats were, themselves, descendants of oldline, Anglo-Saxon families with genteel traditions.

Imbued

with noblesse oblige, they thought that the members of their
64
Many early career diplomats also did not share the
view of their countrymen that American democracy should be
held up as a model for the world to emulate. They regarded
the American brand of democratic egalitarianism as comparable
— in its arrogance— bo the most virulent strain of elitism.
Hugh Gibson wrote: "If it is our aim to get the world organ
ized on the model of the United States, there is one course—
and only one— that holds out hope. If, as a preliminary, we
put our own house in order, develop a faultless and smoothly
working government, find a solution to labor and unemployment
problems, straighten out the tangled and tragic problems of
Negroes and sharecroppers and Okies and slums— if we do all
these things...,other nations may come to us...to show them
how they can do as much for themselves." Road to Foreign
Policy, 160.
65
Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 97.
American Ambassador, 97.

See also Heinrichs,
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class had an obligation to serve their country by conducting
its affairs abroad, and to do so with wisdom, honesty, and
public spirit.

"I can think of no task," Gibson stated,

"which would appeal" to a young gentleman "more than to use
his strength and wits to look after the interests of his
country in such a direct fashion" as diplomacy.

66

The career diplomats also believed that sound diplomacy
required qualities that were more apt to be found in men of
tradition than in a random assemblage of society.

Borrowed

from the precepts of diplomatic practice laid down by European
diplomatists, these qualities or virtues included: "Truthful
ness" in taking scrupulous care to avoid the suggestion of
the false or the suppression of the true; "precision" in not
merely intellectual accuracy, but in moral accuracy as well;
/

"calmness" in the sense of even-temperedness'and exceptional
patience; "modesty" in the sense of avoiding the dangers of
vanity; and "loyalty" to one's government in telling his
sovereign what he ought to know, not simply what he would
like to hear.

That the ideal diplomatist should also possess

"intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality,
67
charm, industry, courage, and even tact" was assumed.
Taken
together, these qualities distinguished the professional
diplomatist from the amateur.
^Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 97.
67
These qualities are taken from Nicolson, Diplomacy,
55-67, who catalogues and elaborates upon the attributes of
the ideal diplomat that have evolved over time. See also
Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 25, 232, 262.
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To the senior careerists in the Foreign Service not
just anyone could master the qualities required of the professional diplomat.

68

Nor could the experience neccesary to

their acquisition be obtained within the boundaries of the
United States alone.

"Diplomacy is primarily a matter of

understanding and experience," one of the careerists noted.
"It distinctly is not a matter of learning.
diplomacy."

You cannot teach

While "you can teach many things it is useful

for a diplomat to know," it "does not make a diplomatist."

69

In addition to the "natural" qualifications the would-be
diplomat should possess, diplomacy required of its practi
tioner a long apprenticeship in the world abroad.^
Under the guidance of the senior diplomats, the Foreign
Service, while opening its doors to a broader socio-economic
cross-section of applicants than its spoils-ridden nine
teenth-century predecessor, retained an exclusive character that
separated it from the American mainstream.

In addition to

learning the practice of diplomacy through training and
68

Within the Foreign Service, a debate ensued over
whether the profession would be marked by "generalists," who
stressed intuition and sound judgement, or by "experts," who
relied more upon objective analysis. Whether expert or
generalist, however, the careerists agreed that certain
qualities did distinguish the professional from the amateur.
De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 15; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 55;
Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 152.
69

Hugh Gibson, March 2, 1938, extracts from a manual
on diplomacy, Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 26.
70

Thayer, Diplomat, 248.
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experience, younger officers were advised to follow correct
diplomatic style, and to emulate the standards of established
European practitioners.

In order to deal effectively with

their sophisticated foreign counterparts, they were expected
to present a proper and courteous appearance, maintain a
proper command of language, and observe the varieties of
diplomatic etiquette.

71

To the initiated, the statesmanlike

demeanor of the ideal diplomat reflected the inward virtues
of suspended judgement, skeptical tolerance, and passionless
detachment necessary for the sound conduct of diplomacy.

72

In short,the young diplomatist was expected to possess and
cultivate a sense of the world that almost naturally separated
him, in appearance at least, from the bulk of his countrymen
who remained at home."^
V
The American public never embraced the Foreign Service.
For most of its history, the United States had scant need,
little use, and no desire to employ traditional techniques
of statecraft abroad.

The United States "preferred to play

its role as a culture, not as a power, in the world arena."

74
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' De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 20.
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Nicolson, Diplomacy, 62; Villard, Affairs at
73
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State, 7.

Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 574.

Franklin Ninkovich, "Ideology, the Open Door, and For
eign Policy," Diplomatic History, 6 (Spring 1982), 190. The
quotation is from Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: Interna
tional Relations as Intercultural Relations," Diplomatic
History, 3 (Spring 1979), 120.
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To most Americans, diplomacy remained, at best, "a disagreeable necessity."

75

To the extent that career diplomats were

to be regarded as more than useless social ornaments, they
were expected to emulate their consular brethren in assisting
American commercial enterprises abroad.
Filtered through the prism of the American democratic
experience, the diplomatic officer reflected an image that
was offensive to the egalitarian temper.

Where the career

officer saw virtue in the demeanor of the diplomatist, "the
average American" saw "an immaculately dressed being..., a
coldly severe and superior manner," a snobbish and conceited
elitist.

77

Where the diplomats saw in the Foreign Service a

professional organization dedicated to the public interest,
the public saw a refuge for the privileged.

78

By his example,

75

k
Heinrichs,' American
Ambassador,
\\
.....
..
. . . . .. ,■ ' v n .
I
76 .
Nicolson notes that, while U.S. diplomats are expected
to assist private American commercial interests, during the
nineteenth century "a British diplomatist would have felt
sullied were he to engage in pushing the material require-!
ments of his nationals." Diplomacy, 89. Rhetoric to:the
contrary, many early American career diplomats ffelt similarly.
See Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 103.
I

j
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General Joseph W. Stilwell noted this popular charac
terization of the diplomat, which he did not share1, in his
diary on December 7, 1943, while attending the Cairo Confer
ence. Theodore H. White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (N.Y.: W.
Sloan Associates, 1948), 256.
78

Referring to diplomatic services in all Western demo
cracies in the 1930s, Nicolson noted that, while statesmen
must be able to call upon the services of a thoroughly exper
ienced staff, the "staff must also be democratized and must
cease to be generally, although to some extent inaccurately,
regarded as the preserve of the upper bourgeoise." Diplomacy,
53.
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the career diplomat suggested that some individuals were more
"naturally" suitable for some occupations, a notion that was
reprehensible to the egalitarian passions of the American
79
people.
By popular egalitarian standards, the diplomatist
was undemocratic and, hence, unrepresentative of American
society.
Indictment of the diplomatist as undemocratic and
unAmerican has found consistent expression in the
Congress.

In

June

1957,

for example, ten members of

the United States House of Representatives— five Republicans
and

five

Democrats— introduced a resolution urging the

State Department to vigorously pursue the recruitment of
candidates throughout the American heartland.

80

According to

its author, Representative Leo W. O'Brien of Albany, New
York, the purpose of the resolution was "to provide a massive
transfusion of Main Street into the arteries of the U.S.
..81
Foreign Service.
Several congressmen engaged in a colloquy on the House
floor to elaborate on the reasons for the resolution.

"We

are now in an era of business-suit diplomacy," Representative

79

Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat,"
152. See also Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making
in Defense and Foreign Affairs (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1971), 45.
80

U.S. Congress, House 85th Cong., 1st sess., April 8,
1957, Congressional Record, CIII, 5301.
81

O'Brien made this statement during a floor speech two
years after introducing the resolution. July 21, 1959,
Congressional Record, CV, 13897.
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O'Brien began, but unfortunately our diplomats "are still
operating" on the "theory that if you can dangle a teacup
in the propper manner...you have an edge on the fellow who
mishandles" it.
excellent people.

Occasionally, he continued,

"we get some

I have in mind...John Peurifoy....His

first job had a civil-service rating of laborer."

In the

present Foreign Service, O'Brien went on, "we have too many
people...speaking the language of a special class of society
and not the language of a cross-section of the American
i

people.

..8 2

Others echoed him.

Representative Ed Edmondson of

Oklahoma pleaded that "if we are going to reach the hearts
and minds of other people throughout the world " we must
recruit the most representative examples of the American
83
people "as members of the diplomatic corps."
Still other
congressmen asserted that the resolution would drop "the
silken curtain" that separates American youth from careers
in the Foreign Service; would provide the "means for the
Federal Government to do as good a

job as business... in

providing... good will ambassadors for the United States " ;
would accord our "youth an equal opportunity" to become
\

diplomats; and would bring "about a new state of democracy"
82

Ibid., 13898 and 13900, wherein O'Brien states: "You
know, they say in this country, and it is an old saying, that
every mother can look in the cradle and see a future Presi
dent....! think all of us will agree that if the same mother
looks in the same cradle seeking a future ambassador, she
would have to be using trifocals."
83Ibid., 13901.
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in the diplomatic service.**4
Congresses of past and present eras expressed similar
concerns.

85

Fearing that American agents would become contam

inated and corrupted by European values, the Continental
Congress ruled that diplomats should remain abroad no more
than three consecutive years. 8 6 Two hundred years later, in
1976, Congress enacted legislation creating the "Assignment
America" program.

Under the program, Foreign Service offi

cers would receive year-long assignments "working with
American state and local governments and schools in an
effort to give" the diplomats "a better feel for the country
they represent."

One of the first states to receive a

diplomat was Georgia, where officials in the governor's
office believed that a career officer "would be helpful" in
84 Representatives O'Brien, John J. Rhodes of Arizona,
and Barratt O'Hara of Illinois, respectively.
Ibid., 13899,
13900, 13901.
85
Nearly every congressional effort to reorganize the
Foreign Service has included provisions aimed at "reAmericanizing" the diplomats. For instance, the Foreign Service Act
of 1946 required every officer to spend at least 3 years
of his first 15 in the United States. Harold Stein, "The
Foreign Service Act of 1946," in Stein, ed., Public Adminis
tration and Policy Development (N.Y. : Harcourt, Brace, 1952),
661-737.
See also Wriston, Diplomacy in a Democracy, 38; Zara
S. Steiner, The State Department and the Foreign Service: The
Wriston Report— Four Years Later (Princeton: Princeton Univer
sity, Center of International Studies, 1958), 20-21.
O
Donald P. Warwick, A Theory of Public Bureaucracy:
Politics, Personalities, and Organization in the State Depart
ment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 13. Like
similar provisions advanced in more recent times, the rule of
the Continental Congress proved impossible to enforce because
of personnel shortages, exigencies of war, and other reasons.

a
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aiding "Georgia businessmen in preparing for missions abroad
to attract foreign trade and investment."

87

VI
The popular stereotype of the diplomatist ha£. endured
with great resilience.

Today, critics inside and outside

government characterize the typical career officer as dull,
routinized and antiquated, possessing an air of superiority
and self-importance, and engaging in undisclosed bureaucratic
chores until the next round of evening parties begins.

88

Contemporary criticisms of the diplomatic establishment reflect,
in part, a modern malaise generally with the societal drift
toward large, impersonal and seemingly unresponsive bureaucratic organizations.

89

Although modern criticisms of the

diplomatist center more upon institutional debilities than
upon individual appearances and attributes, the tension that
permeates, and occasionally disrupts, the compatibility of
professional diplomacy with democracy in the United States
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Independent Record [Helena, Montana], March 11, 1976,
The story is from an Associated Press report.
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For example, see John K. Galbraith, Ambassador1s
Journal; A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (Boston;
Houghton Mifflin, 1969) , 211-212; Etzold, Conduct of Policy,
115, who quotes Galbraith's testimony before a congressional
committee in June 1972.
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Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 16-21. Many career diplo
mats, themselves, bemoan the unwieldly size, apparent inertia
and inflexibility of the modern foreign affairs machinery, as
well as the fragmentation of responsibility for the conduct of
foreign relations that has accompanied the proliferation of
agencies dealing with foreign policy since World War II.
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lays deeply embedded in the nation's culture.
Among modern United States political leaders, none
embraced the popular image of the diplomatist more fully than
President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

By birth, background and

temperment, Roosevelt was as aristocratic as any career
90
diplomat.
He regarded the career diplomats, nonetheless,
as frivolous dilettantes, out of touch with the pulse of the
American public.

As President, he displayed almost contemp-

tuos indifference toward the Foreign Service.
Endowed with an abundance of self-confidence— reflected
in his ever-present, engaging smile— and conscious of his own
superiority, FDR espoused the egalitarian ideals of his
countrymen as only a man assured of his own place and status
could.

91

He taught the people that his rhetoric was their

90FDR's background, is well known. That neither presidents
nor congressmen, themselves, have reflected, in the aggregate,
anything approaching a cross-section of the American citizenry
does not seem to have affected their views on egalitarianism
and diplomats. Like the Foreign Service officers they some
times ridicule, elected officials come to their positions from
a narrow socio-economic base of the populace. See William J.
Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process;
Congress and the States (4th ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1977), 123-127.
91

In an excellent essay on FDR, Theodore A. Wilson and
Richard D. McKinzie write: "The screens...Roosevelt erected
around his motives have proved remarkably durable....Obviously,
in common with his generation and class, he held convictions
about the nature of American society..., however, these be
liefs did not comprise a rigid, all-encompassing definition of
the limits within which he functioned."
"The Masks of Power:
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Conduct of American Diplomacy,"
in Frank J. Merli and Wilson, eds., Makers of.American Diplo
macy: From Benjamin Franklin to Henry Kissinger (N.Y.: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1974), 462.

-36-

opinion and that their opinion was the foundation of his pol92
icies.
Like his fellow Americans, he judged others by the
egalitarian standards he viewed as the hallmark of the public
will, and he found the seemingly unconcealed aloofness of the
diplomats wanting.
Roosevelt also enjoyed a heightened sense of his own
diplomatic abilities and a belief in American exceptionalism as
embodied in her economic abundance.

If he could only meet

face-to-face with this or that foreign leader, he often stated,
he could resolve whatever differences separated them.

93

If he

could place but one American book in the hands of every Russian,
he reportedly asserted, "his choice would be a Sears, Roebuck
'94
catalogue."
Bounded by the dictates of his own character and the
assumptions of the American experience, FDR found little of
value in professional diplomacy.

Whether he would have to

contend with a professional diplomatic corps, however, remained

92
Potter states that FDR did more to give men a sense of
status than any President since Lincoln. He then quotes Justice
William 0. Douglas on FDR: "He was in a very special sense the
people's President because he made them feel that with him in
the White House they shared the Presidency." People of Plenty, 105.
93 For example, see Richard S. Harrison, "A Presidential
Demarche: Franklin D. Roosevelt's Personal Diplomacy and Great
Britain, 1937-1938," Diplomatic History, 5 (Summer 1981), 249.
94

Potter, People of Plenty, 80. Also see pp. 120-121,
wherein Potter states that one of FDR's "most irritating and
successful qualities was his habit of assuming that benefits
could be granted without costs being felt— an assumption rooted
in his faith in the potentialities of the American economy."
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problematic well into the beginning of the
Only very slowly and hesitatingly

twentieth

century.

did the United States

even consider developing a professional diplomatic capability.

Nation* must fitly upon the
quality oh their diplomacy
to act a* a catalyst ion. the
dliicn.cnt {actors that consti
tute their p o w e r . ...thereho re
It Is o f the utmost Importance
that the good quality oh the
diplomatic service be con stan t.
And constant quality Is best
assured by dependence upon
tradition and Institutions
rather than upon the sporadic
appearance oh outstanding
Individuals.

Hans J . Morgenthau-*The diplomatic service Is not
what It should be, principally
hor the reason that It does
not attract to It the best
young men oh the country....
there does not appear to be
suhflelent career to justlhy
a man oh ambition to enter It.

William Phillips2

2
THE BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE:
BUILDING PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY AMID PUBLIC DISTRUST
The United States Foreign Service evolved along a slow
and meandering path.^

Befitting a nation ideologically and

geographically isolated from the outside world, the United
^Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace (2d ed.; N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954) , 131.
To Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, May 8,
1922, Warren F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the
United States, 1779-19 39: A Study in Administrative
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 162.
3
There are several solid treatments of the development
of the Foreign Service, most of which build upon Ilchman's
fine treatment cited above. The best are: Thomas H. Etzold,
-38-

-39-

States devoted little attention to its foreign affairs
machinery during the nineteenth century.

Infested with an

assortment of political appointees and temporary adventurers,
the foreign affairs apparatus lacked stability, tradition,
and any semblance of institutional coherence.

Toward the

end of the nineteenth century, the expansion of American
world interests illuminated serious deficiencies in the
patronage-ridden Diplomatic and Consular Services and kindled
a movement to overhaul the structure of United States
representation abroad.

During the next three decades,

reformers of various hues worked to construct a permanent,
career foreign service immune from partisan political
influence.
Public distrust and suspicion of diplomacy and diplo
mats lurked prominently in the shadows o\f the forelign
service reform movement.

The primary impetus of the reform

The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: ) The Othep Side of
Diplomacy (N.Y.: New Viewpoints, 1977) ; Waldo H. Hifeinrichs,
Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of
American Career Diplomacy," in John Braeman, et./al., eds.,
Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio
State University Press, 1971), 119-206; Heinrichs, American
Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the
United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown,
1966); Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the
Diplomatic Mind: The Training/"Outlook and Style of United
States Foreign Service Officers, 1908-19 31 (Middletown:
Wesleyan University Press, 19 75); Richard Hume Werking, The
Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign
Service, 1890-1913 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1977) .
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movement derived from concerns to promote American commercial
opportunities abroad, not from concerns to improve the
conduct of United States foreign policy.

Economic wealth,

not diplomacy, served as the catalyst for the application
of American power.

In the American mind, however hazy,

diplomats were useless and irrelevant; the use of diplomacy
forebode only ill results for the country.
Except for diplomats and State Department officials,
few reformers believed that a modern, efficient diplomatic
service was necessary or even particularly useful.

4

The

success of the reform movement in creating a foreign service
capable of employing professional, diplomatic methods
occurred incidentally to the larger purpose of improving
the climate for American businesses overseas.

The success

of the reform movement did not portend public and political
acceptance of the traditional practice of diplomacy.
The reform movement, nevertheless, proved beneficial
to the building of a professional diplomatic capability.
In the years between 1924 and 19 33, the Foreign Service
began to develop into a stable, coherent and capable
organization.
4

If and when American statesmen chose to

Werkmg, Master Architects, 239-240.
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engage in diplomacy, some able career diplomatists were
available to assist them.

5

I
The United States foreign affairs establishment of
the late nineteenth century functioned in a state of serene
disarray.

Largely unaltered since the administration

of George Washington, the foreign affairs apparatus consisted
of three disjointed entities.

The largest branch, the

Consular Service, whose agents served in major foreign
cities, especially seaports, performed primarily administra
tive tasks, issuing visas and passports and assisting
Americans engaged in international commerce.

Operating

in a more amorphous realm, members of the Diplomatic
Service resided in the capitals of foreign nations,
reporting on foreign political developments and representing
the United States in its dealings with the highest levels
of foreign governments.

The third branch, the State

Department, theoretically directed the activities of the
^Robert H. Ferrell states:
"One has only to make a
list of a few of the leading diplomatic representatives of
the United States during the Depression to observe the
general level of excellence." American Diplomacy in the
Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933
(M.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1970. Originally published in
1957), 281.
6

The Consular Service had undergone a few minor adjust
ments as the result of congressional action.
See Werking,
Master Architects, 1-7.
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other two.

In reality, each branch operated independently

of the others.
The foreign affairs apparatus lacked any semblance of
a stable, unified institution.

Although most State Depart

ment employees enjoyed the protection of civil service
regulations, patronage riddled the separate Consular and
Diplomatic Services.

7

Capricious shifts in American

political winds regularly propelled new consular agents
and diplomatic envoys into foreign posts.

In his first

year in office, President William McKinley, for example,
replaced 238 of the 272 consuls appointed by his Democratic
predecessor.®
Appointments were made to particular posts, not to a
service.

Even when good men received appointments, as

occasionally they did, no incentive existed for them to
perform in a more than a routine fashion.

g

None of the

requisite scaffolding existed for erecting a capable,
7
8

Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 120.

Katharine Crane, Mr. Carr of State: Forty-Seven Years
in the State Department (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1960),
55-56; Werking, Master Architects, 9-10.
9
Werking, Master Architects, 9-11. See also Heinrichs,
"Bureaucracy," 127.
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permanent organization for the conduct of foreign relations—
no provisions for selection or promotion by merit, no
uniform salary plan, no training program, no retirement
program.
The foreign services suffered from benign neglect.
Graft and corruption characterized the normal course of
business in United States consular offices.

Consuls

profited, sometimes handsomely, from the unofficial fees
they extracted for a variety of services, fees

that often

far exceeded their niggardly, official salaries.

Not until

1896, more than a century after its inception, was the
Consular Service's overseas operation subjected to an
inspection by the Consular Bureau in Washington, D . C . ^
Diplomatic envoys, who of necessity were men of private
means and who occupied positions less accessible to petty
graft than their consular brethern, also found little
consolation in their work.

With little in the way of

"affairs of state" to distract them, they reveled in the
elegant and regal atmosphere of nineteenth-century
diplomatic society, and engaged in a myriad of leisurely
<4. 11
pursuits.

■^Werking, Master Architects, 3-5.
•^Ibid., 121; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 24-26; Ilchnan,
Professional Diplomacy, 15, 76.
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Americans.had earlier relegated diplomatic business
to a position of low priority.

Although the world's great

powers had begun to view the United States as another
world power by the late 1880s, the United States had not
yet begun to think of itself as one.

7 As

1

of 1893, the

United States had no ambassadors, forty ministers of
legation, and less than eighty State Department employees
who managed foreign affairs. 13

International relations,

Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge reflected in 1889, occupy
"but a slight place in American politics and excite only
languid interest."14
II
The idea that the United States should develop a
professional arm for the performance of consular and diplo12

Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy; The Emergence of
America as a Great Power (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 19 73. First
published in 1961), 5-6. Historians long have debated
when the United States became a world power. For example,
see Thomas A. Bailey, "America's Emergence as a World
Power: The Myth and the Verity," Pacific Historical Review,
30 (February 1961), 1-16; Raymond A. Esthus, "Isolationism
and World Power," Diplomatic History, 2 (Spring 1978), 117132.
13
Crane, Mr. Carr, 21; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 121.
14Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 23.
also May, Imperial Democracy, 11.

See
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matic functions germinated under the pressure of expanding
American world interests near the close of the nineteenth
century.

Seldom isolationist in the realm of international

commerce, American overseas trade and investments burgeoned
in the 1880s and 1890s.

By 1899 the United States held

sway as the world's leading industrial nation, exporting
more than it imported, while American corporations increased
15
their capital investments overseas at a phenomenal rate.
Combined with the Spanish-American War, the acquisition of
colonial possessions, and a generally renascent American
assertiveness, this expansionist fervor brought into sharp
relief the inadequacies of United States representation
abroad.
The presence of a large number of unfit, rum-soaked,
tobacco-chewing consuls— uncovered during the inspection
of 1896— threatened to inhibit the expansion of American
commercial interests overseas. 16

Similarly, the "constant

15
See Warren I. Cohen, America's Response
to China: An Interpretive History or sino-American Relations
(N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), 46; Walter LaFeber, The New
Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 196 3), 8-10; J. Carroll
Moody, "The Transformation of the American Economy, 18771900," in William H. Cartwright and Richard L. Watson, Jr.,
eds., The Reinterpretation of American History and Culture
(Washington, D.C.; National Council for the Social Studies,
1973), 401-424; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 131.
i6Werking, Master Architects, 3-4, 14.
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succession of temporary amateurs," who paraded as diplomatic
secretaries and ministers, placed the United States at a
disadvantage when dealing with the professional diplomats
of foreign nations.^

At a time when the United States

was emerging as a world economic power, the pathetic state
of United States representation abroad only seemed to
diminish American prestige.
The need for reform of the foreign services soon
became widely recognized.

Businessmen, progressives, civic

reformers, and government officials— including consuls and
diplomats— criticized "the system," especially the practice
of rewarding "broken down politicians," "failures in
American life," and sons of wealthy political patriarchs
18
with consulates and diplomatic missions.
The systematic
use off patronage, the reformers reasoned, posed the greatest
obstacle to the recruitment and retention of competent
officers.

"The system" discouraged good men from even

entertaining the idea of foreign service.
-

the

I
Reformers

The solution,

postulated, lay in the creation of a career

17 Ibid., 15. The phrase is quoted from Harold Nicolsoq,
Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 196 3. Originally
published in 1939), 120.
18
Werking, Master Architects, 4-12. See also Jerry
Israel, "A Diplomatic Machine: Scientific Management in the
Department of State, 1906-1924," in Israel, ed., Building
the Organizational Society: Essays on Associational Activi
ties in Modern America (N. Y.:
Free Press, 1972), 183-196.
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service in which recruitment, tenure, and promotion would
rest upon merit, not politics. 19
Reform of the Consular Service commanded the greatest
attention.

Unlike the diplomatic corps, the Consular

Service enjoyed a natural and powerful constituency— the
American business community.

Much of the pressure to

remodel United States representation abroad stemmed from
business concern for trade expansion.

Businesses required

timely and accurate information on commercial opportunities
to protect and promote their overseas interests.

Because

of the tangible services the Consular Service rendered,
businessmen and reformers, alike, recognized the concrete
benefits that would accrue from a revitalized consular corps.?®
Consular Service reform also conformed well with the
main currents in American Society.

The rapid industrializa

tion of the American economy at the end of the nineteenth
and the beginning of the twentieth centuries fostered a
fundamental restructuring of society along bureaucratic
lines.

"Organization," "businesslike efficiency," "specialir

^Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 86-90;
Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 128.
20Crane, Mr. Carr, 98, 104, 176-179; Heinrichs, "Bureau
cracy," 154-155, 159, 164, 171; Ilchman, Professional Diplo
macy, 77-86; Werking, Master Architects, 20-48.

zation," and "scientific management," the man-like-machine
concept of the industrial workplace, were the shibboleths
of the day.

The Consular Service— with its emphasis on the

performance of routine administrative tasks and clearly
delineated functions— was a natural target for reform along
the bureaucratic pattern of organization. 21
Reform of the Consular Service also enjoyed popular
support.

The layman, nurtured on the ethics of the dominant

business culture, easily comprehended the work of the Consular
Service.

Consuls engaged in visibly productive tasks.

Consuls, much more than diplomats, dealt with Americans
residing and traveling abroad, assisting them with visas
and various other conveniences.

Although many people

questioned the fitness of consular agents, few could
question their usefulness.

22

Reform of the Diplomatic Service engendered much less
enthusiasm.

Consistent with the ideological and geographical

isolation of the United States, most Americans understood
little about the responsibilities of diplomats and cared
even less.

To most Americans, diplomacy was an abstract and

21

Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 122-123; Israel, "Diplomatic
Machine," 185-187.
22

Schulzmger, Diplomatic Mind, 5; Werking, Master Archi
tects , 121-125; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 128-131.
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rayster ious business that yielded few, if any,
results.

tangible

The functions of diplomats mystified even intelli-

gent, well-read citizens.

22

The art of negotiation— the

primary and distinguishing feature of diplomacy— seemingly
had not been needed to insure United States security and
well-being.

Technological genius and military prowess,

not skill at the negotiating table, appeared to have been
more than adequate to secure the interests of the nation.

24

Diplomatic reform also faced a deeply entrenched public
antipathy towards diplomacy and diplomats.

Americans not

only found the nature of diplomacy difficult to comprehend;
many "associated diplomacy with monarchy, aristocracy,
25
intrigue, duplicity, and war."
That most American diplo
mats, like their European counterparts, were b o m into
society's upper classes and appeared to regale in the
"fantastical grandeur of diplomatic society," only reinforced
popular distaBte and suspicion toward diplomacy.

26

The

elitist class origins of American diplomats clashed with the
20

Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 124; Werking, Master Archi
tects , 37, 122. See also Murat W. Williams, "Life in the
Diplomatic Service, 1939-1962," American Oxonian (July 1962),

171.
24
25

Werking, Master Architects, 14.
Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 139.

26Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 24-26.
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democratic eqalitarian ethic; the serene elegance of their
working environment clashed with the American work ethic.
By comparison, consuls came from predominantly middleclass backgrounds and worked under conditions of uninspired
27
drudgery. Consequently, consuls suffered little of the
public opprobrium encountered by diplomats.

When Americans

thought about diplomats at all, they usually thought about
the parasites of society; they questioned their fitness and
their usefulness.
Reform of the Diplomatic Service appeared to offer no
positive benefit.

American diplomats performed no visibly

productive tasks; they engaged primarily in the monitoring
of political relations among nations.

The American public

and their elected representatives revealed little enthusiasm
for exercising power through the vehicle of diplomacy.
Debate over the efficacy of United States foreign policy
was confined largely to diplomats and academics.

28

Commerce, not diplomacy, typified American involvement
abroad.

Better to leave the Diplomatic Service alone than

to beget an organization that might involve the United
States in foreign machinations.
^"^Werking, Master Architects, 14, 121.
2®Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 22-23.
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Reform of the Diplomatic Service, nevertheless, had
its advocates.

Among the most prominent were the diplomats

themselves, particularly the young men who entered the
Diplomatic Service in the early 1900s.

They included such

future career diplomats as Hugh Gibson, Joseph C. Grew, and
William Phillips.

Like many of their colleagues, these

men joined the diplomatic corps for reasons that held only
a peripheral relationship to diplomacy— to travel, to acquire
educations, to avoid careers in more mundane occupations.

29

Unlike many of their colleagues, particularly the chiefs-ofmission under whom they served, they were not strictly
political patronage appointees.

They served initially as

diplomatic secretaries and clerks, and many received no
compensation from the government.

They came from well-to-do,

old-stock, Anglo-Saxon American families.

Born to privilege,

they possessed a sense of noblesse oblige, a belief that
they were the guardians of American traditions in public
life.

Unlike many political appointees who entered the

Diplomatic Service during that era, these men "vowed to
improve the prestige and effectiveness of their Service."30
?Q

Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 14, 76; Schulzinger,
Diplomatic Mind, 2-4, 15-16, 2 0; Etzold, Conduct of Policy,
. In their memoirs, many diplomats admit, as Hugh
Wilson did, that "ease and a measure of education had
encouraged us to believe that life should have a wider scope
than business alone could offer." Education of a Diplomat
(N.Y.: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938), 4.

24-Zb

30

Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 4.

-52-

In search of support the diplomatic reformers adopted
the arguments of the proponents of consular reform.
Confronted with a poor public image, the diplomats contended
that they, no less than consuls, did and could assist
American business interests abroad.

Only occasionally

did the diplomats attempt to explain publicly the subtleties
of diplomatic practice, of the need for a "certain type of
expert" capable of engaging in the complicated business of
international relations.

31

Perhaps they could not or dared not.

The United States

lacked a tradition favorable to public acceptance of the
tenets of professional diplomacy.

Moreover, diplomacy

belied precise definition; unlike law or medicine, diplo
matic practice required no specialized or technically
\
32
'
sophisticated intellectual training.
And many pf the

A
j
i

career diplomats who entered the diplomatic corps in the
early 1900s believed that the public was too unsophisticated
to appreciate the une certaine habitude du monde bf the
diplomatist.

33

•
'

I

/

31Ibid., 5, 125, 133-134, 140.
J Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 124.
■^Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 6-11; Werking, Master
Architects, 122.
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The diplomats proposed, instead, to "hitchhike" on
the consular reform movement. 34

They focused their arguments

for diplomatic reform on the need to place "the entire
diplomatic system on a business basis," on the assistance
that diplomats did and could provide to trade expansion. 35
The diplomats

found allies in the Consular Service

and in the State Department.

The diplomats wanted the

career status and benefits they saw the reformers advocating
for the consuls.

Elite, wealthy, and privileged men, the

diplomats lacked only legislative protection to insure
that "their" kind remained responsible for American foreign
policy.

The consuls, on the other hand, "coveted the easy

social grace of the diplomats" and the status accorded
36
them m foreign lands.
Consuls and diplomats each wanted something the other
possessed.

Both wanted secure job tenure and public recog

nition as professionals.

State Department officials, in

turn, wanted to achieve some administrative coordination
and control over the disjointed and isolated foreign
34

Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 141.

^Israel,

"Diplomatic Machine," 186.

Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 131. See also Etzold,
Conduct of Policy, 2 7; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 5.
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services.

All of them sought the creation of a permanent

career service as a means to attain their goals.

All of

them courted business interests and progressive reformminded groups for support

.^
III

Early attempts to reform the foreign services achieved
only mixed success.

Reformers directed their efforts

toward the enactment of legislation that would accomplish
for the foreign services what the Pendleton Act of 1883
38
accomplished for the Federal Civil Service.
In 1906 the
Consular Service underwent a substantial reorganization as
the result of the passage of the Lodge Act by Congress.
The Lodge Act provided the cornerstones for a modern
consular corps, but left untouched the patronage system of
appointment. 39

In the ensuing years, the work of Wilbur J.

Carr, the chief of the Consular Bureau and "the architect
of the m o d e m Foreign Service," in conjunction with the
support of the executive and legislative branches and the
business community, established firm precedent for admini^Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 132.
38
The Pendleton Act introduced merit principles into
federal employment, in part, in reaction to the scandals of
the Grant administration.
39

Crane, Mr. Carr, 77-86; Ilchman, Professional Diplo
macy , 56-64; Werking, Master Architects, 89-103.
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stering the Consular Service on the basis of merit
. . ,
40
principles.
Efforts to reform the Diplomatic Service lagged behind.
A series of executive orders promulgated in 1905 by
Theodore Roosevelt and in 1909 by William Howard Taft
established the principle of qualification for diplomatic
service based upon examination and granted civil service
status to diplomats below the rank of minister.

41

The

appointment of ambassadors and ministers— the most valued
positions in the Diplomatic Service— were exempt, left to
the vagaries of politics.

These executive orders, moreover,

served primarily as expressions of worthy intention:

They

neither bound succeeding administrations nor forecast the
end.of political considerations for appointment.

42

Career-oriented diplomats possessed no assurance that
merit and experience would be rewarded.

When Woodrow

Wilson became President in 1912, he dismissed 37 of the 41
veteran chiefs-of-mission who had served under Taft.

Of

the first 51 individuals appointed by Wilson to head diplo40

Werking, Master Architects, 89-120, 219-238.

41

These executive orders affected the Consular Service
similarly.
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 89, 116-118.
^ Tb'id., 118-119; Werking, Master Architects, 59.
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matic missions, only four possessed any prior diplomatic
experience.

43

At the onset of World War I, the entire

course of foreign service reform, particularly diplomatic
reform, hinged precariously upon presidential design.
Reform of the foreign affairs machinery commanded wide
support after World War I.

Prior to the war, from 1906 to

1915, the United States— then recovered from the convulsions
resulting from the Depression of 1893 and experiencing a
deacceleration in trade expansion— retreated to domestic
concerns.

During the war, the demands and responsibilities
44
placed upon the foreign services increased dramatically.
With the war's end, these activities showed no signs of
diminishing.
The United States emerged from the war as the world's
predominant economic power.

The war saw the role of the

United States in the world economy shift from that of a
43

Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 31; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy,"
138. For a thorough evaluation of Wilson's amateur chiefsof-mission, see Martin V. Melosi, "Amateur Diplomats During
the Administrations of Woodrow Wilson: An Evaluation"
(unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Montana, 1971).
44

Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 132, 172-173;
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 50^ 59; William Barnes and
John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States:
Origins, Development and Functions (Washington, DC.: Histori
cal Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State,
1961), 188-189, 195-196, 203.
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A K

debtor to that of a creditor nation. J

Whether the United

States wanted to exercise political power commensurate with
its economic status— and it was not so inclined— it had
acquired a preponderant influence in world affairs.

Under

these circumstances, Americans demonstrated a heightened
interest in foreign service reform.
Proponents of reform now lobbied vigorously for a
sweeping reorganization of the foreign services.

The

campaign for amalgamation of the separate services, for
increased salaries, for tenure, and, in short, for all of
the features of a career system gained wide currency. 46
°
At no point in American history was the time more propitious
for a revamping of the foreign affairs apparatus.
Diplomats and consuls capitalized upon nearly every
opportunity to encourage reform sentiment.
to gain.

They had much

They were, in a sense, their own best constituency.

In the years following World War I, they courted interestgroup support, enlisted chief spokesmen— principally Wilbur
Carr, Hugh Gibson, and Secretary of State Charles Evans
45 For the first time, American nationals had more
capital invested in foreign lands and received more income
from those investments than foreigners had investments in,
and income from, the United States. Barnes and Morgan,
Foreign Service, 203.
46Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 31; Ilchman, Professional
Diplomacy, 4.
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Hughes— to plead their case before congressional committees,
and, in the classical fashion of bureaucratic operatives,
47
they ingratiated themselves with powerful legislators.
In 1919

one congressman, John Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts,

began to introduce bills annually to improve the foreign
service, bills drafted largely by Carr and his consular
48
associates.
The pressures for reform had become almost
irresistible.
In 1924

Congress responded to the demands for reform

by passing the Rogers Act.

Named for its chief sponsor,

John Jacob Rogers, who is often called "the father of the
modern American Foreign Service," the Rogers Act was the
"most notable legislation ever to affect the organization
of American foreign relations."

49

The Rogers Act combined

the Consular and Diplomatic Services into a single, unified
Foreign Service, established competitive entrance examinations,
provided for appointment and promotion on the basis of
merit, and legislated numerous other provisions designed
47
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 65, 69, 81, 115; Werking,
Master Architects, 234; Etzold, Conduct of Diplomacy, 31-33.
^Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 154-155, 159, 164, 171;
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 152, 157, 173-174, 179, 211;
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 212-213; Crane, Mr. Carr,
257-258.
49
Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 35. Others share Etzold's
view of the Rogers Act. See Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy,
184; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 205.
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to create an attractive career in foreign affairs.

50

The

concept of career diplomacy/ spawned in the last years of
the nineteenth century, had become a reality.

The founda

tion for constructing an institutionalized capacity for
the conduct of foreign relations had been laid.
IV
The success of the foreign service reform movement,
however, signaled no abrupt departure in the American
attitude toward diplomacy.

Legislative approbation of

professional status for diplomats and consuls, under the
rubric. "Foreign Service officer," was not synonomous with
public acceptance of traditional diplomacy as represented
by the Old Diplomatic Service.

On the contrary, there

remained among'^the public and Congress a deep suspicion
of diplomacy and diplomats.
«At the same time that World War I sparked a revival in
I
foreign servide reform, the war and its aftermath resurrected
i

f.

I

old prejudices against traditional diplomacy.

Many demo

cratic peoples blamed the European diplomat— the archetype
of the professional diplomatist, the prototype American
diplomats/liked to pattern themselves after— for his
failure to prevent the outbreak of the World War.

The

Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 157-177; Barnes and
Morgan, Foreign Service, 188-210; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy,"
157-158; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 35.
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existence of secret treaties negotiated prior to and
during the war, Woodrow Wilson's idealism and call for
"open covenants of peace openly arrived at," and the
machinations that enveloped the Versailles Conference—
all prominently displayed in the press— reinforced and
exacerbated popular aversion to traditional diplomacy.
More than ever before, ordinary citizens, convinced that
they shared with the masses in all countries a detestation
of war, believed that the harbingers of war— the professional
diplomats, who "represented" an elite minority and who
"controlled" foreign policy-— must be brought under democratic control.

51

The World War marked the democratic politicization of
diplomacy, a "transition from the old diplomacy to the
co
new."
The "old" methods of diplomacy, characterized by
confidential negotiations among professional diplomats who
stood above domestic political battles and partisan
ideologies, became anathema in democratic countries.
51

Elected

NLcolson, Diplomacy, 113. See also Gordon A. Craig,
"The Professional Diplomat and His Problems, 1919-1939," in
Lawrence E. Glefand, ed., Essays on the History of American
Foreign Relations (N.Y.; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972),
311-32 0; Paul Gordon, Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats;
The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth Century
Diplomacy in France and Germary (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), 222-227.
52
Nicolson, Diplomacy, 99, 113.
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chief s-of “State began to conduct negotiations themselves.^3
Encouraged by their citizen constituencies, political
leaders employed euphemisms such as "democratic diplomacy"
and "diplomacy in the public view" to describe the transition
from the "dark ages" of diplomacy to the new, sunshine
diplomacy.^
That the professional diplomatist had functioned
largely as an instrument and not as a creator of policy
mattered little.

Nor did it matter that Wilson, Lloyd

George, and Georges Clemenceau had negotiated an "open
covenant," the Treaty of Versailles, in strict secrecy.
Diplomats everywhere had incurred the public's wrath.
Elected leaders and citizens now believed "that it was
possible" and necessary "to apply to the conduct of external
affairs, the ideas and practices which, in the conduct of
internal affairs, had for generations been regarded as the
55
essentials of liberal democracy."
The democratization of diplomacy found expression in
the post-World War American foreign service reform movement.
5 ^Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, 227.
Ibid., 226-227; Craig, "Diplomats and Problems,"
313-315; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 43.
55

Nicolson, Diplomacy, 113.
mats and Bureaucrats, 226.

See also Lauren, Diplo

With the World War, broad masses of the American people
became more attentive to foreign affairs.

They saw that

the Diplomatic Service had been the almost exclusive
"preserve of the young and older rich with their interlocking
connections of birth, education, and f r i e n d s h i p . M e r i t
and competence appeared to count for little alongside
proper breeding, wealth, and social manners.

Increasingly,

reformers demanded that the recruitment base of the Diplo
matic Service be broadened, that the barriers to entry be
eliminated, that the Service be "democratized."

The consi

derations that "actuated" the reformers, according to one
observer, was "the danger inherent in recruiting a service
from a social elite," the danger "that the demands of the
majority on foreign policy might be ignored."

57

The

solution proposed by the reformers was to provide sufficient
salaries to permit the "people's representatives" to enter
58
the Service.
The Rogers Act addressed directly the issue of "democraC

C

Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 32. See also Schulzinger,
Diplomatic Mind, 10; Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (N.Y.r
Harper & Brothers, 1959), 72.
57
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 141.
58
Ibid. The pre-war executive orders eliminated
neither political patronage in appointments nor elitism in
the ranks of the corps. Barnes and Morgan state:
"With the
small salaries creating what was, in effect, a property
qualification for the Diplomatic Service, the merit system
was far from being effectively applied." Foreign Service,
210- 212.
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tization."

In providing for decent, though not generous,

salary increases for Foreign Service officers, and in man
dating that entry into the Service be at the lowest level
and that appointment and promotion be based upon merit, the
act attempted to remove many formal barriers to recruitment^
In amalgamating the Diplomatic and Consular Services, the
act looked ahead to the day when diplomats and consuls
would be interchangeable, when diplomats would embrace
the egalitarian and democratic vestments of the consular
agents.
American diplomats approached the enactment and
implementation of the Rogers Act with caution and ambiguity
Hoping to acquire some of the public esteem enjoyed by
consuls, the diplomats had worked hard to convince the
public of their usefulness and to dispel the notion that
diplomats were unnecessary ornaments.

Time and again the

59

Prior to the Rogers Act, diplomatic salaries— exclud
ing chiefs-of-missions— ranged from a low of $1,500 to a
high of $4,000, while the highest-paid consuls received
$8,000. After the Rogers Act, the salaries for Foreign
Service officers— all consuls and diplomats— were the same,
ranging from $3,000 to $9,000, depending upon class and
grade in the Service.
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 67, 73,
76.
60

The act had been drafted by Carr and the consuls who
were better organized administratively and who had more
friends in Congress than the diplomats.
See Etzold, Conduct
of Policy, 24-25; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 9; Werking,
Master Architects, 161-162, 170.
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diplomats had invoked the argument that "not only did a
diplomat try to secure equal treatment for his nation’s
commerce, but among the principal reasons for political
overtures and policies was the desire to maintain conditions
suitable for commercial intercourse."

61

The diplomats,

however, also wanted to maintain the privileged status
of their elite fraternity.
A strong sense of elitist esprit de corps had developed
within the diplomatic corps since the end of the nineteenth
century.

From the outset of their careers, the younger

diplomats shared upper-class origins and "best family"
traditions.

Most possessed independent wealth— a prerequisite

to entrance into the Diplomatic Service since the government
offered little or no compensation.
Faced with an indifferent, if not hostile, public,
the diplomats found solace and comfort among their own
kind.

They would have in any case.

them remarked, was their home town:

The world, as one of
They could not travel

abroad without meeting someone they knew and were glad to
62
see.
With no formal process available for appointment
and promotion, an informal old-boy network evolved among
61

Werking, Master Architects, 223-224.
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Willard F. Beaulac, Career Ambassador (N.Y.: Macmillan/
1951), 201.
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the diplomats based upon family, education, and social
connections.

63

Increasingly, too, the diplomats had become jealous
of their privileges and protective of their status, which
many of them equated with the best possible management of
64
United States foreign relations.
The Diplomatic Service
was "like a club," one member confided to his diary in
1919.

"The outsider was regarded with a faint air of

suspicion, but a member, even a junior, was treated with
absolute trust."^
Many diplomats, moreover, regarded consuls as unfit
material for admission to the club.

Although sincere in

their commercial fervor, the diplomats never believed that
\
the "lowly" consuls, who "traded" in the menial tasks of \
the business world, were capable of performing political
63
*
Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 26. See also Martin Weill,
A Pretty Good Club; The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foxelgi
Service (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1978), 15-16, 27, 52 ,
passim; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 85; Henry Serrano
Villard, Affairs at State fcj.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965) ,
152.
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Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 27.
65
Nancy Harvison Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers: Selec
tions from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat,
1919-1943 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 9.
See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 23; Perrin C. Galpin, ed.,
Hugh Gibson, 1883-19 54: Extracts From His Letters and Anec
dotes From His Friends (N.Y.: Belgium American Foundation,
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work in a unified Foreign Service.

66

The diplomats had

supported amalgamation of the two services for reasons of
self-interest:

The consuls enjoyed much better relations

with Congress than the diplomats did, and the consuls
wanted amalgamation as part of the legislative package
to reform the foreign services.

67

While the diplomats

cooperated in securing passage of the Rogers Act, many of
them reserved for the consuls the same kind of scorn that
members of the upper class reserve for the working class.
The diplomats, thus, viewed the Rogers Act with mixed
sentiments.

The act accorded them the professional status

and career stability they had labored so assiduously to
achieve.

But the act did not bring with it public and

political support for the sound, traditional practice of
diplomacy.

Nor did the act mollify public suspicion of

diplomacy or raise the level of public esteem of diplomats.
Finally, amalgamation— desired by consuls who resented the
pretensions of the diplomats, while coveting their social
graces and diplomatic positions— threatened to disrupt, if
not destroy, the diplomats', elite fraternity.
66

Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 9, 115; Werking,
Master Architects, 223-224.
67

Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 33.
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V
The amalgamation of the Consular and Diplomatic
Services proved to be the most difficult issue encountered
by the nascent Foreign Service.

68

Amalgamation meant that

consular and diplomatic positions would be interchangeable,
that consuls and diplomats would share equally the work of
the consular and diplomatic branches.

With the passage of

the Rogers Act, Wilbur Carr and the consuls believed that
interchangeability would be the rule.
intended it to be the exception.

The career diplomats

69

The diplomats proved the better bureaucratic politicians
until at least 1927.

Many of the career diplomats "grand

fathered" into the Foreign Service from the old diplomatic
corps were socialites:
diplomatists as well.

70

A considerable number were expert
Although they lacked experience

in personnel administration, they were seasoned in the
realm of international politics and negotiations.

They
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Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 115; Ilchman, Profes
sional Diplomacy, 165, 188.
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Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 149-152, 165;
Crane, Mr. Carr, 259-260; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind,
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Thayer, Diplomat, 2 72; Etzold, Conduct of Policy,
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translated their considerable skills into the theater of
internal bureaucratic politics.

The diplomats— lead by

Joseph C. Grew, Hugh Gibson, Hugh Wilson, and William
Phillips--gained control of the Foreign Service Personnel
Board at its inception in 1924, and made it an instrument
that served the interests of the diplomatic elite.

For

four years, the diplomats enclosed in the old-boy network
received a vastly disproportionate share of the choice posts
and promotions. 71
The bureaucratic omniscience of the diplomats did not
last, however.

In 1927, with evidence in hand, the consuls

enlisted the aid of their friends in Congress to rectify
the situation.

A minor scandal erupted.

Although the

diplomats were absolved of most of the charges leveled
against them, they were also stripped of their authority on
the Personnel Board. 72
Four years later, in 19 31, Congress enacted the MosesLinthicum Act.

The result, in part, of lobbying by the

consuls for fairer treatment, the act improved several
aspects of Foreign Service operations, building upon the
structure of the Rogers Act.

The act also limited the

71 Schulzinger,
, , .
Diplomatic Mind, 77-78, 115-123; Crane,
Mr. Carr, 281-282.
72
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 122; Heinrichs, American.
Ambassador, 123; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 173-196.
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power of the diplomats to employ favoritism.

The act

prohibited the promotion to chief-of-mission of Foreign
Service officers on the Personnel Board for three years
73
following the end of their service on the board.
Other
provisions insured that new recruits would be members of a
74
fused Foreign Service.
By 19 33 over 40 percent of the
officers held dual commissions.

75

VI
The labor pains suffered by the embryonic Foreign
Service over amalgamation faded in comparison to the
improvements wrought by the Rogers Act.

Elevated to the

status of a career and profession, the Foreign Service
began to attract a steady supply of competent applicants.
In 1925, 172 candidates gathered to complete the first
entrance examination administered under the Rogers Act.
Two years earlier, only 36 applicants took the exam,

11 of

whom passed, necessitating that the State Department accept
and appoint to diplomatic vacancies nearly anyone who met
73

Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 136; Barnes and Morgan,
Foreign Service, 215-216; 235-236.
74
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 123.
75
Robert P. Skinner, "Ten Years Under the Rogers Act,"
American Foreign Service Journal, 11 (July 1934), 341.
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the minimum qualifications.
Business opportunities during the roaring 1920s kept
some qualified individuals from applying.

However, fully

282 persons received Foreign Service commissions from 1925
to 19 31.

Among those embarking upon diplomatic careers

during this period were such able diplomatists as George F.
Kennan, Charles "Chip" Bohlen, John Patton Davies, Jr.,
David K.E. Bruce, Loy Henderson, Henry S. Villard, and
77
Robert D. Murphy.
The Service also attracted candidates from broader
social and economic backgrounds.

Because of the Rogers

Act's provisions for salary raises, pension pay, and
representation allowances, the Service was no longer closed
to all of those without substantial private means. 7 8
Whereas, in 192 3

32 percent of the members of the Diplo-

^Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 35. Forty-one persons in
1921 and 37 in 1922 took the entrance exam to the Diplomatic
Service. See also Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 173; Ilchman,
Professional Diplomacy, 152, 186, 202-203; Barnes and Morgan,
Foreign Service, 213, 225; Villard, Affairs at State, 57-58.
77

Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 194 ftn. 3.

78
Nevertheless, some degree of private wealth was still
very helpful, and no Foreign Service officer could afford to
take an embassy in Western Europe on his salary alone. Hugh
Gibson wrote in his diary in 1929: "Diplomacy is the one
thing that interests me....But failing an assured financial
future I can't see what there is to justify a decision to
stay on indefinitely in diplomacy. What a pest that money
has such importance!" Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 42-4 3.
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matic Service had attended Harvard, in 1936
percent of all recruits came from Harvard.
. .
79
had matriculated at public universities.

less than 6
Over 50 percent

The Service, thus, took great strides in becoming
"democratized."

Two exceptions were blacks and women, few
80
of whom applied and few of whom received appointments.
Reflecting the prejudices of the larger American society,
the Foreign Service remained an "aristocracy of skin" and
81
an 'aristocracy of sex. "
The Service succeeded, too, in dismissing a number of
incompetents.

The Rogers Act provided for the weeding out

of inferior men.

Soon after the passage of the act, the

Personnel Board began to comply with this provision.

As

Joseph C. Grew, a member of the board, wrote to William
Phillips in the summer of 1924:
A good many dead boughs have been separated
from the Service through age, retirement and
the abolition of the unassigned list, while
other men have been given to understand
that their cases will be further dealt with
79

Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 108; Ilchman, Profes
sional Diplomacy, 225-226.
80
81

Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 108-109.

The phrases are John Stuart Mill's in his intro
duction to Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
(2 vols.; N.Y.: Schocken Books, 1961. Originally published
in 1835), I, xii.
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in the near future. R2
By 19 34, eighty-nine officers— or 15 percent of those who
were in the Service in 1924— had been retired for age,
83
disability, or incompetence.
More significantly, with the Rogers Act the era had
passed when a change in presidential administration fore
cast the wholesale replacement of foreign service personnel.
Merit principles, experience, and bureaucratic politics—
not party politics— ruled the placement of officers below
the rank of minister.

The appointment of chiefs-of-mission—

ministers and ambassadors— remained the prerogative of the
President and, thus, a prisoner of the spoils system.
However, in 1924, President Calvin Coolidge, via an execu
tive order, instructed the Foreign Service Personnel Board
to include among its responsibilities the task of recommend
ing for promotion to

chief-of-mission those Foreign Service

officers who had demonstrated special ability.

84

All

administrations since have followed a similar practice,
although the practical results have varied from administra82

Walter Johnson, ed., Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic
Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (2 vols.. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1952), I, 626. See also Ilchman, Professional
Diplomacy, 209.
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tion to administration.
The appointment of chiefs-of-mission from the ranks of
the Foreign Service soared under the Republican administra
tions of the 1920s.

From a low of 8 percent under

Woodrow Wilson in 1916, the percentage of career chiefsof-mission climbed to 2 8 percent under Warren G. Harding
and to 41 percent under Coolidge.

By 1932, under Herbert

Hoover, professional diplomats held nearly 50 percent of
85
the top diplomatic posts abroad.
To acquire a share of the top posts abroad was as
important to career development as was the Rogers Act.

The

mark of professional distinction for a diplomat lay in
heading an embassy or legation.

86

The actions of Republican

presidents and their secretaries of state during the 1920s
in promoting career officers as chiefs-of-mission reflected
a growing recognition of the merits of professional diplo87
mats over amateurs.

These actions also established a

precedent for future administrations to match.
85
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American Foreign Service Journal, 17 (December 1940), 679.
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Henry K. Norton, "Foreign Office Organization: A
Comparison of the British, French, German and Italian
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See also Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 125.
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VII
Few people connected to the foreign affairs community
doubted that the United States had passed a milestone in
the development of a Foreign Service capable of assisting
American statesmen in the conduct of foreign relations.

88

A strong sense of esprit de corps permeated the Foreign
Service, marked by the high morale of officers who now
felt that they belonged to an important, established
professional organization,.

By the 19 30s

it was "no longer

regarded as a reward to be assigned to the Diplomatic
branch, nor a punishment to be assigned to the Consular
branch."89

The schism between the diplomats and consuls

had largely healed, the distinctions and animosities that
remained now confined to "the unreachable area of personal
relations."

90

In some ways things had not changed or improved.
Entering the 1930s, the State Department-— a synonym for
88

For example, see George F. Kennan, "The Future of Our
Professional Diplomacy, " T h e F o r e i g n Affairs Quarterly, 33 (July
1955), 566; G. Howland Shaw, "The American Foreign Service,"
ibid., 14 (January 1936), 328; Skinner, "Ten Years Under,"
341-343.
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cient in only one branch of the Service cannot hope to
reach the highest ranks."
90
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the foreign affairs establishment— was still "small,
placid," and "comfortably adjusted to the lethargic diplomacy" of they1920s.

91

Endowed with economic abundance and

technological superiority, the United States maintained
a traditionally

nonassertive, if not inactive, foreign

policy.
The activities of the Foreign Service officer reflected
the relative serenity of American foreign relations.

One

of the best of the early American diplomats, Lewis Einstein,
wrote in contemplating retirement in 1930:
After more than eight years passed at Prague,
I was somewhat tired of the monotony of diplo
matic life. Such glamour as it ever possessed
for me had long ago worn off, and though I liked
the work, when work there was, I was bored by
diplomatic entertainment and the continuous obli
gation of attending tedious banquets and talking
to tedious people.92
David F. Drummond, "Cordell Hull (1933-1944)," in
Norman A. Graebner, ed., An Uncertain Tradition: American
Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (N.Y.: McGrawHill, 1961), 188. Beaulac, a career diplomat
serving in Haiti in 1927, recalls:
"Life had been gay and
easy.
I had swam, played golf, and driven about the/country,
usually in the company of other Americans. My work,; while:
never arduous, had been instructive." C are e r Amb ass ado r,105 /
92
A Diplomat Looks Back (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968),207.
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The genteel and slow-moving world of American diplomacy
remained unaltered from that of an earlier era.

93

Nor had the American public significantly altered its
view of diplomats.

More than before, perhaps, diplomats

invoked in the public mind visions of boys with white spats,
tea drinkers, and cookie pushers.

94

The results of the

Rogers Act in eradicating social elitism from the ranks
of diplomats had not conformed with public expectations.
Being a diplomat in the United States, imbued as its
citizens were with the egalitarian ethic, carried no
special distinction.

Being a businesman did.

By contrast,

being a diplomat in Europe, where class distinctions were
more pronounced, had always been considered a suitable
calling for the sons of the aristocracy.

Only in the 1920s

93
Beaulac again recalls:
"The State Department was all
too backward in coming forward and insisting that its needs
be met.... I recall that at one of my posts I received an
instruction in which the Department noted, gravely, that
during the preceding quarter my expenditures for toilet
paper had averaged 20 percent higher than for an earlier
quarter.
I was asked to submit an explanation.
I was
forced to reply, equally gravely, that the temporary in
crease in expenditure for this item was owing to the circum
stances that the officer in charge had had recurrent attacks
of diarrhea during the period under review..*.of course, this
was a reflection of the period in which we lived." Career
Ambassador, 107-108.
94
Diplomats who wrote memoirs about this period univer
sally agree on this point. Of course, they were particularly
sensitive to it, perhaps overly so. Perhaps, too, their
expectations of the Rogers Act were not matched by the
results.
For example, see Villard, Affairs at State, 1, 2,
5-6; Thayer, Diplomat, 72.
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did businessmen in Europe begin to approach the public
status accorded diplomats.

95

Nor had American diplomats adequately defined the job
of a Foreign Service officer.

In explaining the professional

practice of diplomacy to businessmen, laymen and politicians,
the diplomats spoke of the "ideal qualities" of the diplo
matist as delineated by twentieth-century European practi
tioners, the qualities that differentiated the professional
from the amateur diplomat— truthfulness, precision, calmness,
96
modesty, and such things as sound judgment.
With no
tradition of diplomacy by which to measure professionals
and amateurs, Americans found it difficult, if not
impossible, to understand why diplomacy, more than other
occupations, required "special" expertise.

Diplomacy

remained an abstraction to most Americans, while the
diplomats, themselves, had to build their own tradition,
borrowing much from the Europeans.
The United States, nevertheless, had framed a solid,
95

Norton, "Foreign Service Organization," 51-52.
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subjected to hasty and ill-informed criticism." Ibid., ix.
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institutional structure for the conduct of foreign rela
tions.

During the 1920s the Foreign Service built upon

this framework.

The

older diplomats instilled in new

recruits the traditional, time-honored— if not always
practiced— view of diplomacy, and encouraged them to develop
a "realist" outlook on world politics.

97

By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the presi
dency, the Foreign Service was confident, stable, and
improving.

No one, however, could have foreseen the

effects of the Great Depression and of the attitudes and
concerns of a new Democratic President upon the infant
Foreign Service.
97Ibid., 81, 87-88, 98.

A n.ulz compelling everybody

In all Embattle.* and Legation*
to ivoA.fi eight kouAt a day-{loe day* a week--would be
the. kind o$ cyclone which
would b e heasid nound the
wo Aid!
President Franklin D.
Roosevelt

3

THE FOREIGN SERVICE UNDER FDR, 1933-1939:
DEPRESSION AND PREJUDICE
The presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt proved to be

an inauspicious environment for sustaining the development
of the United States Foreign Service.

FDR's attitude

toward career diplomats, his lack of enthusiasm for pro
fessional diplomacy, coupled with the exigencies of the
Depression, stymied the cultivation of a Foreign Service
capable of assuming a leadership role in the formulation
and implementation of American foreign policy.
When FDR assumed office on March 4, 1933, the Great
Depression was at its nadir.

Millions of unemployed

people haunted the nation's streets.
desperate.

Farmers were

Bank failures were endemic.

Bewilderment borne

of prolonged desperation gripped the country, while the
FDR to Hull, January 17, 1935, Edgar B. Nixon, ed.,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs (3 vols.; Cam
bridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969),
II, 366-367.
-80-
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machinery of government seemed hopelessly stalled, unable
to combat the misery.
President Roosevelt naturally focused his energies on
the Depression at home for most of his first seven years
in office.

Confronted with unprecedented economic depriva

tion, most Americans evinced little concern for the crises
brewing abroad in the Far East and Europe.

If anything,

the Depression exacerbated the inclination of most Americans
to blame the Europeans and the munitions manufacturers for
World War I.

Many Americans vowed not to permit the United

States to engage in another foreign imbroglio.

Whether

from political reality or personal conviction, Roosevelt.,
too, revealed little interest in employing the power of
the United States to halt the world's descent toward chaos.
FDR also embraced deeply-entrenched, popular prejudices
against career diplomats.

He regarded the Foreign Service

as a playground for dilettantes and socialites.

As the

Depression forced severe retrenchment upon the nation's
diplomatic resources, Roosevelt looked upon the plight of
the Foreign Service with almost haughty scorn.

He displayed

little regard for the efficacy of a professional diplomatic
corps.
Even a more favorable climate would not have compelled
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Roosevelt to assume an active interest in strengthening
the Foreign Service.

Although the Depression would have

affected adversely the strength of the Service under any
administration, Roosevelt's demeanor toward diplomats, as
well as his peculiar administrative habits and supreme
confidence in his own diplomatic abilities, militated
against a diligent concern on his part for maintaining a
vigorous Foreign Service.
Roosevelt's treatment of the Foreign Service augured
ill for the application of American influence abroad.

The

President's ability to exert leadership in foreign affairs,
if and when he should choose to do so, rested in part upon
the health of the Foreign Service.

Similarly, the ability

of the Foreign Service to respond to changes in the inter
national environment depended in part upon its institutional
vitality.

That the record of United States diplomacy during

the 1930s is one of singular failure can be attributed, in
at least some small measure, to FDR's disdain for the
Foreign Service he inherited from his predecessors.2
2see Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression,
1-18, 225-277; William Manchester, The Glory and the Dream:
A Narrative History of the United States, 1932-1972
(Boston: Little Brown, 1974), 68, 174; John E. Wiltz,
From Isolation to War, 19 31-1941 (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell,
196 8)^ passim.
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I
The Depression shattered the normally imperturbable
administration of the Foreign Service.

Amidst the depths

of the Depression, the Service suffered a pervasive retrench
ment in its operations.

Although the Service experienced a

restoration of sorts after 1935, the wounds inflicted upon
it healed slowly and incompletely.
Reductions in appropriations were most severe.

In

1933 the New Deal.administration, with the assent of Congiessr
slashed the State Department's budget by 33 percent.

The

decimation of the budget— along with across the board pay
cuts of 15 percent, the curtailment of rental allowances
by 65 percent, and the devaluation of the dollar as the
United ^tates abandoned the gold standard— effectively
reduced -the salaries of Foreign Service officers serving

i

abroad by over 50 percent. Congress restored most of the
t
salary Reductions and rent subsidies by the end of 1935.
Not until 1938, however, did the State Department receive
an appropriation that approached its 1932 level of funding,
only then to suffer a reduction of nearly $1,000,000, or
6.25

percent of its allocation, in 1939.

3
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service,
also FDR to Jesse Isidor Straus, July 11,
Bryan Owen, November 17, 1933, and Claude
December 13, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
514, 528-529; and FDR to Bowers, February

,217-219. See
1933, FDR to Ruth
G. Bowers to FDR,
Affairs, I, 329,
5, 1934, Elliott
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Recruitment virtually halted.

Entrance examinations,

suspended in 1932, resumed again only late in 1935.

The

number of officers, arbitrarily reduced by 10 percent in
1934, did not reapproximate the 1932 level of 762 until the
eve of World War II, when the complement of officers
reached 72 3.^
Individual career advancement nearly ceased.

All

promotions within the Service were suspended from 1931
through 1935.

Young officers far from retirement filled

the top four classes of the corps.

In 1934, for example, the
5
average age of all Foreign Service officers was 40.25 years.
o

Roosevelt, ed., FDR; His Personal Letters, 192 8-1945 (2
vols.;N.Y.: Duell^ Sloan, and Pearce, 1950), I, 389-390.
The State Department's appropriations were approximately
$18,000,000 in 1932; $13,500,000 in 1933; $16,000,000 in
1936; $16,600,000 in 1938; $15,600,000 in 1939. August C.
Miller, Jr., "The New State Department," American Journal of
International Law, 33 (July 1939), 518. See also Hugh
Gibson, "Diplomats Pay to Work," The Saturday Evening Post,
209 (May 8, 1937),49.
4
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 219. See also
Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of
Its Organization, Procedure, and Practice {SJ.Y.: Macmillan,
1949), 326; Kenneth W. Thompson, Diplomacy and Emergent
Patterns (N.Y.: New York University Press, 1962) , 85.
Recruitment was also suspended during World War II. In 1945
the number of Foreign Service officers was only 785.
Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 201.
5Skinner, "Ten Years Under," 342. See also Heinrichs,
"Bureaucracy," 186-187; Shaw, "American Foreign Service,"
329.
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Alt ho ugh few diplomats resigned for the perils of the bread
lines, they could hardly feel sanguine about their careers.
The high morale fostered in the years since the Rogers
Act deteriorated.

Foreign Service officers, but especially

politically-appointed chiefs-of-mission, flooded the State
Department and the White House with letters describing
hardships.

One typical letter reported that a vice consul

"has had to borrow money to send his wife and child home
to live with her people while he lives in a cheap furnished
6

room."

f

Another noted that a diplomatic attache "has gone

home on leave completely broken in health, largely because
of the difficult and arduous work that he has performed
without vacation during the past two years."

7

Home leaves at government expense, indefinitely dis
continued in 1932, placed officers abroad in a state of
virtual exile.

Sixteen officers, a State Department spokes

man told a congressional committee in 1936, had not returned
to the United States in seven years.

Many others had

served abroad for over three years without leave, although
the Department regarded a three-year exile as long enough.
^Bowers to FDR, December 13, 1933, Nixon, FDR and
Foreign Affairs, I, 529.
See also Barnes and Morgan,
Foreign Service, 188-189, 214-215.
^Straus to FDR, April 9, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
Affairs, II, 465.
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Few officers could afford the transportation expenses.
Fewer still could afford the luxury of a savings account.
In 1936 the government reinstated home leave provisions,
Q
but allocated only $35,000 for that purpose.
The distress of the Service was acute.

To Assistant

Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr, who had served in the
State Department since 1892, "the distress of the Foreign
Service [was] greater [in 1934] than at any time within
9
the memory of those of us in the Department."
Secretary
of State Cordell Hull concurred.

"Much of the Foreign

Service," he testified before Congress in April, 1934, "is
now more or less in a state of demoralization so far as
actual efficiency is concerned."10
The plight of the Foreign Service severely handicapped
/

the efficient management of foreign affairs.

The Service

confronted a retrenchment in resources at the same time that
it faced a substantial increase in demands and responsibili
ties.

With the Depression thundering across national

boundaries "like a global tornado," the comparative serenity
g

"A Better Deal for Our State Department," American
Foreign Service Journal, 14 (August 1937), 464.
^ Stuart> Department of State, 326 . See
also Crane, Mr. Carr, 314-315; Ilchman, Professional Diplo
macy^ 229-230.
10 Ilchman,

Professional Diplomacy, 229-230.
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of the 1920s evaporated.11

Tumultuous international condi

tions, sparked by crises in the Far East and Europe and
fanned by the Depression, expanded dramatically the work
load of the State Department at home and abroad.

From 1929

to 1939, dispatches between the Department and the diplomatic
missions abroad increased tenfold.

Nearly every day,

Secretary of State Hull recalled, proved hectic, "being
hopelessly crowded with emergency problems calling for
feverish activity."

12

Limitations in personnel posed the greatest problem.
Carr calculated that each of the 4 7 diplomatic missions
and 271 consular offices abroad required four to eight
officers:

As of 19 34, when the number of officers in the

classified Service numbered 6 88, an average of no more than
13
two could be assigned to each post.
Three of the most
critical posts— Berlin, Paris and London— had four, five
and six officers respectively.

14

In addition, the Service

■^Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 9.
12
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols.;
N.Y.: Macmillan, 1948)1
183.

T~,

13
14

Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 219.

Hull to FDR, January 14, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
A ffairs, II, 35 8. Hull notes that there were 7 officers in
Paris.
That number was soon reduced to 5. Straus to FDR,
April 9, 19 35, ibid., 465.
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employed 3,600 secretaries and clerks, an average of ten
4. 15
per post.
More staff is not necessarily synonpmous with more
efficient administration.

Today the embassies in Bonn,

Paris, and London each employ over 1,000 people.

The

State Department employs over 500 people— nearly the equiva
lent of all Foreign Service officers in 1933— just to sort
and distribute the mail.

16

Whether the Department functions

more effectively today than yesterday is questionable.

More

staff often translates into more work and more burdens, not
into more efficient operations.

Today, at least, small may

be beautiful and even desirable.
More might have been better during the 1930s, however.
With world conditions descending toward chaos, the State
Department was, as it is today, the smallest of the federal
departments.

In 1935 all State Department employees in

Washington, D.C., could assemble together on the steps of
17
the Executive Office Building for a photograph.
At no
15Hull to FDR, January 14, 1935, ibid., 358.
16
Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 101. On the question of
staff size, see also Ferrell Amer1can Diplomacy, 20-22.
Classified Foreign Service officers comprise less than -17
percent of the total number of State Department employees
today. John Ensor Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Prince
ton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 94.
17

Harr, Professional Diplomat, 95.

-89-

time during the 1930s did the annual appropriations of the
State Department equal more than 1 percent of the funds
allocated to the United States military, which, at that
time, ranked behind the army of Yugoslavia in efficiency
and preparedness.^
The adversity that afflicted the Foreign Service
largely reflected the exigencies of the Depression.

Faced

with the lingering spectre of between 12,000,000 and
18,000,000 unemployed workers, the New Deal administration
necessarily diverted available resources to combating the
domestic crisis.

Domestic federal employment projects

sprouted like weeds in vacant lots, particularly during
the famous "First 100 Days" of the Roosevelt administration.
Wilbur Carr, charged with the unpleasant responsibility of
being budget officer for the State Department, acknowledged
that the Depression forced austere economic measures upon
the nation's diplomatic machinery.
18

19

Manchester, Glory and Dream, 6; Hull, Memoirs, I,
183. See also I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and
Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 72), 23.
The total State Department budget in the early 1970s was
approximately $350 million, while that of the Pentagon was
nearly $80 billion.
Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy
Making
in
Defense
and
Foreign Affairs F7Y7I Harper & Row', 1971) ,
4_
^Crane, Mr. Carr, 314.
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Private ly, however, Carr faulted President Roosevelt.
Carr perceived the President as "out of sympathy" with the
Department and the Foreign Service and, therefore, unrespon.

.

sive to requests for greater support on appropriations.

20

In part, Carr's incrimination of FDR revealed his own
frustration at having to inflict radical economies on
the structure he had labored so long and hard to construct.
Reverentially attached to the well-being of the Service,
Carr acquired during the Depression an unjustified reputa
tion within the Foreign Service for not doing enough to
convince Congress of the need for additional funds.

For

Carr administration of the Service under FDR was a night21

mare.

Carr's personal distress also reflected a more funda
mental human condition.
different ways.

People react to crises in several

Sometimes a crisis produces a despondency,

a sense of hopelessness, a feeling that personal survival
is all that matters.

Sometimes a crisis produces exhilara

tion, a sense that a challenge exists to be conquered, a
renewed feeling of alturistic purpose.

21

Not infre-

Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 184-186.

-91-

quently, the most dire circumstances can provoke in people
a renewed vigor, a desire to challenge and to overcome the
worst of situations-— especially if they can be assured that
their determination is appreciated and supported by their
leaders.
II
FDR approached the peedicament of the Foreign Service
with cavalier indifference.

As one ambassador correctly

suspected, the President believed that the diplomatic
corps was "overstaffed, underworked and overpaid; that
the average career man
lizard."

[was]

a tea hound and a lounge

22

Secretary of State Hull repeatedly attempted to
convince the President otherwise.

"The employees of the

Foreign Service," Hull wrote FDR on January 31, 1934, "have
suffered losses out of all proportion to those which other
employees of the Government have suffered."

A year later,

with no remedy in sight, and even more reductions forecast
in diplomatic personnel, Hull predicted dire consequences
for the future of the Service.
22

In a letter to Roosevelt,

Straus to FDR, April 9, 19 35, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
Affairs, II, 464.
23 .
Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 621.
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he explained:
There have been no promotions in class or
filling of vacancies created since 1932.
These drastic reductions in personnel with
out the recognition of efficient service
through normal advancement in class as the
law contemplates will, I fear, have a
demoralizing effect upon the most capable
men in the Service and produce a condition
which it may be difficult to repair.
Hull questioned the wisdom of further reducing the corps
at a time of growing international tension.

Instead, he

urged that new candidates be recruited, noting that "it
takes time and patience to make a really good Foreign
Service officer out of a raw recruit."
Hull then implored Roosevelt to obtain a supplemental
appropriation for the Service.

He assured FDR that Congress

would be receptive to such a request:
It is my considered judgment that if we are
to try to have a live, energetic Foreign
Service personnel capable of meeting what
I believe to be the need of the present
situation it would be distinctly in the
public interest if you could see your way
clear to restoring all or as much as possible
of the $200,000 reduction made in appropriation
for salaries of Foreign Service officers by the
transmission to Congress of a supplemental
estimate to that effect. This is not only
my judgment, but when I and my assistants
appeared before the Appropriations Committee
of the House the importance of this action
was urged repeatedly upon us by members of
the Committee.... Of course , we declined to

-93-

discuss and in no way advocated a change in
the amount which you recommended to be
appropriated.24

Roosevelt replied briefly, sarcastically to his
Secretary's lengthy and earnest plea.

He would consider

requesting an additional appropriation, but he was
confident that "a greater part of" the reduction in the
proposed budget could "be covered by reducing the staffs
in the Embassies and Legations especially."

FDR concluded:

"A rule compelling everybody in all Embassies and Legations
to work eight hours a day— five days a week— would be the
kind of cyclone which would be heard round the world!"
Knowledge of Roosevelt's attitude soon percolated
through the ranks of the Foreign Service.

Several diplomats

ventured to transform the President's views.

Jesse Isidor

Straus, an old friend and politically-appointed ambassador
to France, wrote in the spring of 1935 that he discerned,
"from various sources," that the President was "being
filled up with stories about the iniquities of the diplo24

January 14, 19 35, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II,
358-360. Carr probably drafted Hull's letter to FDR. Crane
states that Carr appeared before the House Appropriations
Committee on January 4, 1935, and that following the hearing
he felt compelled "to edit and amplify his [Hull's] state
ment to make it count for something." Presumably, the
statement is Hull's plea to FDR. Mr. Carr, 315. In any
case, it is hardly novel for a subordinate to draft a letter
or statement for a superior's approval.
25
January 17, 19 35, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 366-367.
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matic service."

Contrary to the portrait of diplomats

lounging on the public dole, Straus asserted:
Those with whom I have been associated... , and
those whom I have had the pleasure of meeting... ,
are a lot of serious-minded men who are most
attentive to their duties and spare neither
time nor thought in their endeavors, some
times under very trying and difficult condi
tions. ... Long hours mean nothing to them.
Straus regretted that in some circles the view prevailed
that a display of physical activity during prescribed hours
was

the prime guage of efficiency.

so necessary to all
26
of office-hours."

"Most of the information

of us," he revealed, "is gained outside

Another ambassador and long-time acquaintance wrote to
Roosevelt in a similar vein.

After echoing Straus' senti

ments, Jefferson Caffrey sought to dispel the notion that
social prestige and fraternization were unnecessary accouter
ments of the diplomatic profession.

Caffrey, a career officer

of twenty-four years experience, explained that a diplomat's
"efficiency" depended upon prestige, as well as intelligence
and personality.

He defined "prestige" as the respect and

esteem in which an officer is held by the country to which
he is accredited.

Whether palatable to us or not, he

continued, foreigners often measure prestige by such ex
ternal trappings as an envoy's mode of living and social
habits.
26

Without prestige an officer's efficiency is
April 9, 1935, ibid., 464-466.
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re duced, for successful diplomacy depends largely upon
personal contacts, and results are obtained by mutual
understandings fostered through associations outside of
the office.
Caffrey then invoked an old stance of the diplomats.
By "successful diplomacy," he asserted emphatically, "I
mean, on the one hand, direct results in thousands and
millions of dollars to American interests and, on the other,
results in the way of confidence and good will on the part
of foreign people."

Caffrey believed that much of diplomacy

consisted of cooperating with American businesses.

"I take

this Foreign Service business seriously," he concluded; "and
I believe that an efficient Service is worth saving and
27
fighting for."
Roosevelt's attitude toward the American foreign
affairs community remained unshaken.

He treated the State

Department and the Foreign Service, as institutions, less
than graciously.

In 1939, for instance, Roosevelt asked

Harry Hopkins, his confidant and secretary of commerce,
to investigate the contention of the State Department that
the costs of living in Venezuela exceeded that in Washington,
27
March 8, 1935, ibid., 435-537. For a brief portrait
of Caffrey, which notes his support of American business,
see Herbert Herring, "The Department of State: A Review
With Recommendations to the President," Harper1s, 174
(February 1937),, 234.
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D.C., by 100 percent.

The subsequent report verified the

State Department's figure.

FDR read the report, according

to one insider, "with utmost interest" and "with some
disappointment that he had not caught the Foreign Service
off base.
III
Roosevelt viewed State Department officials and Foreign
Service officers, as a class, with hearty disdain and
distrust.^

He held a mental picture of the State Depart30
ment "as a haven of routineers and paper shufflers."
28

Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins; An
Intimate History (N.Y.: Grosset & Dunlap, 1959), 116-117.
See also Stuart, Department of State, 326.
29

William Lv Langer and Everett S. Gleason were among
the first scholars to suggest, from a reading of official
sources, that FD,R was prejudiced against career diplomats.
They contended, however, that "it would in fact be a mistake
to underline the President's suspicions." The Challenge to
Isolation, 1937-1940 (N.YI: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 8.
But it was not ahd is not] The number of career diplomats
who have commenced upon FDR's deep-rooted prejudice against
diplomats is suqh as to constitute almost an oral tradition
in the diplomatic commund/ty. For instance, see J. Rives
Childs, Foreign Service Farewell: My Years in the Near
East (Charlottesville*.; University Press of Virginia,
1969), 109; Ellis Briggs, Farewell to Foggy Bottom: The
Recollections of a Career Diplomat (N.Y.: David McKay, 1968),
296; Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That .Shaped History
(N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1951) , 215-2.16; Villard, Affairs
at State, 69; Thayer,; Diplomat, 73^74; John Franklin Camp
bell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (N.Y.: Basic Books,
1971) , 114; George Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 567.
Joseph P . Lash, The Partnership That Saved the West:
Roosevelt and Churchill , 1939-1941 (N.Y.: W.W.“ Norton, 1976), 182.

-97-

He believed the Foreign Service was rife with holdovers
from the old Diplomatic Service who had received appoint
ments more for social reasons than for practical considera
tions.

Along with Harry Hopkins, he reveled in calling the

diplomats "cookie-pushers," "white-spat boys," "tea-drinker^ "
31
and "snobbish Europeanized expatriates."
He loved to
crack jokes about the diplomatic establishment.

One of

his favorite, oft-repeated to anyone who would listen, was
"here's a typical State Department letter; it says nothing
at all."32
The popular stereotype of diplomats as undemocratic,
unAmerican and, therefore, unrepresentative of American
life found consistent expression in FDR's dealings with the
Foreign Service.

Shortly after his inauguration in 1933,

Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of State Hull in regard to
representatives sent abroad to attend meetings of inter
national conferences and congresses :
It seems to me that we have an opportunity
here to get in new blood and I hope you
will work up lists that will be more repre
sentative of this country than some of the
lists I have seen in the past.
31

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 34. See also Grace
Tully, FDR: My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949),
175; John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect: A Profile in
History (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 127.
32

Manchester, Glory and Dream, 34 7.

33March 20, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 27.
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Roosevelt did not elaborate upon what he meant by "more
representative of this country."
FDR evidently feared that the lists might be comprised
of a large number of diplomats.

In fact, the lists Hull

contemplated, as he had informed the President earlier, were
largely of "individuals outside of the Government service
selected because of their particular knowledge of subjects,"
including scientists, educators, economists, and humanitarxans.

34

Most of the conferences attended by delegates on

these lists were nonpolitical and relatively unimportant:
The United States participated in
ences

seventy-five such confer-

O C

in 1936 alone. J
Roosevelt preferred to approve personally the names of

all persons who represented the United States abroad in any
capacity.

In November 1934, Undersecretary of State William

Phillips suggested to FDR— -"with a view of saving your time
and expediting business"— a simple plan for designating
persons to attend the technical but nonvital international
meetings.

With no explanation, Roosevelt appended a note

to Phillips' memorandum stating that he preferred "the
36
present practice as it keeps me 'au courant.'"

Dennis P. Myers, and Charles F. Ransom, "Reorganiza
tion of the State Department," American Journal of Inter
national Law, 31 (October 1937), 716.
■^November 9, 1934, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 266,
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FDR believed that the career diplomats were "out of
touch" with American life.

He reasoned that the diplomats,

elitist by birth and abroad too long, acquired unAmerican
habits, mannerisms, and thoughts.

"Ever since he had been

in Washington," Roosevelt told Secretary of State-designate
Edward Stettinius in 1943, he had tried "to reorganize our
Foreign Service so that these professional diplomats knew
something about America."

FDR "felt diplomats should be

recalled and sent to Tennessee for a year" so that they
;

could better represent America abroad.

37

Like most of his countrymen, Roosevelt never questioned
whether the "unAmerican habits" of American diplomats
impaired their ability to serve United States interests.
He simply assumed that if the diplomats failed to reflect
the mores of the ordinary American, they misrepresented
the United States to foreigners.

Roosevelt's attitude,

like that of the general populace, revealed the American
penchant for proselytizing American democratic life.

Only

Americans, the national conscience rationalized, could
represent American democracy and, hence, United States
interests abroad.

Diplomats, by definition, were not

Americans.
Ironically, amateur American diplomats have succumbed
37Weil, Pretty Good Club, 145.
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more readily to foreign ways and thoughts than professionals.
The classic example is Walter Hines Page who served as
Woodrow Wilson's ambassador to the Court of St. James's
during World War I.

Much to Wilson's dismay and the Ambas

sador's own loss of influence with the

President, Page

38
became a convinced Anglophile.
FDR, himself, expressed to his intimates his shock
and surprise over Joseph Kennedy's Anglophilic conversion
in 1938.

Roosevelt had appointed Kennedy— a man of very

definite campaign contributions and indefinite personal
qualifications— ambassador to London, in part, because he
could "trust him."

Kennedy, the President felt compelled

to remark after the Munich Conference, "had been taken in
by Lady Astor and the Cliveden set."

He unfailingly mis

represents United States policy to the cabinet of Neville
Chamberlain.

"Who would have thought," Roosevelt exclaimed,

"that the English could take into camp a red-headed
Irishman!
38

For example, see Ernest R. May, The World War and Ameri
can Isolation:
1914-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1959); Ross Gregory, Walter Hines Page: Ambassador
to the Court of St. James' (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 19 70) .
39

Harold L. Iekes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes,
(3 vols.;N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1953-1954), II, 377, 676,
70 7, 712; John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries
(2 vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959-1965), I, 518.
One historian has stated:
"However the State Department
might instruct him, Kennedy was irresistibly tempted to
reduce American influence abroad to: the sqm.of zezo. " William W.
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Roosevelt never could understand it.

To recognize

the relationship between a diplomat's external demeanor and
his ability to represent his country requires some subtlety
of thought.

The function of the diplomatist, as the pro

fessionals know, "is not to serve as a museum exhibit" of
the external qualities of his countrymen.

Rather, he is

"to constitute an effective channel of communication with
other governments" and to be "a perceptive observer of life
in other countries."

In so performing, the sensitive diplo

matist can hardly avoid "acquiring outlooks, habits of mind,
and occasionally mannerisms" that distinguish him from his
fellow nationals.

In large measure, the diplomatist's use

fulness rests in his ability to place himself in the position
of the other man, to understand the interests and motives
of his counterparts so that peaceful accommodations can be
40
reached without damage to anyone's national interests.
The "differentness" that separates the professional diplo
matist from the amateur, as well as from his countrymen, is
not, therefore, synonomous with disloyalty or an absence of
Kaufmann, "Two American Ambassadors:
Bullitt and Kennedy,"
in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats,
1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953),663.
40
Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 573-574, and "Foreign
Policy and the Professional Diplomat," Wilson Quarterly, 1
(Winter 1977), 148-149.
See also Nicolson, Diplomacy,
55-67.
---------
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patriotism, although American laymen and politicians
often assume as much.
Many American career diplomats, returning after long
years abroad, did find themselves "out of touch" with
American life, but not because of any disloyalty or
foreign attachments, as FDR presumed.

Rather, these

diplomats experienced estrangement and alienation in much
the same manner, but to a far greater degree, as the person
who returns to his hometown after a long absence:

The

changes he sees appear to him more extensive, more stark,
and less comprehensible than they appear to his high school
classmate who had never departed and who had gradually
adjusted to the changes as they occurred.

Years of

shuffling^ from one foreign capital to another did make
"rootless expatriates" of many diplomats.
Few career diplomats have described the feelings of
diplomatic "expatriatism" more eloquently than George F.
Kennan.

Following a summer's visit to his hometown in

Wisconsin in 1936, he wrote:
I came away...aware that I was no longer
a part of what I had once been a part of—
no longer, in fact, a part of anything at all.
It was not that I had left the world of my
boyhood, although this too was true; it was
also that this world had left me. It had
left everyone else, for that matter; but
its departure had been sufficiently gradual
so that those who remained had been less
aware of its passage, and had adjusted in
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varying degrees to the change.
I, like
all other expatriates, simply had been left
behind.
These feelings were only the first strong
reminder of a reality which affects the situa
tion of almost every professional diplomatist.
Increasingly, now, I would not be a part of
my country.... I, not being a part of it,
would nevertheless
, understand it. It,
being still to some extent a part of me,
would nevertheless not understand me. I
would continue to pay it my loyalty....
^
What else, after all, could I be loyal to?
To President Roosevelt, another loyalty existed,
loyalty to the Democratic party, a loyalty equal to or
synonomous with loyalty to the United States.

To it, FDR

found the loyalty of the career diplomats woefully deficient.
Roosevelt judged the career diplomats to be unsympathe
tic, if not hostile, to his New Deal programs.
He also
42
believed that they were Republicans at heart.
More than
any other perception FDR held about the loyalties of
career diplomats— and he rarely questioned their national
patriotism— his view that they displayed less than enthusas^^George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1967), 76-77.
42
Ernest R. May, The "Lessons" of the Past: The Use
and Misuses of History in American Foreign Policy (N.Y.:
Oxford University Press, 1973), 22; Langer and Gleason,
Challenge to Isolation, 8-9.
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tic allegience to the New Deal rankled h i m . ^
He expressed his displeasure openly upon several
occasions.

For example, in a letter to Ambassador Jefferson

Caffrey on March 20, 19 35, FDR admonished:

"I know you will

realize that the only real complaint is against those in
the Service" who "care mighty little about what is happening
in their own country" and who "take very little interest"
in "the masses in the countries to which they are accredited."
Roosevelt continued:
One of our very important new agency heads
[Harry Hopkins, then chief of the Civil
Works Administration] went abroad last
summer and saw several of our Counselors
[sic] and Secretaries and not one of them
asked any questions about how our big
efforts, such as Relief and NRA [National
Recovery Administration] and AAA [Agricultural
Adjustment Act ], were working out. They had
neither the knowledge nor the desire to learn,
43

On at least one occasion, however, FDR compared the
career diplomats to Bolsheviks, only partially in jest.
FDR to William C. Bullitt, February 5, 1935, Orville H.
Bullitt, ed., For the President: Personal and Secret
Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C.
Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 102. On another,
FDR seriously suggested that an Atlantic Monthly article
entitled, "Worse Than Arnold," an account of the machina
tions of Dr. Edward Bancroft during the American Revolution,
be required reading for all Foreiqn Service officers.
FDR to Hull, December 17, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
Affairs, III, 126.
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and yet if they had known they could have
been far more injuresting in their contacts
with foreigners.
Roosevelt wholeheartedly believed that the career diplomats
were political conservatives/ as he understood the term in
regard to domestic politics.
To extend the presumed political conservatism of the
diplomats in domestic matters to the realm of foreign
affairs was a short leap in political faith for FDR.

He

deduced that the professional diplomats in the State Depart
ment were generally critical of his foreign policies.

In

his suspicions, FDR received constant reinforcement from
the ardent New Dealers in his entourage, especially the
internationalists who, like the First Lady Eleanor, urged
the President to take a stronger stance against fascism
abroad.

When such a stance failed to emerge, the inter

nationalists concluded, as did FDR, that the career diplo
mats deliberately conjured up obstacles to place in the path
of whatever foreign policy initiatives the President might
44

Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 450. Hopkins
is not identified in FDR's letter or in the accompanying
notes as the agency head who went abroad. However, it is
clear that the reference is to Hopkins.
See Joseph P. Lash,
Eleanor and Franklin; The Story of Their Relationship Based
on Eleanor Roosevelt's Private Papers (N.^.: w.W. Norton,
1971), 571.
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contemplate.
The charge that the career diplomats were politically
conservative, if not anti-New Deal, contained some truth.
The pre-Rogers Act career diplomats had witnessed the
successful evolution of their profession under the auspices
of Republican, not Democratic, administrations.

In addition,

their patrician backgrounds inclined them, almost naturally,
toward conservative modes of thought.
The post-Rogers Act diplomats, on the other hand,
possessed no vivid memory of how and under whom the Foreign
Service evolved.

They were more democratic and less aristo

cratic than their diplomatic forefathers.

They also were

less fraternity-oriented, less ideologically-inclined,
whether conservative or liberal, and less imbued with an
elitist sense of noblesse oblige than their pre-1924
cousins.
oriented:

The younger diplomats were more institutionallyThey had joined and always had belonged to a

recognized, professional organization.

They could claim,

with some justification, that they had no politics.

46

45

Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 571. See also Weil,
Pretty Good Club, 91; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt
and American Foreign Policy, 1932-194? (N.T7T Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1979), 138.
^Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 148-149, 187-188; Ilchman,
Professional Diplomacy, 224-225, 236.
The memoirs of U. S. diplomats also reveal these dis
tinctions. For example, compare Wilson, Education of a Diplo-

Both generations of diplomats, moreover, eschewed
direct participation in domestic partisan politics.47

Both

owed their allegiance to the United States, whether under
Republican or Democratic administrations.

Both gave their

allegiance to a professional diplomatic ideal.

The only

evidence FDR possessed of the diplomats' Republican sympa
thies was their association with past Republican administra
tions as Foreign Service officers.
IV
FDR's suspicions about the diplomats reflected more
than a question of simple political partisanship.

His dis

trust mirrored a fundamental strain between democratic
politicians and professional diplomats, a strain nowhere
more acute than between American presidents and diplomats,
a strain nowhere better exemplified than between FDR and
the career diplomats.
mat with Kennan, Memoirs. Wilson entered.the old Diplomatic
Service in 1911, while Kennan entered in 1926. See also
Kenneth B. Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat: George S. Messersmith and the State Department's Approach to War, 1933-1941"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota,
1978), 1-46.
47
However, many a diplomat did not hesitate to ingra
tiate himself with influential politicians? many also con
ducted strong letter-writing campaigns on their own behalf
whenever it seemed that a change in presidential administra
tions placed their positions in j e o p a r d y . F o r examples, see
Werking, Master Architects, 245; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 7982.
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Roosevelt and the career diplomats operated from
diverse, even conflicting, perspectives.

Like most presi

dents, FDR viewed foreign affairs from a predominantly
domestic, political vantage point.

As President, he was

both the nation's leading domestic politician and the
nation's chief foreign policy maker.

Elected to office by

popular mandate, Roosevelt equated his New Deal policies,
and even himself, with the national interest.

Accountable

to a democratic electorate, he realized that his personal
survival depended upon how well he fared in foreign as well
as in domestic affairs.
From such a perspective Roosevelt tended to be oppor
tunistic.

He regarded domestic political considerations,

with all of their ramifications and constraints, as necessary
antecedents to the formulation of foreign policy.

If and

when the public became attentive to foreign affairs, he
would look for opportunities abroad that would enhance or,
4©
at least, not diminish his reputation with the voting public.
The image presented would be as important as the substance
achieved.
—

For a good discussion of the differences in the
perspectives of presidents and professional diplomats, see
Monteagle Stearns, "Making American Diplomacy Relevant," The
Foreign Affairs Quarterly, 52 (October 1973), 153-167,
especially 159-162.
See also Dallek, Roosevelt and American
Foreign Policy, 138.

The career diplomats, by contrast, focused exclusively
on foreign affairs.

Like most diplomatists, the Foreign

Service officers of the 1930s regarded domestic political
considerations as unwarranted and unhealthy intrusions in
the conduct of foreign relations.

They abhorred the thought

that temporary shifts in democratic opinion at home could
abruptly alter the course of United States policy abroad.
They had no domestic political constituency:

Their consti

tuency was an abstraction— the national interest.

To the

impulses of democratic passion, whether of mass opinion or
of highly organized interest groups, the diplomats preferred
a consistent policy, "founded on the interests of the nation
49
as a whole and the needs of world peace and stability."
From such a perspective the diplomats instinctively
\v

tended to be conservative'.

They were prone to emphasize

risks over opportunities, to delineate the costs of presi. 50
dentxal mxtiatives abroad.
They yearned, moreover, for
I

I

a "high concentration of authority /behind them," for an
I

!

administration that knew what it was doing, that provided

j

clear and consistent direction in foreign policy matters,
that allowed them to operate with certainty and authority
49
Kennan, "Foreign Policy
149-151.
50

.
and the Professional Dxplomat,

Stearns, "Making Diplomacy Relevant," 160.
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in the application of diplomacy abroad.^
Illustrative of the strain in the perspectives of
Roosevelt and the diplomats was the President's admonition
to Ambassador Caffrey about "those in the Service" who
"take very little interest" in the "masses in the countries
to which they are accredited."

For FDR, the rhetoric of

democracy played just as well abroad as it did at home.
The era of "democratic diplomacy" was in full bloom.

If

the diplomats were democratic instead of aristocratic, they
would share the President's concern— albeit that of the
patrician class— for the masses at home and abroad.

If the

masses at home figured prominently in his foreign policy
calculations, surely the masses abroad counted similarly
in the calculations of his foreign counterparts.
The diplomats displayed little congeniality for the
masses.

They dealt principally with the established

authorities abroad, the official representatives of foreign
governments.

They functioned to reach accommodation, not

to foment domestic political change.

Most of the diplomats

adhered strictly to the view that to cultivate the masses,
whomever they might be, would be to interfere in the
domestic affairs of foreign nations.

American diplomats

knew that their foreign counterparts resented, no less than
51
149.

Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat,"
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themselves, the intrusion of democratic opinion in the
affairs of state.
Many American diplomats, nevertheless, sought to ascer
tain the pulse of opinion groups in foreign lands.

They

regularly visited with and sought information from a variety
of unofficial, as well as official, sources.
for instance, were always a prime source.

Correspondents,

No less than the

foreign diplomats who reported on events in the United
States, American diplomats realized that their superiors in
Washington would be interested in the internal affairs of
the nations to which they were accredited.

To anyone in

Washington who cared to read them, the dispatches of American
52
diplomats were replete with information on "the masses."
Neither Roosevelt nor the career diplomats ever appre
ciated the perspective of the other.

Roosevelt— as a

politician— thrived on action; he strived to change institu
tions, in image if not in substance.

The diplomats— as

professionals— yearned for stability and consistency; they
sought to preserve institutions, not to reform them.
52

See the volumes m Foreign Relations of the United
States: Diplomatic Papers, 1933-1939 (29 vols.; Washington,
D.C. :Government Printing Office, 1949-1957), passim.
Others have remarked favorably upon the overall quality of
American diplomatic reporting from abroad during the 19 30s.
For instance, see Langer and Gleason, Challenge to I s o l a t i o n ,
!25 .
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V
Roosevelt's personal style and administrative methods
precluded him from reaching a modus vivendi with the Foreign
Service.

His habits and behavior were antithetical to the

diplomatic mind.

Tempermentally flexible but often impatient,

FDR's intellectual processes were "intuitive rather than
logical."
He

He often "thought lazily and superficially."

53

rarely thought through his position on a particular

subject until some concrete action on it was presented to
him for his approval or disapproval.

54

Generally distrust

ful of so-called "experts" and genuinely indifferent, if
not antagonistic, to systems of any sort, Roosevelt preferred
to act in all matters by improvisation and intuition.

55

He deliberately fostered inconsistency, confusion, and
Byzantine intrigues among his subordinates.

He created

overlapping administrative empires in competition with each
53

Arthur M. SchJesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt
(3 vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957-1960), I, 407.
54
Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 258.
55 .
Historians agree on very little about FDR. Like
FDR's contemporaries, historians generally view
FDR favorably or harshly.
However, almost all agree upon
his unorthodox administrative methods.
See Clarke A.
Chambers, "FDR, Pragmatist-Idealist: An Essay in Histori
ography," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 52 (April 1961),
50-55.
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other and delegated incomplete and uncertain responsibilities
to his lieutenants.56

Few people inside or outside govern

ment ever could decipher, to their satisfaction, the overall
direction of the New Deal.

Only FDR knew, and one might

question whether even he knew, what initiatives his admini
stration was forging at any given moment.
The President’s peculiar administrative style emanated
from a compulsion to hold power securely in his own hands.
His administrative methods linked access to information and
the power of decision-making to his own survival and

authority.

Few presidents, moreover, have possessed a

sharper sense of personal power or more faith in their
competence to use it than FDR.

57

Whether m

domestic or

foreign affairs, Roosevelt evinced a supreme confidence in
his own power of persuasion, divorced from any systematic
or coordinated planning.
One of the first to offer this interpretation of FDR's
administrative methods was Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt,
II, 528. See also Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power:
The Politics of Leadership (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1960) ,
161; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the
Fox (N.Y.: Harcourt, Bracer 1956), 373-374; Theodore A.
Wilson and Richard J. McKinzie, "The Masks of Power:
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Conduct of American Diplomacy,"
in Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, eds., Makers of
American Diplomacy: From Benjamin Franklin to Henry Kissin
ger (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19 74), 475 .
57

Neustadt, Presidential Power, 161.
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Roosevelt held a highly personalized view of diplo
macy, adapted from his domestic political triumphs.

He

believed that his considerable personal charm, if applied
in face-to-face negotiations with foreign leaders, best
could resolve differences and rectify misunderstandings.
"I know you will not mind my being brutally frank," he once
wrote Prime Minister Winston Churchill, "when I tell you
that I think I can personally handle Stalin better than
58
either your Foreign Office or my State Department."
About the same time, FDR also told Hopkins that "if I give"
Stalin "everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him
in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything
and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace."

59

Convinced that he could deal with foreign statesmen as he
dealt with his own countrymen, Roosevelt never distinguished
between the conduct of domestic and foreign policy.
58
March 18, 1942, Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D.
Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill:
Their Secret Wartime Correspondenci fa.y.: E .P . Dutton,
T9 757,

196":----------------------------

FDR's

^^ May, The "Lessons" of History, 23.
penchant for personal diplomacy was evident at least as
early as 1933. Herbert Feis quotes FDR from the Morgenthau
diaries of March 9, 19 33, in regard to the negotiations
with the Soviet Union over recognition:
"Gosh, if I could
only, myself, talk to some one man representing the Russians,
I could straighten out the whole question." 1933: Charac
ters in Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 309. On
FDR and Mussolini, see Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreigi
Policy, 145.

Nor did Roosevelt ever seriously consider the impli
cations of his unorthodox methods for the implementation of
foreign policy.

That his penchant for indirection and

inconsistencey— however conducive to the control of the
bureaucracy and to the exercise of leadership in domestic
affairs— merely left both friends and foes, including the
State Department, uncertain about American intentions in
foreign relations never troubled him.

60

He contented himself with occasional fulminations
about the static nature of bureaucracies.

To the head of

the Federal Reserve Board, for instance, he commented:
The Treasury [ Department] is so large „and
far-flung and ingrained in its practices
that I find it is almost impossible to get
the action and results I want....But the
Treasury is not to be compared with the
State Department. You should go through
the experience of trying to get any changes
in the thinking, policy and action of the
career diplomats and you'd know what a real
problem was. But the Treasury and the State
Department put together are nothing compared
with the N-a-v-y....To change anything in the
N-a-v-y is like punching a feather bed.
60

For a critical view of FDR's administrative methods
as they applied to foreign affairs— views which contrast
sharply with the laudatory views of Schlesinger and Neustadt
on FDR— see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years
in the State Department (N.Yu W.W. Norton, 1969), 734;
Campbell, Fudge Factory, 98-100; Wilson and McKinzie, "Masks
of Power," 474-475.
61

Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 182.
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Devotedly scornful of established routines, FDR regarded
all bureaucracies as behemoths of inaction and ineptitude
against which he had to battle.
More so than most bureaucracies, the diplomatic
establishment was of little use in FDR's eyes.

During the

better part of his first two terms in office, the Depression
at home occupied his

energies and diverted his atten

tion from all but the most pressing of foreign crises.
Supremely confident of his own abilities, Roosevelt adhered
comfortably to his deeply-entrenched prejudices against
career diplomats.
VI
Roosevelt formed his impressions of career diplomats
during the pre-Rogers Act era.

As President Wilson's

assistant secretary of the Navy from 1913 to 1920, FDR had
opportunity to view the foreign services.

As President,

he regarded a few remnants of the old diplomatic corps
as representative of the new Foreign Service.

That Repub

lican administrations largely created and nurtured the
Foreign Service did not ameliorate his suspicions.

In a

conversation in January 1935 with Edith Rogers, widow of
the sponsor of the Rogers Act and a Republican member of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Roosevelt discussed
the Service in terms of its inadequacies as of 1919.

Rep-
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re sen tat ive Rogers subsequently reported to Wilbur Carr
that FDR was "definitely unfavorable" to diplomats, although
he thought "consuls were good."

She concluded that President

Roosevelt possessed "no clear picture of the Foreign Ser
vice. "62
The Service had changed significantly since 1924.

It

was, for instance, much less elitist and more receptive to
men of diverse social and economic backgrounds.

To officer

George S. Messersmith, who began his career as a consul in
1915 following several years as a high school teacher and
who lacked independent wealth, the Service had become by
the mid-1930s "unquestionably as democratic as one could be
devised.
Additional reforms, nevertheless, beckoned for attention.
A malaise born of long-standing public opprobrium toward
diplomats and reinforced by economic deprivations stemming
from the Depression haunted the Foreign Service.

Acute

sensitivity to the lack of public support for their profession embittered many diplomats.

64

^2Crane, Mr. Carr, 314.
63
Memorandum, February 2, 1938, Ilchman,
Professional Diplomacy, 232. See also Heinrichs, "Bureau
cracy," 187.
64

The articles by Kennan, cited supra, are prime
examples.

-118-

In addition, internal divisions,, competition for
primacy in foreign affairs with other federal agencies,
principally the Department of Commerce, and a deeply-held
feeling among diplomats of the need to protect themselves
from a hostile environment inhibited innovative thinking
about the conduct of diplomacy and weakened the diplomatic
establishment at a time of increasing international tension.®'’
The need for leadership to restructure the foreign affairs
bureaucracy and to instill in it a renewed vigor was clear.
President Roosevelt chose to ignore the need.

He

never looked beyond the superficial portrait that he drew
of diplomats as cookie-pushers, tea-drinkers, and idlers.
He saw only the outward appearances, not the inward sub
stance of diplomacy.

He never seriously considered reexamin

ing his indictment of the diplomatic profession.

Nor did

he proffer any positive antidote for the ills, real or
imagined, that he judged beset the Foreign Service.
FDR was more inclined to discipline the diplomats than
to reform the Foreign Service.

In 19 36, for instance,

®®The United States foreign affairs bureaucracy was
small and compact, even by the standards of the 1930s,
reflecting, no doubt, the passive role the U.S. played
then in world affairs.
It is a mistake to equate the
present bureaucratic apparatus with that of the 1930s,
as Wilson and McKinzie do.
"Masks of Power," 475. They
refer to "the chaotic foreign affairs bureaucracy," a
description more relevant to modern times.
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Roosevelt suggested to Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton
Moore that "we should have a definite rule that hereafter
the President will not reappoint to: the Foreign Service any
former officers...who have resigned and become officials of
the Estate] Department."

He -further suggested that "we

should discourage appointing any Foreign Service officer as
66
officials of the Department."

Previous administrations periodically assigned Foreign
Service officers— a few, not all1
— to tours of duty in the
State Department to benefit from their expertise.

Such a

tour also provided the officer with an opportunity to live
in the United States for an extended period of time.
were senior officers.

Most

By law, an officer whose stay in the

Department exceeded four years had to resign from the
Service:

Upon presidential authorization, he then could

become an official of the Department or be reinstated to the
Servxce.67
In seeking to abolish this practice, infrequent as it
was, Roosevelt offered no rationale.'

He simply wanted to

prevent, one might surmise, the "cohabitation" of Foreign
^ M a y 27, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III,
314. See also FDR to Rudolph Forster, Executive Clerk,
White House Offices, May 23, 1936, ibid., 310.
^Norton, "Foreign Office Organization," 37; Myers and
Ransom, "Reorganization of State Department," 717.
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Service and State Department personnel, who easily came to
share common perspectives.

Had the President possessed

positive intentions, he would have expressed them.
not.

He did

Although limitations in the number of competent

experts available to fill Department slots prevented the
implementation of Roosevelt's "definite rule," his suggestion
characterized his approach to the need for improvement of
Foreign Service operations.
Roosevelt sought to punish the diplomats in other ways
as well.

He held no animosity toward Foreign Service

officers who performed consular functions.

Like the

average American who knew anything at all about the Foreign
Service, FDR distinguished between diplomats and consuls.
He believed that the latter were hard-working, unpretentious
men who provided useful services to the nation.

Early in

1935 Roosevelt ordered the State Department to inform those
diplomatic officers of pre-Rogers Act vintage who had no
consular experience that the President expected their
transfer to the consular branch as part of their training
requisite to consideration for promotion to a ministerial
post.

He would consider no diplomat, whatever his back

ground, for chief-of-mission status unless the diplomat
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had consular experience.68

Ostensibly, FDR wanted "all

diplomats to have at least one consular assignment in order
to gain administrative experience and make contact with the
business world."

69

In actuality, he wanted to humble the

diplomats, to extract punitive retribution for their elitist
demeanor.
The protests FDR received over his policy on diplomatconsul interchangeability surprised him.
resistance from the senior diplomats.

He anticipated

One of the first to

question the President's wisdom, however, was Jesse Isidor
Straus, the head of Macy's department store whom Roosevelt
had appointed ambassador to France.

From Paris, Straus

wrote to FDR in April 1935:
I understand that an effort is being made in
the various appointments in the Foreign Service
to insist upon experience in both branches
[diplomatic and consular] of that service.
Of this in theory I heartily approve, provided,
however, that there is a realization that there
is a difference in type, in background, in
acquaintanceship with social amenities and
customs that must be observed. A good admini
strative type may be a first class Consul or
Vice Consul, but often he is not at all
fitted for a service in which social
68
Hooker, Moffat Papers, 1 2 4; Crane, Mr. Carr, 318-319.
See also Ilchman, Professiona1 Diplomacy, 210; Barnes and
Morgan., Foreign Service, 212-213; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy,"
183; Jefferson Patterson, Diplomatic Duty and Diversion
(Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1956), 187, 206.
^Hooker, Moffat Papers, 124.
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contacts are essential, whether the
envious, devoid of certain character
istics, admit it or not.70
A man of impecable business credentials and limited
diplomatic experience, Straus perceived that less than
pragmatic motives inspired the

president's policy.

He

also perceived a difference in the abilities and functions
of diplomats and consuls.
Roosevelt soon retreated from his strict policy on
interchangeability.

In September, Nicholas Roosevelt,

a distant Republican cousin of the President's and a
former chief-of-mission under Hoover then working on the
editorial staff of the New York Herald-Tribune, added his
voice to the list of protesters.

With a list in hand of

proposed transfers in the Foreign Service, which he may
have obtained surreptitiously, Nicholas questioned FDR's
foresight at a time when new crises arose abroad almost
daily.

In particular, he wondered about the wisdom in

transferring Jay Pierrepont Moffat, chief of the Depart
ment's Division of Western European Affairs, to Sidney,
Australia, as consul general. 71x

FDR replied that

"^April 9, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II,
467.

^Notation, ibid., Ill, 10.
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"Moffat was delighted to go" but that "no other shifts"
would occur "in the present emergency."

72

The career diplomats/ themselves, were slow to react
publicly to the president's directive on transfers.

Although

the senior diplomats, especially, never embraced the concept
of interchangeability with consuls, they had accepted it in
principle by the time FDR ascended to the White House.

In

part, the "scandal of 192 7" had forced them to accept
transfers as a reality.

They also had employed the argument

that diplomats, no less than consuls, could and did assist
American businesses overseas:

They had done so as a means

to the end of achieving career status for their profession;
they could not now comfortably argue for the recognition of
distinctions between diplomats and consuls, distinctions
they had worked to blur.
Distinctions did exist, however.
officers, whether

Most Foreign Service

they served in the diplomatic or consular

branch, knew as much.

Yet, they had never

deigned to define
73
publicly the differences in diplomatic and consular work.

^ F D R to Nicholas Roosevelt, September 19, 1935,
ibid., III, 10. Moffat felt the policy on-transfers "was
fine only, if the diplomat was a poor organizer." Hooker,
Moffat Papers, 124.
"^Schulzinger, Diplomatic M i n d , 122.
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Nearly all officers, whether distinguished for their
administrative or analytical abilities, coveted the diplo
matic rank of chief-of-mission.

Nearly all of them also

believed that American laymen and politicians were incapable
of understanding diplomatic functions apart from consular
work.

Too often the public had revealed scorn for diplo

macy.^

The officers had preferred, therefore, to deal

with the distinctions between diplomatic and consular work
through internal bureaucratic processes.
The Foreign Service finally addressed the issue of
diplomatic versus consular work in an article in ;The Foreign
~7C
Affairs Quarterly published in January 1936.
The author
of the article, G. Howland Shaw, a young career officer,
argued that excessive attention'had been focused upon the
administration of the Foreign Service to the virtual exclu
sion of the more vital elements of work and personnel.
must now face a fact that for
conceal.

eleven

"We

years we have endeavored to

The work of the higher positions in the diplomatic

branch differ from that of the average comparable positions
in the consular branch."

The diplomatic branch, Shaw

explained, afforded greater opportunity for individuality,
74

Ibid .

75
'-'Shaw, "American Foreign Service," 323-333.
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initiative, and imagination, whereas the consular branch
required organizational and administrative skills.

He

deplored the concept that shuffled diplomats into consular
positions and vice versa.

The emphasis in consular work

is on the perfection of individual problems, rather than
on analytical thought or deduction based © n broad trends;
a man who is a first-rate administrator does not necessarily
make a first-rate ambassador, any more than the possession
of those qualities that make an outstanding ambassador
guarantees success in administering a large and complex
consular office.

"Such differences of aptitude and there

fore of function are recognized in other lines of work,"
Shaw wrote.

"Why should they not be recognized in the

Foreign Service?"

He then offered several suggestions for

the development of officers according to their interests
and abilities.

76

In part Shaw's article signaled the healing of the
schism that had existed between diplomats and consuls since
77
at least 1924.
He articulated the views of the postRogers Act generation of diplomats, officers who had little
stake in the quarrels that beset the older diplomats.
76Ibid., 327-332.
77

Heinrichs provides a detailed analysis of Shaw,
his career, and his article in relation to the Foreign
Service.
"Bureaucracy," 154-179, 185-188, 192-200.

The
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new, younger group of officers identified themselves
exclusively with the Foreign Service. 7 8
In his article

Shaw set aside the old battles and

offered a new direction for leadership within the Service.
Indicative of the support for Shaw's thought among officers
was the plea of one amateur ambassador that FDR appoint
Shaw as chief of Foreign Service Personnel.

"The morale of

the Service," Ambassador William C. Bullitt wrote to
Roosevelt in May 1937, "is becoming more demoralized every
day and nothing could turn the tide of discouragement so
7Q
quickly and completely as his [Shaw's] appointment."
In part, too, Shaw's article reflected an attempt to
explain the mission and needs of the Foreign Service to an
audience outside of the diplomatic community.

"The work of

the American Foreign Service," the article began, "has
often been shrouded in mystery.
mysterious about it."

In reality there is nothing

Shaw proceeded to describe the work

of the Foreign Service and the historical and current
constraints under which American diplomats functioned.

He

also offered several suggestions for reforming the management
78

Shaw entered the Diplomatic Corps in 1918.
185-188.
79

Ibid.,

May 5, 19 37, Bullitt, For the President, 212. Shaw
was appointed chief of Foreign Service personnel later that
year.
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of the Service.80
The article garnered a wide readership within the
diplomatic community.

Whether President Roosevelt read the

article or contemplated its recommendations is doubtful.
evidence exists to suggest that he did.

No

The State Department

and Foreign Service did implement several organizational
reforms during Roosevelt's second term.

The President's

role in instigating these reforms was negligible.
VII
The major impetus for reform of the foreign affairs
bureaucracy originated from within the State Department.

81

Under the direction of Secretary Hull, the Department
quietly began to formulate plans for reorganizing its internal
operations in 1935.

Policy formulation always had interested

Hull more than matters of administration.

He recognized

that phe Department could not devote serious attention to
formulating sound, long-range policies without a more
_____________

I
■

80

"American Foreign Service,"

81

32 3, 32 7-332.

See Moore to FDR, December 15, 19 36, Nixon, FDR and
Foreign Affairs, III, 541? "Hull Reorganizes State Depart
ment," The New York Times, May 27, 19 37, A3. The Times
article noted that a quiet reorganization had been underway
in the Department for the past two years.
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efficient system of meeting the demands of immediate
QO
problems.
Although the Department "was excellently
informed about its trees," it "had no time to care for the
woods entrusted to it."

83

And to Hull, the era had passed

when the United States could afford to treat policy merely
. . 84
as a response to a crisis.
A series of departmental orders issued in May and
August 1937 transformed the State Department's internal
operations.

These orders rearranged and reduced the geogra

phical divisions in the Department.

A new division of

European Affairs, for instance, absorbed the old division
of Eastern European Affairs, while a division of American
Republics consolidated the divisiore of Mexican and Latin
American Affairs.

The orders also created, with congressional

approval, several new advisory positions and the office of
counselor.

Through reorganization, the Department's hier

archy hoped to provide more time for personnel to devote to
82

Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 224.
83
Myers and Ransom, "Reorganization of the State
Department," 714.
84

Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 224-225; Myers and
Ransom, "Reorganization of the State Department, 713-714;
Miller, "New State Department," 500-501.

the consideration and formulation of broad governmental
pc
policies.
The Department remained a compact and a highly inte
grated organization.

In marked contrast to most reorgani

zations of governmental agencies, the reorganization of the
State Department did not result in the hiring of additional
personnel.

Nor did the Department receive additional

appropriations to implement its plans .

Indeed, Hull claimed

that his efforts to reshape the Department had resulted in
the "weeding out" of forty to fifty inferior officers
through voluntary or forced resignations since 1935.®^
The reorganization of the Department did produce,
however, a substantial shuffling of personnel.

Reorganiza-

tional schemes often contain a hidden agenda to shift
personnel.®^

Such may have been the case, at least in part,

85
George Messersmith returned to the Department as an
assistant secretary of state in 1937 after a tour as
ambassador to Austria and played a crucial role in the
reorganization planning and implementation.
p ZT

"Hull Reorganizes State Department,"The New York
Times, May 27, 1937, A3. See also,,Miller, "New State Department,"
505. There were 732 Foreign Service officers in 1932 and
700 in 1938.
gy
■
See Harold Seidman, Politics, Position & Power: The
Dynamics of Federal Organization C3ra ed., N.Y.V Oxford' '
University Press, 1980), 3-33.
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of the changes implemented by the Department.

Beginning

in 1938, several Foreign Service officers— mostly of the
younger generation— received transfers to the Department
where they became chiefs of various divisions.

G. Howland

Shaw, for instance, became chief of Foreign Service Personnel.
Simultaneously, several older officials, including Carr,
received assignments abroad as chiefs-of-mission.

88

The reorganization of 1937 preceded a more significant
development that occurred on the eve of World War II.

For

two decades the Department of State had faced the steady
encroachment of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce
into the area of foreign relations.

Both departments

operated their own independent foreign services.

The

Commerce Department, especially, had involved itself increas
ingly in questions of a political nature, instead of simply
providing liaison support to American businesses overseas.
Responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations had
become fragmented.

In 1936 the State Department initiated

a concerted effort to establish its control over foreign
affairs.
qo

Myers and Ransom, "Reorganization of the State
Department," 506-507; Miller, "New State Department,"
716-717; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 130-131.
See also
Chapter 5 infra.
89

For example, see Moore to FDR, December 15, 1936,
Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 541; Moss, "Bureaucrat
as Diplomat," 225.
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The State Department realized its objective with
congressional approval of President Roosevelt's executive
reorganization plan in 1939.

The president's plan instituted

a broad reordering of bureaus and agencies within the
executive branch.

Among the changes in his plan was the

amalgamation of the foreign services of agriculture and
commerce into the United States Foreign Service under the
supervision of the secretary of state.

With amalgamation,

the State Department finally assumed the dominant role for
the conduct of American foreign relations, a role envisioned
for the Department in the Rogers Act of 192 4.90
Roosevelt's support for the State Department's position
in the reorganization plan was not quixotic.

Roosevelt

harbored no ideals about how and why foreign affairs should
be consolidated under the direction of the State Department.
His support derived from less loftier motives.

From a

professional and bureaucratic perspective, the fragmentation
of authority and responsibility for foreign affairs was
wasteful and unwieldly.

From FDR's perspective, Herbert

Hoover's old department— the Department of Commerce— was
partially responsible for the Depression.
90

More than to

Heinrichs states:
"As a result of these developments
(and others), the Foreign Service on the eve of World War II
was stable, confident, and improving. This was perhaps the
most favorable position it would ever achieve." "Bureau
cracy," 20 0. See also Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service,
222-223.
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grant firm control in foreign relations to the diplomats,
Roosevelt wanted toveaken the powerful position the Commerce
Department had enjoyed with American businesses since the
1920s. 91

Including the foreign service of the Agriculture

Department in his reorganization plan merely served to
conceal his motives.

He always intended to be his own

secretary of state.
VIII
President Roosevelt demonstrated scant regard for the
Foreign Service bequeathed to him by his predecessors.
In 1933 he inherited a young, imperfect, but steadily
improving professional diplomatic corps.

Under his admini

stration, the development of the Foreign Service virtually
halted.

Retrenchment and restoration, devoid of any

significant departures or progress, marked the path along
which the Service traveled under the New Deal.

By the time

of the opening salvos of World War II, the Service had
changed little since the 1920s.
Members of the corps were less illusioned, less
enamored with diplomatic life, more inured to hardships,
92
and more professional in their orientations.
The Service
91
92

Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 215.
Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 188-201.
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was also vastly understrength, given the new demands placed
upon it.

As the result of economy measures and highly

selective recruitment, the Service had only grown by 30 per93
cent since the Rogers Act.
Many officers were near
retirement.

Despite the presence of many talented diplomats

within the Service, the future augured the onset of anemia.
The Service suffered from the lack of life-sustaining
transfusions— the infusion of new recruits, who require
years of training and experience to develop into professional
diplomats, and upon whom the future institutional capacity of
the nation to conduct diplomacy rested.
Underlying the lack of development sustained by the
Foreign Service was FDR's prejudice against career diplomats.
The Depression forced austerity on the Service and inhibited
\

.
1

Roosevelt from assuming a more active role in foreign affairs.
The Depression did not shape his behavior regarding the
Service.

The Depression was more a situation that constrained

the making of foreign policy than it was a
conditioned attitudes toward the machinery
implementing policy.

I
f
.
I
responsible foi:
I

factor that

With rare exception, FDR confined his

interest in the Foreign Service to admonishing certain,
characteristics that he perceived in diplomats.
93

Ibid., 201.

I
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Roosevelt's prejudices against the Foreign Service
reflected traditional, popular American attitudes toward
diplomats and diplomacy.

He personified the "chronic

distaste of democratic opinion for the image of the pro
fessional diplomatic agent."

He suspected career diplomats

for their isolation from the mainstream of American society,
for their mode of dress and social mannerisms, and for
their presumed leanings toward foreign ways and thoughts.
He sometimes thought that career diplomats should reimburse
the government for allowing them to lead their idyllic lives.
Although he liked consuls, whom he judged by little more than
their presumed appearance, he associated the Foreign Service
with the unflattering popular image of the old Diplomatic
Service.
Like the average American FDR seldom subjected his
prejudices against diplomats to critical analysis.

He

considered the Foreign Service unrepresentative of American
society and less than suitable as a vehicle for the promul
gation of United States foreign policy.

Combined with his

haphazard administrative methods and penchant for personal
diplomacy, his attitudes bespoke a lack of concern for the
development of an institutional diplomatic capability.

He

simply had little use for the Foreign Service.
The Foreign Service, nevertheless, still conducted the
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bulk of the nation's diplomacy under FDR.

How well American

diplomacy fared during the tumultuous years prior to World
War II depended, in part, upon the chiefs-of-mission that
FDR appointed to head the embassies and legations abroad.
In the matter of appointments, no less than in other aspects
concerning the Foreign Service, Roosevelt found little to
attract him to professional diplomats.
On the eve of World War II, the

President cordially

ridiculed career chiefs-of-mission in a memorandum to
Secretary of State Hull.

"You get to be a Minister if

(a) you are loyal to the Service,
offend people,
functions."

94

(b) you do nothing to

(c) you are not intoxicated at public
Although FDR was partially correct, he might

have added, in fairness, another compendium of qualifications
for selection as chief-of-mission, to wit, if you possess no
diplomatic experience, you are a loyal Democrat, and you have
contributed to the campaign coffers.

QAAugust

28, 1938, Roosevelt, His Personal Letters,
1928-1945, II, 914.

Thz two-A.tng z I a ca6 ofa d i p l o 
matic. appolntmznt6 - -the.
?AZ6ldznt'6 pzA.6on.al pAzdllzzt-con and thz zaAzzA oi£ic.zA.6>
zholzz by ability and 6znloAlty-- lka6 bzgunl.
Assistant Secretary of State
Sumner Wellesl

4

THE PRESIDENT, THE STATE DEPARTMENT
AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CHIEFS-OF-MISSION:
THE WARD'-HEELERS VERSUS THE OLD-BOY NETWORK
During a press conference in the executive offices of

the White House on July 12, 1933, a reporter queried Presi
dent Roosevelt regarding reports that he had encountered
"difficulty in finding enough rich Democrats to fill the
diplomatic posts."
believe it.

FDR replied bluntly.

"Now don't you

I have in the diplomatic folder, I think there

are two hundred and fifty or three hundred names of deserving
Democrats who would like to have places under any condition,
salary or no salary."

As an afterthought, Roosevelt added:

"Then, for instance, just to give you an example, we have
career diplomats.

Of course, we are going to keep them in."

President Roosevelt deviated little from traditional
ways of selecting men to represent the United States abroad.
Keith Eagles, "Ambassador Joseph E. Davies and Ameri
can-Soviet Relations, 1937-1941" (unpublished Ph.D. disser
tation, University of Washington, 1966), 90.
2

Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 301.
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Like most presidents before and since, he reserved the most
prestigious and important diplomatic posts for loyal parti
sans.

Although he appointed nearly as many career diplomats

as deserving Democrats to head diplomatic missions, he rele
gated the career chiefs to the least desirable and least
significant posts.
That career officers headed a proportionate share of the
diplomatic missions derived more from the tenacity of State
Department officials than from the beneficence of the Presi
dent.

Like most Foreign Service officers before and since, the

career diplomats and their colleagues in the Department view
ed the appointment of chiefs-of-mission with particular sen
sitivity.

Chief-of-mission status represented the highest

mark of professional distinction within the diplomatic community.
The appointment of amateurs denigrated the office in the
eyes of the diplomats and their foreign counterparts.

The

appointment of amateurs also augured for the relinquishment of
a measure of professional diplomatic control over foreign
policy.

Amateurs owed their loyalty to the White House, not

to the Foreign Service.

With political acumen born of earlier

struggles to enhance their profession, the diplomats engaged
FDR and his patronage advisers in a battle over appointments.
President Roosevelt established and maintained the boun
daries within which the struggle ensued.

In typical Roose-

veltian fashion, he allowed the proponents of patronage and
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the proponents of professionalism to compete for his favor
in the selection of envoys.

He delegated responsibility to

both factions for recommending nominees, while reserving
final authority for the selections to himself.
Roosevelt never cherished the idea of appointing career
diplomats to American legations and embassies.

In the end,

the precedent of appointing career diplomats as chiefs-ofmission, established during the 1920s, contributed to the
relative success of the diplomats as much as any other factor.
The ratio of approximately equal career-to-noncareer appoint
ments, reached under Hoover in 1932, remained unchanged under
the New Deal.

After 1944 the proportion of career chiefs-

of-mission again rose steadily.

By 1960 career diplomats

filled 71 percent of the United States missions abroad.
Had Roosevelt wanted to, he could have appointed sub
stantially more career diplomats as chiefs-of-mission.

De

spite the pressures of patronage, the opportunity to do so
existed, particularly after 1936.

Then, with the increasing

erosion of world peace, even the President's dispensers of
patronage would have approved.

Instead, little changed.

bued with a commanding assurance of his own diplomatic
abilities, Roosevelt viewed the need for experienced
representation abroad in the same light that he viewed the

Im
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value of a healthy Foreign Service.
I
Loyal Democrats and Roosevelt supporters awaited the
advent of the New Deal with eager anticipation in 19 33.
FDR's triumph of the previous November ended twelve
Republican dominance of the White House.

years of

With the long

drought over, the Democratic faithful looked forward to a
hearty feast at the trough of political patronage.

Rarely

in the history of the United States, one commentator wrote,
had a national administration faced so much pressure from
hungry job-seekers.

3

The President-elect was inclined to satisfy them.

FDR

harbored few qualms regarding the application of spoils
politics.

A tireless, adroit player of the patronage game,

the former New York Governor well understood the strategies
of job distribution.

Shortly after the election, Roosevelt

informed his closest associates that, while he would not
accept "political suggestions" for cabinet appointments,
loyalty and campaign contributions naturally would be among
the criteria for many other appointments.

4

3
Harold Brayman, "Roosevelt and the Spoilsmen," Current
History, 41 (October 1934), 17.
4
Edward J. Flynn, You' ie the Boss (N.Y.: Viking Press,
1947), 123.
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FDR especially wanted the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago"
men to receive just awards.

Known by the acronym RBC,

the group numbered thirty-four.

While many traditionally

large Democratic contributors waited until after the Chicago
nominating convention to commit themselves, the RBC group
thoroughly won Roosevelt's devotion by pledging considerable
financial assistance to his bid for the nomination.

Follow

ing the election, FDR's close advisers formed an informal
committee for the purpose of "taking care" of the RBC people.
As one adviser, Edward J. Flynn, remarked:

"There was more

or less tacit understanding between the President-nominate
and us that wherever possible they should be taken care of."
Seven members of the RBC group later sought and received
.

6

prestigious diplomatic appointments.
T
---- *
^------------ ’
L------ 'R
•
, Ibid., 84-85, 123.
See also Burns, Lion and Fox, 187189; Henry Carter, "The Spoils," The North American Review,
235 (June 1933S) , 523-528; Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roose
velt) (4 vols.;| Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), III, 172;
Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, I, 420-421.
] Gunther states: Roosevelt was a long-minded man. To the
end bf his life he maintained a zealous loyalty to almost
all /members o/f the small original clique of his supporters,
and /indeed! to most others who came out for him before the
actual nomination.... Conversely, he never forgave some
leading. Democrats who opposed him, or were lukewarm, before
the Chicago Convention.
It is striking in the extreme that
he never gave any really big job to any Democrat, no matter
how eminent or potentially useful, who did not think he was
fit to be/President in 1932." Roosevelt in Retrospect, 265.
6

The 7 immediate members of the RBC group who received
diplomatic assignments were: Judge Robert Bingham, Joe
Davies, Joseph Kennedy, Breckinridge Long, David H.

5
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The task of assembling information on deserving
Democrats fell to James A. "Big Jim" Farley.

A strapping,

genial, redheaded Irishman and former New York boxing
commissioner, Farley had worked "with furious energy" as
Chairman of the Democratic National Committee during the
1932 campaign.

Following the election, Roosevelt slated

Farley for postmaster general, a position traditionally
held by the "keeper of the plum tree."

Roosevelt's advisers

concurred with the choice of Farley as the administration's
chief dispenser of spoils:

No other man knew more about

who ought to be rewarded and why.
Farley plunged into his job as "captain of spoils" with
unabashed enthusiasm.

Flouting custom, he publicly pro

claimed that his job was to reward the politically deserving.
In regard to the customs patrol along the Mexican border,
Farley announced to the press that "Democrats would look
g

just as well riding horses as Republicans."
Morris, Laurence Steinhardt, and Jesse Isidor Straus.
Sever
al others, just as loyal to FDR, but on the fringe of the
RBC groups also received eminent diplomatic posts.
See
chapter 5 infra.
7
Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (N.Y.: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1966), 75; /"“John F.~Carter7 The Nev/ Dealers (N.Y.: Simon and
Schuster, 1934), 244-245.
g

Brayman, "The Spoilsmen," 19.
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He openly systematized patronage procedures.

Not

content to rely upon memory alone, Farley developed an
elaborate filing system.

He established a folder for every

person who sought a position, and he maintained numerous
Q
lists of political loyalists and their preferences.
One
list— the Preferred List— comprised the names of those who
qualified for major appointments by virtue of their political
loyalty and munificient financial donations to the campaign
coffers.^
The Preferred List included many potential candidates
for chief-of-mission posts.

Like nearly all administrations

before and since, the New Deal administration regarded
ambassadorships as prize plums with which to reward the more
generous campaign contributors.

The Preferred List was .

also the one patronage list that commanded FDR* s assiduous
attention.

He was its principal compiler.^

^Ibid., 17-20; New Dealers, 244-246.
1{^Ralph Robert Stackman, "Laurence A. Steinhardt: New
Deal Diplomat, 1933-1945"
(unpublished. Ph.D. dissertation,
Michigan State University, 1967), 33-34.
■'■"^Ibid. Many presidents have maintained a Preferred
List— at least in the twentieth century. For instance, an
eyewitness recounts how President Eisenhower, glancing down
the list, recalled that he had promised Senator Aiken of
Vermont to appoint the first person from that state who made
the Preferred List to a particular vacancy.
Reportedly, Ike
casually stated:
"Take him— take this fellow from Vermont."
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Appointments
to the Regulatory Agencies: The Federal ■Communications
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, 1949-1974,
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Foreign Service officers were naturally apprehensive
of their fate under the new Democratic administration.
Prior to Roosevelt's inauguration, word circulated through
out the State Department that the President-elect distrusted
professional diplomats and viewed the development of the
Foreign Service during the 192 0s with a jaundiced eye. 12
Most officers were assured of job security by law.
The Rogers Act had granted career status to the diplomats,
and no public official seriously considered undoing what the
Rogers Act had accomplished.

Nevertheless, the President's

biases, as well as the pressures of patronage, appeared to
limit the prospects for promotion to the rank of chief-of-

1

mission for many career diplomats.
Career diplomats who served as chiefs-of-mission under
President Hoover awaited the commencement of the Roosevelt
administration with particular anxiety.

Technically,

these officers were without legal protection.

United States

ministers and ambassadors served at the pleasure of the
president; they were his personal representatives to other

Commerce-Committee Print. (Washington, D. C . : Govern
ment Printing Office, April 1976), 120. For other examples,
see also page 390.
12

Crane, Mr. Carr, 311-323; Freidel, Franklin D. Roose
velt, IV, 360; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 72, 79.
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chief s-of-st ate .

Once a diplomat accepted an appointment

as a chief-of-mission, he was no longer regarded as a
Foreign Service officer under the law.

If a President

replaced him with a political appointee or with another
diplomat, he could be readmitted into the Service only upon
authorization of the President.

In 19 33 rumors abounded

that President Roosevelt intended to dismiss all chiefs-ofmission who had had close ties with the Hoover administra
tion. ^
To the diplomats who held chief-of-mission posts in
1932 the advent of the New Deal invoked nightmarish visions
of the last Democratic regime.

In 1913 the administration

of Woodrow Wilson virtually obliterated the progress
achieved in appointing only professional diplomats as
chiefs-of-mission.

Wilson and his secretary of state,

William Jennings Bryan, dismissed nearly all of their
predecessor's veteran, as well as political, ministers and
ambassadors.
The appointment of Raymond Moley as an assistant
secretary of state only served to heighten the disquietude
13 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 360;
Crane, Mr. Carr, 311-323.
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of the professional diplomatic corps.

Temporarily vacating

his position as a professor of government and political
science at Columbia University, Moley joined the Roosevelt
entourage early in 1932, and quickly established himself as
the leader of Governor Roosevelt's "Brain Trust."

A man of

strong views, exaggerated self-importance, and phenomenal
tactlessness, Moley held an intense antipathy toward career
diplomats, whom he beheld as rather elegant, pro-British,
whxte-spat boys. 14
Roosevelt ensconced Moley in the State Department more
for reasons of personal convenience than for matters relatiig
to foreign affairs.

Congress provided no funds for White

House assistants until 1939.

The President wanted his

chief trouble-shooter where he could be reached quickly.
Besides a salary, the position of assistant secretary of
state provided Moley with an office adjacent to the executive
offices of the White House.

In appointing Moley to the

State Department, Roosevelt neither consulted with Secretary
Hull nor defined Moley's duties.
14

15

(N.Y.:

Raymond Moley, After Seven Years
Harper Brothers,
1939), 131, and "Shake-Up," Newsweek, 10 (July 17, 1937), 44.
See also New Dealers, 324-329; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt
III, 317-318; Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, II, 204.
1S

Feis, Characters in Crisis, 100; Freidel, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, IV, 135, 363-364.
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One of Moley's informal tasks was that of ousting from
the State Department all Hooverites.

Upon his appointment

in March 1933, Moley immediately discerned that "the New
16
Deal desperately needed friends in the State Department."
On March 6 , Moley conducted a brief press conference during
which he announced that he "would certainly work to clean out
the Department of all Republicans."

When several reporters

responded that career diplomats had "no politics," Moley
declared that anyone who had served in the Hoover administra17
tion had politics.
II
The prospect of a massive infusion of politicallyappointed amateurs into the diplomatic ranks deeply disturbed
Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

A distinguished trim-ldpk-

ing gentleman of sixty-two, Hull was in the twilight of his
career in public service when Roosevelt tapped him to head
the State Department in 1933.

For twenty-three years, Hujl

had served loyally the state of Tennessee and the Democratic
party as a U.S. congressman and senator.

From 1921 to 1924,

he had held his party's national chairmanship.
training, Hull was also idealistic.

A lawyerby

As secretary of state,

16
Moley, After Seven Years, 114.
17
90.

Diary entry, March 6 , 1933, Hooker, Moffat Papers,
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he aspired to be an elder statesman of the stature of a
Thomas Jefferson or of a John Quincy Adams.

18

He profoundly

wanted to be above politics.
Hull long had believed that United States foreign
affairs "should not be the football of domestic politics."
As a congressman in 1914, he had witnessed the Wilson
administration's blatant use of spoils politics to fill
diplomatic missions.
I could not but remember [Hull wrote] the
long line of suitcases stretching along the
corridor wall outside of William Jennings
Bryan's office when he became Wilson’s
Secretary of State. They belonged seemingly
to every Tom, Dick and Harry from the 'sticks'
who had been his friends and had done Democratic
service. These men came straight from the
railroad station to this office, without
even going to a hotel, feeling sure that he
would instantly create jobs for them.
The portrait of a secretary of state actively engaged in
patronage politics was repugnant to Hull.
The Secretary held professional diplomats in high
esteem.

The knowledge and political wisdom of those career

officers Hull met in the early days of the New Deal admini
stration, and later, impressed him.

Although bereft of

Hull, Memoirs, I, 179-180.
See also Julius W. Pratt,
Cordell Hull, 1933-1944 (2 vols.; N.Y.: Cooper Square Publishshers, 1964), I, 3-23.
19

Hull, Memoirs, I, 180.
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diplomatic experience himself, he appreciated the
advantage of experience in the conduct of foreign policy,
especially in times of acute international tension.

"It

matters not how brilliant an appointee may be," Hull stated,
"he is helpless when deep-seated questions arise in rapid
succession about whose background he knows little or
nothing." 20

The inexperienced amateur envoy, Hull thought,

was more apt to be a liability than an asset in the conduct
of United States foreign relations.
Hull had no intention of sanctioning the wholesale
replacement of professional envoys with amateurs.

Early

in the spring of 1933, he recommended to Roosevelt that
diplomatic appointments be divided equally between career
and noncareer men.

The Secretary had hoped that his

recommendation would counter those presidential advisers
who urged that "sweeping changes" be made in the Foreign
Service to accommodate deserving Democrats.

21

Hull was

sufficiently realistic to appreciate the improbability of
preventing the bestowal of some diplomatic posts as
political rewards.
if the precedent

If the status quo could be preserved,
established during the 1920s of appointing

career officers to at least half of the posts could be
20Ibid., 181, 188-189.
21Ibid., 179,

181-182.
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xnaintained, the Secretary would be satisfied.
President Roosevelt responded equivocally to Hull's
proposal on diplomatic appointments.

Ingeniously indirect

with people on nearly all matters, FDR neither approved nor
disapproved Hull's prescription.

22

To Roosevelt, who

displayed dogmatic inconsistency, a proposal to establish a
policy on diplomatic appointments, however
too staid, too implacable.

broad, appeared

Instead, the President indicated

to Hull that he would entertain suggestions on diplomatic
appointments from the State Department as well as offering
his own recommendations from time-to-time.^
With his recommendation to FDR on diplomatic appoint
ments, Hull ended his active participation in the selection
of chiefs-of-mission.

He early decided not to concern

himself with appointments.

As befitted a secretary of stata

he preferred to concentrate upon broad policy matters and
22

From Hull's recommendation, Warren Ilchman concludes
that FDR and Hull early agreed upon a rough balance between
career and noncareer appointments.
Ilchman provides no other
documentation to^support his contention, which he employs
to support his claim that "every administration and its
Secretary of State in the period [1924-1939] advanced the
cause of professional diplomacy." Moreover, Ilchman states
that Hull had "a strong voice in the appointment of ambassa
dors and ministers." Professional Diplomacy, 212-213.
^Hull, Memoirs, I, 200-201.
Hull, I, 22.

See also Pratt, Cordell
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to leave administrative affairs to his subordinates.
Hull also disliked making direct representations to
the President.

A proud man with a reservoir of humility who

endeavored to avoid confrontation, Hull despaired early
of Roosevelt's disregard of him.

More than once Hull

complained about "that man across the street who never tells
25
me anything."
In his twelve years as secretary of state,
a tenure unmatched by any other secretary, Hull received few
invitations from FDR to discuss foreign matters.
World War II, FDR almost totally ignored him.

During

26

24

Moley, First New Deal, 241. See also Beatrice Bishop
Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs, eds., Navigating the Rapids,
1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 110; R. Walton Moore to
Bullitt, May 20, 1937, Bullitt, For the President, 214.
Then an assistant secretary of state, Moore wrote Bullitt
in regard to the selection of a successor to Undersecretary
of State Phillips:
"I can also understand in what a sweat
the Secretary has been involved for several months, in view
of his disinclination to deal with the matter of appointments."
25
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 459.
26

The cordial but distant relationship Hull had with
FDR is well-known. Numerous contemporaries and historians
have described the details. For instance, see Crane, M r .
Carr, 310, 324-325, 357; Hooker, Moffat Papers, 93, 108;
Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil
War (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1968), 18-21;
Drummond, "Cordell Hull," 184-207; Pratt, Cordell Hull, I,
13-15, 28, 38-39.
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Hull's influence with Roosevelt was marginal.
Domestic political expediency, not foreign policy, had
bound Roosevelt and Hull together.
Hill

In his years on Capitol

as a congressman, Hull had acquired many important

friends.

"Judge Hull" from Tennessee would be, FDR reasoned,

a politically valuable member of his cabinet, dominated as
it was by Northern liberals.

Roosevelt always intended to

be his own secretary of state.
To discuss appointments with FDR and his political
cronies ventured to be an unpleasant experience for Hull.
In Hull's opinion, petty politics too often guided Roosevelt's actions.

28

Besides, Hull was not familiar with the

qualifications of many of the members of the Foreign Service
who might be worthy of promotion to chief-of-mission status.
Consequently, he entrusted to his undersecretary of state
the responsibility of conferring with the White House on
29
diplomatic appointments.
The position of undersecretary of state has become over
the years a post comparable to that of the executive officer
^Drummond, "Cordell Hull," 194-196; Crane, Mr. Carr,
310; Freidel, Franklin P. Roosevelt, IV, 459.
28

Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 19-20.

29

Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 240.
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of a ship.

Whereas the secretary is the captain, the

undersecretary is in charge of day-to-day operations,
including recommending to the captain the placement of
subordinates.

Today, the position of undersecretary is one

of great responsibility, reserved for men of high profes
sional calibre, whether from within or outside the Foreign
o ■•
30
Service.
The role of the undersecretary was still largely
.
experimental m

1933.

receive or assume

31

Then, the undersecretary could

any number of responsibilities.

Of the

nine men who had borne the title since the creation of the
office in 1919, six had been political appointees and
three had come from the ranks of the diplomatic corps.

0

3

Foreign Service officers considered the office more as a
stepping-stone to higher posts abroad than a major appoint
ment at home.

Although ranked number two in the hierarchy,

the undersecretary received $1,000 less in salary than the
four assistant secretaries.

33

30

Harr, Professional Diplomat, 107, 334-335. Chester
Bowles noted that as undersecretary in the Kennedy admini
stration, he "was given primary responsibility for recruit
ment" of chiefs-of-mission. Promises to Keep: My Years in
Public Life, 1941-196 9 (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1971), 315.
■^Henry K. Norton, "Foreign Office Organization," 23-24.
32U. S. , Department of State, United States "Chiefs of Mission, .
1778-1973 Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 185-136.
33
Norton, "Foreign Office Organization," 2 3-24, 37.
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As a condition for accepting the secretaryship, Hull
insisted that his chief lieutenant be a person of experience
who knew the diplomatic world.
limitations in diplomacy.

Hull appreciated his own

He also held an aversion to the

social amenities that accompanied the life of the nation's
number one diplomat, as well as to the administrative
responsibilities of a cabinet officer.

He hoped that the

undersecretary would attend to the necessities of diplomatic
entertainment and to administrative matters.

Hull's

stipulation also eliminated Raymond Moley as a contender
to the office.

With Hull's warm endorsement, Roosevelt

chose William Phillips.

34

Phillips served as undersecretary through most of
FDR's first administration.

In 1936 he received an assign

ment he had long coveted, the ambassadorship to

R o m e .

35

Phillips' replacement as undersecretary was Sumner Welles,
then assistant secretary of state for Latin American
affairs.
34

Hull, Memoirs, I, 158, 160-161; Feis, Characters in
Crisis, 99; Louis B. Wehle, Hidden Threads in History:
Wilson Through Roosevelt (N.Y.: Macmillan, 195 3) , 129-130.
^Richard N. Kottman, "Hoover and Canada Diplomatic
Assignments," Canadian Historical Review, 51 (September
1970) , 297 ftn, 8 .
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III
Both Phillips and Welles could be counted upon to
defend the interests of the Foreign Service.

Both were

career diplomats with distinguished records of service.
Between them in 1933, Phillips at age 55 and Welles at 41
possessed a total of 47 years of diplomatic experience.
William Phillips epitomized the American professional
diplomat.

Described by a contemporary as "the career man's

perfect picture of a diplomat," Phillips combined many of
the attributes that marked the demeanor of the sophisticated,
cosmopolitan diplomatist of the

old world.

He possessed

complete self-assurance masked by an appealing shyness; he
displayed a capacity for gracefulness under any circumstance.
and in any language; he was able "to say yes and no with
such distinction as to leave one in doubt as to whether the
36
sun sets in the east or west."
Warm, friendly, and
courteous, Phillips was also tenaciously loyal to the
Foreign Service.
Phillips was one of the "founding fathers" of the
36

Herring, "A Review With Recommendations," 227.
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Foreign Service.

37

A member of a wealthy Boston Brahmin

family and a great-nephew of Wendell Phillips, the abolition
ist, he decided during his senior year at Harvard to seek
a career in diplomacy.

Like many American diplomats of his

generation, Phillips found the prospect of a family business
career tcoconfining, too much a life of ease.

Imbued with

a sense of noblesse oblige, he responded to the call of
progressives like Theodore Roosevelt to entertain service
in the public interest.
Service as a private,

In 1903 he entered the Diplomatic
nonsalaried secretary to Ambassador

Joseph H. Choate in London.

Eager and intelligent,

Phillips heeded every opportunity to learn diplomatic pro
cedure and to cultivate contacts in diplomatic society.
That he counted., among his early friends Franklin D. Roose
velt, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Cordell Hull helped
assure

him of a long diplomatic career.

Phillips rose rapidly among the diplomatic ranks.

In

190 7 he became chief of the newly-created Division of Far
Eastern Affairs within the State Department.
37

In December

Phillips' career can be traced in his Ventures in
Diplomacy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952). See also Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 54-58; Werking, Master Architects, 131.
Feis states of Phillips:
"His presence provided signs of
continuity in the State Department; his dress, gentlemanly
manners and direct talk reminded me of what I had found
admirable in the upper reaches of Boston society when I was
a student at Harvard....Phillips' assignments in other lands
made him feel closer to people of another race, religion or
color than the usual members of the Boston society to which
he belonged." Characters in Crisis, 100.
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1908, President Theodore Roosevelt elevated him to assistant
secretary of state.

At the same time, Phillips gained

admission to the select social group of the President's
friends known as the "tennis cabinet."

In 1920,after

several years in which his career followed a more erratic
course, Phillips received his first chief-of-mission post,
that of minister to the Hague.

From 1922 to 1924, he

served as undersecretary of state, the Department's fourth,
and played a major role in securing the creation of the
career service.
Even more so perhaps than Phillips, Welles "was the
quintessential diplomat."

In the words of commentators and

peers alike, he possessed "a firm hold on everyone of the
diplomatic virtues." Welles combined studiousness with
\
j
worldliness; cosmopolitanism became him naturally.
Six
feet three inches tall and always impeccably dressed in
•

I

Savile Row suits, Welles presented an impressive figure.

38

Fourteen year/s junior to Phillips in age, Welles' rise
38

Theodore A. Wilson, The First Summit: Roosevelt and
Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941 (Boston; Houghton Mifflin,
1969), 34-36. Another excellent description of Welles is
in Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 22. See also Herring,
"A Review With Recommendations," 228; Weil, Pretty Good
Club, 87; Nicholas Roosevelt, A Front Row Seat (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), 67. Like Phillips,
Welles' backgro'und included an abolitionist family
relative— his great-uncle after whom he was named, U.S.
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts.
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in the diplomatic corps was meteoric.

He entered the old

Diplomatic Service in 1915 as a private secretary, carrying
with him a letter of recommendation from Assistant Secretary
of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt.

In six years Welles

became chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, the
youngest divisional head in the history of the State Depart
ment.

Welles was then twenty-nine years old.

During the

1920s he served the Republican administrations as an adviser
on the volatile situation in the Dominican Republic.

He

also published a creditable two-volume history of that
40
country m 1928.
The appointment of Phillips and Welles to positions in
the New Deal administration was almost axiomatic.
enjoyed a special relationship with both.

FDR

During the Wilson

administration, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt dined often
with William and Caroline Phillips, firmly cementing a
friendship that had begun almost twenty years earlier by
virtue of shared backgrounds.

Similarly, Welles shared

with FDR, as well as with Phillips, a Groton and Harvard
education, security of wealth, high social standing, and
mutual friends.
40

Moreover, Welles had served as a page at

Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924
(2 vols.; N.Y.: Payson and Clark, Ltd., 1928).
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the Roosevelt wedding in 1905.

41

Among all State Depart

ment officials, Welles was Eleanor's favorite, one of the
few inhabitants of Foggy Bottom she trusted.

42

The trust

FDR embraced for Welles and Phillips derived not from their
credentials as career diplomats but from the comfortable
friendship, erected upon common foundations, each had
developed with FDR over many years.

43

Roosevelt knew he could rely upon the fidelity of
Phillips and Welles to the New Deal.

Neither was in the

employ of the Hoover administration when FDR achieved his
victory in 1933.

Both were unemployed.

After serving as

the first American minister to Canada under Coolidge,
Phillips found himself replaced by a political appointee
soon after Hoover assumed office.

Rather than reenlist

in the Foreign Service, Phillips opted for a few years
44
. .
of retirement.
A similar experience found
41

Traina provides one of the best, short analyses of
the FDR-Hull-Phillips-Welles relationship. Diplomacy and
Civil War, 19-23. While Hull and Phillips got along well
together, Hull and Welles did not. Welles often dealt
directly with the White House, bypassing Hull to the
latter's intense displeasure.
42
Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 375. See also Weil,
Pretty Good Club, 130-131.
43
Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 22.
44
Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic Assignments," 296298; Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 149-155.
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Welles acting as FDR's unofficial adviser on Latin American
affairs during the 1932 campaign.

Both hoped, however, to

return to government service under FDR.

Both also contri

buted to FDR's campaign, Welles' $2,500 donation topping
Phillips' lesser offering of $1,000.
IV
The knowledge that Phillips had assumed responsibility
for the State Department on appointments revived the sagging
spirits of the career diplomats.

During his lengthy diplo

matic career, Phillips had survived the purges that usually
accompanied a change in administration.

He had served tinder

both Republican and Democratic presidents.

Whenever his

career had appeared in jeopardy— as it occasionally had—
he had managed to reappear, often in a better post, much to
the envy and admiration of some of his less fortunate
colleagues.^
Phillips was a seasoned bureaucratic in-fighter.

He

understood that internal, bureaucratic politics— more so thai
45

Louise Overacker, "Campaign Funds in a Depression
Year," American Political Science Review, 27 (October 1933),
782. See also Beatrice Farnsworth, William C. Bullitt and
the Soviet Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1967) , 206 Ftn7"54.
Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 45-46, 5 7-59, 62-68,
100, 155.
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electoral politics— was a tough business, that one had to
identify the games, the players, the conditions, and the
bargains, and act accordingly to succeed.

To the advice

that the British diplomat Humphrey Trevelyan offered his
colleagues, Phillips would have nodded knowingly.

Only

half facetiously, Trevelyan wrote in 1973:
A diplomat should...above all, seek to pack
the department with his friends^
If he
achieves this, he need have no thought for
the morrow. His peccadilloes will be
suppressed before they come to the ears
of ministers perennially nervous of the
press; his errors of judgment will be
forgotten; his unfulfilled prophecies
will be lost in the files; all will be
given unto him.

1

Phillips, like many of the first generation of American
career diplomats, acquired a knowledge of the politics of
survival in an era of blatant spoils politics.
Phillips was a charter member of the American diplomatic
old-boy network.

Whenever he had been in a position to do

so, he saw that his fellow diplomats received preferential
47 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 151. Graham T.
Allison states:
"The hard core of the bureaucratic politics
mix is personality.
How each man manages' to stand the
heat..., each player’s basic operating style....” E s s e n c e of
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1971), 166.
On the modern-day Foreign Service, Harr notes;
"Elitism
is manifested in the essentially defensive posture of most
FSO’s in regard to the Service. If one is a member of an
elite group there is a strong tendency toward having a stake
in protecting the elitism of that group. This is done in a
number of ways." Professional Diplomat, 209.
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treatment.

He also had found occasion to enlist the

support of influential people, including a U.S. senator
from his home state of Massachusetts, on his own behalf as
well.48
Throughout his career Phillips managed to remain on
the

good side

of his colleagues and co-workers.

In

contrast to FDR, Phillips treated Hull with great deference,
thereby earning him the Secretary's respect.

49

"I found it

pleasant to work with and for the new Under-Secretary,"
Herbert Feis, the Department's economic adviser, remarked.88
Although Phillips was to confront Farley and Moley on
appointments, they never expressed rancor toward him.
FDR's undersecretary of state could be beguiling.
Phillips prepared to do battle with the Farley-Moley
patronage cartel soon after assuming his position as under
secretary of state in March.

With Assistant Secretary of

State Wilbur Carr, Phillips reviewed the status of the
incumbent chiefs-of-mission.

Carr, who served as the chief

48

Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 45-46. See also
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 57, 171 ftn. 28; Werking,
Master Architects, 144; Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic
Assignments," 287 ftn. 8; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 19, 73-74.
49

Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 185; Wei], Pretty
Good Club, 77, 79.
^8Feis, Characters in Crisis, 100.
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administrative officer of the Foreign Service, had prepared
a detailed report on all of Hoover's chiefs-of-mission in
anticipation of whatever changes the new administration
might contemplate.

In reviewing the report, Phillips and

Carr designated in each case which chiefs could be regarded
as patronage appointees in any sense, which ones— amateurs
and professionals— the President probably would want to
replace, and which posts might yield opportunities for the
51
appointment of career officers.
Their list was no less
detailed or less meticulously devised than the patronage
folders maintained by Farley.
Phillips and Carr presented together a formidable
front to the dispensers of political patronage.

No one

knew the State Department and the Foreign Service better
than Carr.

After entering the Department in 1892, he had

gradually acquired, through diligence and devotion, command
of the administrative structure of the foreign affairs
bureaucracy.

By 1933 Carr had had

Department under eight presidents.

forty-one years in the
Like Phillips, Carr had

always worked to take care of "his boys," those who shared
his concern for the diplomatic machinery.52
5^Crane, Mr. Carr, 311-312, 326.
52

Ibid. See also Schulzinger, Diplomatic
Mind, 47; Werking, Master A r c h i t e c t s 88-90.
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Once before, during Woodrow Wilson's presidency,
Phillips and Carr had collaborated on appointments.
Phillips then was a member of the diplomatic branch, while
Carr headed the Consular Service.

At the latter's request,

Phillips had assumed the task of presenting suggestions on
consular appointments to Secretary of State Bryan.

In

contrast to Wilson's purge of the chiefs-of-mission, most
veteran consular agents were retained.

53

The task of dealing directly with Roosevelt and Farley
belonged to Phillips.

During FDR's second administration,

Welles would adopt the same role.

In contrast to Carr, and

to Hull as well, Phillips and Welles knew how to talk to
Roosevelt.

They possessed the kind of precision, alacrity,

and self-assurance that FDR admired, and which Carr and Hull,
both slower, more circuitous and cautious, lacked. Indeed,
Roosevelt preferred to discuss foreign policy with Phillips
54
and Welles rather than "with Hull. Thus, as the administration
marshalled its forces to combat the Depression in 1933,
Phillips assumed the role of challenger to the ward-heelers.
The competition for leverage with the President on
appointments proved keen.

Moley vividly recalled the

53

Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 60, 66.
C.A

Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 19-23.
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imbroglio that developed between Phillips and Farley.
While retaining final authority on all appointments, FDR
directed Farley to confer with Phillips on diplomatic
vacancies.

In the meantime, Phillips bypassed Farley.

Phillips consulted directly with Roosevelt, offering
several suggestions for chief-of-mission appointments.

When

Farley learned of Phillips' maneuvering, he "raised the
roof."

With gentlemanly tact, Phillips then agreed that he

and Farley should confer on all prospective appointments.
The encounter between the old-boy network and the wardheelers over appointments had only just begun.

Phillips'

"preference for career boys" soon proved "so overpowering"
that Farley— who oversaw dispensation of patronage throughout
all of government— finally demanded that Phillips consult
with Moley "before he made any moves."

Farley "turned over

to" Moley "his complete file on diplomatic prospects,
designating in each case what they had contributed in effort
and money to the 1932 campaign."

He asked Moley to use his

influence with Phillips and Roosevelt "in providing suitable
appointments for these people."

55

^Moley, After Seven Years, 13], and First New Deal, 242.
See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 71-74. For examples of
Phillips' large role in the matter of appointments, see Nixon,
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 50-51, 301, 303, 361, 459, 492;
II, 560.
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Mo ley 1s position was clear.

He did not intend to

permit Phillips "to ignore every last one of the campaign
contributors."

Moley held "that appointment as a

reward for political service" was neither wrong nor undesir
able.

Nor did Moley believe that "a career man [was] per se
c7
preferable to an amateur."
Less certain was Moley's tenure in the Department.
Invading the confines of a bureaucracy, however small and
compact, poses some risks.
easily disrupted.
undermined.
advised.

Bureaucratic routines are not

Nor are bureaucratic loyalties readily

For the bureaucratic novice, caution is well-

As a university professor, Moley should have

been better versed in the mores of bureaucratic politics.
He was not.

Instead, he had challenged publicly the "rights?1

of the career professionals

to retain their jobs from one

administration to the next.
The professionals in the Department set about immediate
ly to undermine Moley.

They convinced Hull that, whereas

they were loyal to him, Moley was not.
convincing.

Hull required little

The Secretary respected loyalty, a trait he,

himself, possessed in abundance.

He also believed that

56
Moley, After Seven Years, 132.
^Moley, First New Deal, 242.
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Moley intended to construct his own cadre of followers
within the Department, separate and apart from the Secretary
of

Jtate.

Moley lost no time in providing ample evidence

to confirm Hull's suspicions.

In marauding between the

White House and the State Department without the secretary's
knowledge, Moley soon earned Hull's lasting enmity.

58

The celebrated estrangement between the two during the
London Economic Conference in July 1933 sealed Moley's fate.
When Moley implied via an indiscreet cable to Roosevelt
that Hull was incapable of leading the American delegation
to the conference, the Secretary erupted with full fury.
Roosevelt was forced to choose between Hull and Moley.
chose to dismiss Moley.

59

He

In describing Moley's ouster to

his associates, Hull pulled his forefinger across his
throat and stated:
ear to e a r . " ^

"I cut the son of a bitch's throat from

With Moley's departure, there was "an

unanimous sigh of relief from everybody in the Department,"
61
Sumner Welles informed a friend.
58
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 481; Weil, Pretty
Good Club, 78.
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 491-495.
S O w e i l , Pretty Good Club, 7 8 .
See also
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 493-494.

61

Welles to Norman Davies, August 19 33,
Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, II, 232.
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The jubilation within the Department, however
restrained, was premature.

Well into 1935 Moley continued

to consult with and advise the president on numerous matters
from his position as editor of a new magazine, Today.

By

his own account, he spent 132 days in Washington after his
resignation.

On a few occasions he used his connections to

influence diplomatic appointments.

Gradually, however,

Moley became less sympathetic to the New Deal.
waned.

His influence

By 19 37 he was a conservative opponent and no longer

of value to Roosevelt.6^
V
The spiritual departure of Moley from the ranks of the
New Dealers left Farley virtually alone to deal with the
State Department in the years prior to World War II.

FDR,

of course, continued to have the final decision on all
appointments.

Even he realized, however, that Farley was

no match for Welles and the career boys, especially in the
latter"s backyard.

Late in 1937 Roosevelt asked Adolf Berle,

one of his original "Brain Trusters," to accept an appoint
ment as an assistant secretary of state.

The President

told Berle that the State Department needed a New Dealer,
that "Hull was magnificent on principle but timid," while
62
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 4 94. See also
Schlesinger, Age of Roo seve11 , II, 549; New Dealers, 328.

"Sumner was fundamentally a 'career man.'"
Berle accepted FDR's offer.

Treated as an outsider by

his colleagues in the Department, the abrasive Berle was
neutralized if not ignored.

He provided no assistance to

proponents of patronage in the matter of appointments.

64

Farley encountered less and less support for his job
of rewarding the party faithful as the crises in Europe
became more acute.

One friend of Farley's and the

President's, William C. Bullitt, objected strongly to the
practice of selecting diplomatic chiefs based upon their.
campaign largesse.

Although not bereft of diplomatic

experience, Bullitt, himself, was not a career diplomat.
Appointed by FDR as ambassador

to the Soviet Union in 19 33

and tothe embassy in Paris in

1936, Bullitt maintained a

close confidential relationship with the President until at
least 1939.

On December 7, 1936, Bullitt wrote to FDR:

Jim Farley has just passed through Paris....
In talking with Jim, I tried to convince
him (and I believe I did) that the situation
in Europe today is too serious for him to
suggest the planting of duds in diplomatic
posts in order to repay them for contribu
tions to the campaign fund.
Diary entry, December 10, 1937, Berle, Navigating the
Rapids, 151. See also Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 181-182.
64

For instance, see Weil, Pretty Good Club, 78.
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Sup reme ly confident of the wisdom of his advice, Bullitt
further noted:

"Jim said that he agreed with me, and we

went on to discuss how it might be possible... to get rid
of...the men who are not fit to hold their present jobs as
65
chiefs-of-mission."
Bullitt submitted a simple plan to Roosevelt with
Farley's concurrence.

FDR should issue "at once" a circular

instruction from the State Department requesting that all
chiefs-of-mission submit their resignations to the President
no later than January 15, 19 37, under the pretext that the
date of the presidential inauguration had been changed from
March 4 to January 3.

In this manner, Bullitt submitted,

the President could do with the chiefs as he pleased without
having to engage ^.n the unpleasant task of requesting individual resignations. 66

'
Bullitt
believed, as Farley evidently

told him, that while FDR "wciuld be glad to get rid of" a

i

number of incompetent chief£, he "would hesitate to ask for
,67
their resignations."
--- ---

f

j--—

I

j

^Bullitt, For the President, 194-195.
See also Nixon,
FDR and Foreign A f f a i r s III, 528-529.
"Genial Jim" Farley,
incidentally, was well-liked by many people, a natural
salesman who rarely worried about consistency.
66
Bullitt, For the President, 195.
67
Bullitt to R. Walton Moore, December 8 , 1936, Nixon,
FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 545.
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Roosevelt accepted Bullitt's idea.

By custom, not law,

chiefs-of-mission often offer their resignations when a new
president is inaugurated.

In following Bullitt's recommen

dation, Roosevelt suggested the issuance of a general
circular requesting the resignations of all c h i e f s . W h e t h e r
inadvertently or by design, the President's suggested wording
applied only to those "who belonged to the career service,"
and not to the amatuers.
The State Department was quick to decipher the flaw in
the Bullitt-Roosevelt plan.

Within five days of receiving a

draft of the circular, Acting Secretary of State R. Walton
Moore, a confidant of Hull's, sent the President a letter,
along with1’a memorandum prepared by the chief of Foreign
Service Personnel.
The letter and memorandum tactfully presented the
following points.
(1)

The President's circular referred "only to those who belonged
to" the career service.

(2)

Career chiefs-of-mission who resigned "would lose their re
tirement rights if they broke their service by retiring at
the end of a presidential term."

(3)

"Should a career chief's resignation be accepted, the President
would have the authority to reinstate him to the classified
Foreign Service." However, "at this moment" only "seven
reinstatements to Class I would be permissable" under the
law, whereas there now were twenty-five career officers

^®FDR to Moore, December 19, 1936, Roosevelt, His
Personal Letters, 1928-1945, I, 641.
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serving as chiefs-of-mission.
(4)

Hie reinstatement appointments might have to be confirmed
by the Senate.

At a minimum, the Department wanted FDR to alter the circu
lar on resignations to account for the peculiar circumstances
of the career chiefs.681
Roosevelt replied four days later in a manner perfectly
suitable to the diplomats.

To Moore, he penned a brief

message:
In regard to resignations of
Chiefs-of-Mission, it seems best to
do nothing further in regard to the
career men but the non-career Chiefs
should, of course, submit their resig
nations as has always been done in
the p a s t . 69
Whether accidental, or planned by one party and reacted to
by the other, this procedural duel rebounded to the advan
tage, however slight, of the career diplomats.

Theoretically,

the result portended more potential vacancies in diplomatic
posts.

On a more mundane level, even the President's most

trusted adviser on patronage--Jim Farley--apparently had
become reticent about annointing political hacks with key
chief-of-mission slots.

^^Moore to FDR, December 24, 1936, Nixon, FDR and
Foreign Affairs, III, 556-557.
^December 28, 1936, ibid. , 558.
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VI
The initial skirmish over appointments produced a
standoff of sorts between the ward-heelers and the old-boy
network.

7n

Of the 51 diplomatic missions maintained abroad

by the United States, career diplomats headed 24 or 47 per
cent after FDR's first year in office.

An assortment of

campaign contributors and amateurs filled the remaining 53
percent of chief-of-mission slots.

By the end of Roose

velt's first term, these figures remained virtually unchanged:
Career chiefs-of-mission held 25 or 48 percent of the
missions.

Of the 29 individual career diplomats who

received chief-of-mission commissions from 1933 to 1936,
ten served in more than one post; four others retired or
resigned before 1936.

By comparison, of the 31 individual

political appointees who headed diplomatic missions during
the same period, five served in more than one post.

Another

five moved on to other challenges after brief tours as
diplomats.
Amateurs dominated the more prestigious and important
diplomatic missions.

The initial appointees to Great

Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union,
70
T h e ’-statistical breakdowns on the diplomatic appoint
ments were calculated from information in U.S., Depart*-"~
ment of State, State Department Biographic Register, 19331940 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19321941), and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973. Most

-173-

Belgium, Poland, Austria, as well as to three of the four
Scandinavian countries, were amateurs.

Although professional

diplomats held the two most important Far Eastern posts—
Japan and China— most were relegated to Latin America.
That Japan and China were virtually at a state-of-war in
1933 made even FDR reticent about sending glove manufacturers
or toy tycoons to those countries.

Of the 20 Latin American

countries in which the United States maintained missions, four
teen opened their doors to career chiefs-of-mission in 1933.
That amateurs received the best diplomatic assignments
presaged no break with traditional practice.

With rare

exception, all presidents have practiced the custom of re
warding generous campaign contributors, who possess little or
71
no diplomatic experience, with ambassadorial appointments.
President Richard Nixon, for example, bestowed upon generous
campaign donors fifteen of the most prestigious embassies,
with Paris and London heading the list for $300,000 and
$254,000 respectively.

Under Nixon, the "price" for even

the less esteemed missions appeared to run to five figures,
prompting The New York Times to declare that "every
of the statistical calculations can be traced from a careful
reading of the appendices to this thesis.
71

For examples, see Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 3-14.

four years" the United States "auctions off its embassies
in Western Europe and in a few other agreeable areas to
72
the highest bidders."
FDR was no exception.

He employed the spoils system

pervasively in selecting diplomatic envoys.

While foreign

affairs commanded little of his attention during his first
administration, he fully recognized the relationship
between ambassadorships and domestic politics.

To reward

loyal followers with glamorous foreign posts was to retain
loyalty to his domestic programs and to himself.
In 1936 Roosevelt asked many of his ambassadors— all
.loyal and deserving Democrats— to return to the United States
to assist him in his reelection campaign.

Ironically, nearly

all of them had come to regard their diplomatic assignments
more seriously than did the President.

"I think you ought

to consider," one politically-appointed ambassador wrote,
much to Roosevelt's chagrin, "the... political effect...of
letting a number of men from key posts in Europe return
to participate in political activities during a period"
73
that "is more dangerous than any since 1918."
72April 4, 1973, A42.
73

Breckinrxdge Long to FDR, March 13, 1936, Nixon, FDR
and Foreign Affairs, III, 254-255.
See also FDR to Lincoln
MacVeagh, May 23, 1936, Roosevelt, His Personal Letters, 192 81945, I, 5 92; Grenville T. Emmett to FDR, February 26, 1936,
Jesse Isidor Straus to FDR, May 1936, Robert W. Bingham to
FDR, September 2, 1936, Claude Bowers
to FDR, October 29, 1936,
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Nevertheless, the practice of conferring celebrated
missions upon political loyalists remained intact.
Roosevelt also recognized the distinction between the
prestigious and the dreary diplomatic posts.

Beneficient

campaign contributors often balk at accepting appointment
to missions outside of Western Europe and Scandinavia.
Consequently, a president can employ the less desirable
assignments— in Latin America and Eastern Europe, for
example— for other purposes.
Again President Roosevelt proved to be no exception.
Sometimes he was ingenious.

In the autumn of 1934, for

example, Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes complained to
Roosevelt about a politically-appointed official in his
department who had become particularly troublesome.

In

clined not to offend anyone— FDR rarely could dismiss any
body outright— the president wrote to Hull in a "private
and confidential" memorandum:

"Do you think it would be a

terrible thing to send this man as Minister either to
Ireland or Albania?

I really think we should help Ickes."

74

Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 218, 300, 412, 464;
Claude Bowers, My Life: The Memoirs of Claude Bowers (n .Y.:
Simon and Schuster, 1962), 289-290; William E. Dodd, Jr.,
and Martha Dodd, eds., Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938
(N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1941), 309.
"^October 8, 19 34, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II,
230. Hull's reply is not recorded in the public documents.
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That career diplomats received a predominant share
of the Latin American missions thus foretold no great
departure from past practice.

Much has changed since the

New Deal in regard to the status and amenities associated
with United States diplomatic missions throughout the world.
During the 1930s and before, however, Foreign Service
officers regarded, with some justification, Latin America
75
as "the graveyard of American diplomats." Most Latin
American posts then were unhealthy, desolate, and poor,
lacking in comfort and prestige.
Hugh Gibson aptly summarized the low esteem in which
diplomats held Latin American posts.

A distinguished

career diplomat, Gibson had received the ambassadorship to
Belgium under Coolidge in 1927.
there.

Hoover had retained him

Upon his transfer to Brazil by FDR in 1933, he wrote

a friend:
It's dreadful how the sins of your youth
come home to roost. All my life I've
preached to the other [career] boys
that when they were honored with an
appointment to Latin America they must
dash away with courage high and hearts
aglow...and when I was offered Rio I took
one big gulp and sent off a telegram of
75

Beaulac, Career Ambassador, 135. According to
Schulzinger, the Foreign Service Personnel Board
relegated the poorer diplomats to Latin America in the
1920s. Diplomatic Mind, 95, 113.
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.
76
appreciation.
However

the diplomats felt about Latin American posts,

they were often the only ones "available" for those who
aspired to chief-of-mission status.
Roosevelt differed little from his predecessors in
sending the career diplomats to Latin America.

Fourteen of

the 24 career chiefs-of-mission under the New Deal in 19 33
were in Latin America, while 15 of the 25 career chiefs
under Hoover in 1932 were similarly ensconced.
The Republican administrations of the 192 0s, however,
had improved considerably upon the performance of their
predecessors in appointing career diplomats as chiefs-ofmission.

Hoover, for instance, announced prior to his

inauguration that he believed career diplomats were
77
preferable to amateurs.
Although he selected his share
of worthy politicos, he did appoint career diplomats to
Belgium, Italy, Norway and Poland.

78

By comparison, the

proportionate rise in the number of career diplomats
76

Gibson to William R. Castle, May 11, 1933, Galpin,
Hugh Gibson, 54.
77

Herbert Hoover, Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (3 vols..
London: Hollis and Carter, 1952), II, 332. See also
Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic Assignments," 296.
^ United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, 12, 83,
115, 124.
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selected to head missions in the 1920s was not sustained in
the 1930s.
Throughout the process of appointments Roosevelt
assumed a characteristic posture.

He retained the final

authority over all nominations, while playing the role of
mediator between the old-boy network and the ward-heelers.
He allowed both factions to compete for his favor and to
believe that they each commanded his bidding.
Aware that career diplomats received nearly 50 percent
of the diplomatic posts in 1933, Joseph C. Grew, a firstgeneration professional diplomat, expressed great enthusiasm
for the President:

"Isn't it fine the way the President is

supporting the career diplomats?

Some day that will cease to

be a term of opprobrium in the United States."

79

Stationed

in Japan, Grew was neither privy to the machinations
surrounding the appointments nor totally accurate in his
reflections.
One close observer of the process more accurately
reflected the President's manner in steering a course
between the proponents of patronage and career appointments.
Caroline Phillips, the wife of the Undersecretary, confided
to her diary in 1933:
79

Grew to Norman Armour, September 11, 1933,
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 362.
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Franklin R. is rather ruthless and thinks
only of handing out diplomatic plums to
some of the many hungry Democrats just to _
be relieved from their ceaseless clamoring.
Mrs. Phillips' statement also expressed her husband's
frustration in not being able to secure more favorable
posts for his colleagues.
The success of Undersecretary Phillips in protecting
the interests of his colleagues during FDR's first term
was indisputable, nevertheless.

Only seven of the 25

career diplomats serving as chiefs-of-mission under Hoover
failed to receive appointments under FDR:

five of the

seven voluntarily resigned or retired; another became an
assistant secretary of state, while a cloud enveloped the
removal of only one.

81

Moreover, seven diplomats, four of

whom had prior experience in the consular branch of the
Service, received their first ministerial post between 1933
on

Diary entry, April 9, 1933, Weil, Pretty
Good Club, 71.
81
Robert Woods Bliss, Edwin V. Morgan, Charles C.
Eberhardt, John W. Garrett, and Irwin B. Laughlin retired
or resigned. Jefferson Caffrey became an assistant secretary
of state. Why F. Lamont Belin left is unclear; the Senate
failed to confirm his appointment under Hoover in 1932 to a
different post, after which information is sketchy. State
Department Biographic Register, 1933-1934, 124, 127, 16 3,
174, 205, 225.
Whether these officers
retired voluntarily is
also unclear. FDR did force out several State Department
officials, including William R. Castle, a man much respected
by the career diplomats, who was a close friend of Hoover's.
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and 1936.

Of the 18 "Hooverite" professional chiefs who

survived the anticipated purge, 12 were retained initially
in the same post in which they served Hoover, while the
other six received different chief-of-mission assignments.
Finally, all but two members of the old-boy network survived
through 1936.

oo

Upon their own turf, the old-boy network—

buttressed by the homework of Phillips, Carr and Hull—
proved difficult to dislodge.
VII
Sumner Welles performed equally well in securing
appointments for the career diplomats during FDR's second
term.

As assistant secretary of state for Latin American

affairs from 1933 to 1937, he assisted Phillips in procur
ing suitable appointments for Foreign Service officers,
especially to the more desirable posts in Latin America.

83

As undersecretary of state, a position he held from 1937 to
1943, Welles continually urged upon the President the appoint82

Sheldon Whitehouse resigned on December 8, 1933,soon
after being transferred to Columbia. Francis White retired
on November 30, 1933, . 5. months after being transferred
from Latin America to Czechoslovakia. White, in particular,
was dissatisfied; he knew little about Eastern Europe, but
was considered an expert on Latin America.
83
For example, see FDR to Hull, October 29, 1934, Nixon,
FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 248. FDR begins:
"I enclose
suggestions made by Sumner Welles for Diplomatic transfers."
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men t of career officers as chiefs-of-mission.

He also

embarked upon a campaign to raise the status of the American
missions in Latin America— fourteen of which were legations in
1933— to embassies,

a step in image building warranted, in

part, by the Good Neighbor policy.

By 1943 all United

States missions in the Southern Hemisphere were embassies.

84

Insiders dubbed the men elevated from ministers to ambassadors in Latin America "Sumner's shambassadors."

85

Welles championed the cause of the career diplomats
in the press as well.

He maintained a close relationship

with syndicated columnist Drew Pearson, and he occasionally
consented to interviews with sympathetic journalists.
In an interview with a former State Department official
that appeared in The New York Times on August 22, 193 7,
Welles remarked:
84

Nine of the legations were raised to embassy status
between 1941 and 1943. United States Chiefs of Mission,
1778-1973, passim. Some authors imply that all of the Latin
American posts became embassies in the 1930s.
See Etzold,
Conduct of Policy, 88-89;. Robert Freeman Smith, "The Good
Neighbor Policy: The Liberal Paradox in United States
Relations With Latin America," in Leonard P. Liggio and
James T. Martin, eds., Watershed of Empire: Essays on New
Deal Foreign Policy (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, Pub
lisher, 1976), 70. That most of the legations became
embassies after the beginning of World War II suggests
that the exigencies of the war and America's relations
with Latin America,more than the Good Neighbor policy,
incited the changes.
85

Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 89.
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There is not: much use in the government's
spending money on a career service unless
the best men get a chance to serve in the
best posts. The President supports this
policy. 86
More than FDR's "policy,” Welles' statement reflected his
own efforts.

Although career officers received appointments

to the important embassies in Rome and Berlin in 193.6 and
19 38, respectively, few other advances in the career
position occurred during Roosevelt's second term.
The relative position of the career diplomats remained
unchanged from FDR's first, term.

Of the 25 incumbent career

chiefs as of July 1, 1936, nine resigned or retired prior
to the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.

An

equal number— six of whom had served in the consular branchreceived their first chief-of-mission posts during the same
period.

Thirteen of the remaining 16 served in more than

one capital.

Only three— Joseph brew in Japan, Nelson T.

Johnson in China, and William Phijllips in

Italy— served

the entire 30 months of! FDR's second term prior to World War
I

■

I

II in the same country./ However, the number of career offi/
87
cers in chief-of-mission positions— 25-— remained the same.

'

86

.

Weii, Pretty Good Club, 130.
87
Ilchman contends that in FDR's second term "the
career position was advanced." Professional Diplomacy, 213.
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VIII
Given the circumstances, Phillips, Welles, and their
associates proved capable of matching the acumen and zeal
of the ward-heelers.

Within the general boundaries of the

most and least desirable missions available, the diplomats
managed a semblance of control over appointments.
Within these confines, too, seniority and preference
counted.

Of the 42 individual career diplomats who received

chief-of-mission appointments between 1933 and 1939, three
had entered the diplomatic profession prior to 1900, 32
had embarked upon a diplomatic career between 1900 and 1915,
and seven had become diplomats between 1915 and 1920.

For

the most part, the senior diplomats— members of the old-boys
club of the pre-Rogers Act era— received preferential consi
deration in appointment to the few desirable posts "open"
to the diplomats.

At one time or another, for instance,

Hugh Gibson held the Belgian post,

Hugh Wilson headed the

embassies in Berlin and Berne, Leland Harrison also filled
the Swiss post, and Phillips served in Rome.

Twenty-two

of the 42 career chiefs, moreover, had held one or more
positions within the State Department— as assistant secre
tary of state, as division chief, as a member of the Foreign
Service Personnel Review Board— during the 1920s.
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Bureaucratic patronage operated upon the Foreign
Service from within in much the same manner as political
patronage operated upon it from without.

In 196 9 Foreign

Service officers listed three factors that they regarded
as important to the advancement of their careers.
factors were, in order:
ment;

(2)

(1)

friends in the State Depart

experience in Washington, D.C.; and (3)

connections.

88

These

political

While never so publicly blunt, their precur

sors, the "founding fathers" of the Foreign Service, would
have agreed.
Members of the old Consular Service, however, were
neither overlooked nor ignored by their colleagues in the
Department.

Of the 42 career

chiefs,

had served in the old Consular Service.

17f or 40 percent,
Another six chiefs

had held consular positions for brief periods.

Of the 16

officers elevated for the first time to chief-of-mission
1
status, nine came from the consular branch of the Foreign
Service.
88

1

J

If hostility still prevailed between diplomats
''

Harr, Professional Diplomat,. 213.'
In the fall of 1932, Hoover 'submitted a nurrber of nominations
for chief-of-mission appointments, many of them career
officers, to the Senate for confirmation. The Senate
refused to confirm them, preferring instead to await the
outcome of the November election. This may have been an
attempt by Hoover, perhaps in cooperation with the career
diplomats, to limit— or at least to make more difficult—
FDR’s use of patronage to fill diplomatic posts. On
Hoover's nominations and the Senate's refusal to confirm,
see United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, passim.
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and consuls, it was not in evidence in chief-of-mission
appointments.
The absence of post-Rogers Act diplomats on the
list of career chiefs-of-mission conformed with the natural
order of career advancement.

Their absence alone revealed

no antagonism or undue influence on the part of the senior
diplomats.

Generally, 15 to 2 0 years of experience was, and

is, regarded as an appropriate apprenticeship prior to the
attainment of the higher positions in the diplomatic pro
fession, as it was, and is, in many other occupations.

As

of 1936, for example, diplomats who joined the Foreign
Service between 1924 and 1927 were, on the average, 31 to
35 years of age with between eight and 11 years of experience.
The median age of the career chiefs-of-mission under FDR was
52.5 years.

On the average, each possessed 23.5 years of

diplomatic experience at the time of their appointment.

89

The achievement of the diplomats in retaining nearly
half of the top positions abroad owed much to their persis
tence and perspicacity.

In openly supporting the appoint

ment of diplomats, Secretary of State Hull established a
positive climate within the Department, while Phillips and
89

The medium and average statistics were calculated
from information in the State Department Biographic Register,
1933-1940. These statistics can also be calculated using
the information in the appendices to this thesis.

Welles exerted their influence with the President.

At

the same time, the diplomats employed the techniques of the
lobbyist, encouraging and cajoling their colleagues and
sympathizers to speak and write to FDR on their behalf.
Carr's early preparation, too, was invaluable.

90

The

list that he mainly devised and that Phillips used as a
guideline demonstrated prescience.

By the end of 1933, for

instance, New Deal political appointees largely filled the
same posts that Hoover's political appointees had headed.
Career diplomats similarly received appointments to the
same missions.

Only 17 of the 51 posts changed complexion-

from career-to-noncareer and vice-versa— from 1932 to 1934.
Even then the changes were almost evenly divided between
91
amateurs and professionals.
Although shifts in chiefs-of
mission occurred frequently thereafter, the ratio of career
to-noncareer appointments remained stable.
Precedent also contributed immensely to the relative
success of the career diplomats.

By 1932 they held 49 per-

90

For examples, see Weil, Pretty Good Club, 79-82;
Phillips to FDR, April 8,. 1933, Ni xon, FDR and~Foreign
Affairs, I, 50; Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 189^-190;
Werking, Master Architects, 245; Kahn, China Hands, 136;
Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 90, 284-286.

Nine were noncareer;

8 were career.
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cent of the legations and embassies.

Whatever the public

thought of professional diplomats, the practice of filling
nearly all missions with patronage appointees had become
less and less acceptable.
The practice of patronage, generally, had fallen into
disrepute.

The more the federal government intervened in

the lives of its citizens— whether required or called upon
to do so— the more the citizens and the press demanded,that
government personnel be selected on the basis of "merit."
Under the pressures applied by progressives and "good govern
ment" \ types,

merit system coverage of federal employment

increased from 10 percent in 1884 to over 70 percent by the
Q?
end of World War I.
In 1924 Congress placed all diplomatic
positions below the rank of minister under merit coverage.
Chiefs-of-mission, like cabinet officers, have never been
92

Jay M. Shafritz, Public Personnel Management: The
Heritage of Civil Service Reform (n .y .: Praeger, 1975), 24.
Shafritz notes: "American presidents during the reform
period typically entered office taking full advantage of
their patronage perogatives and left office with extensions
of the merit system to their credit. This was the case from
Arthur to Wilson*••*lame duck presidents being succeeded by
someone of a different party would 'blanket in' large
numbers of employees in order to reduce the amount of pat
ronage available to the opposition party... .civil service
rules....made it easier for retiring American presidents...
to extend the classified service to cover their party
friends."
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included.^

They represent the ? resident.

Nevertheless,

the view that the highest diplomatic positions should be
filled by men of experience and training gained currency
during the 1920s as more and more career diplomats achieved
chief-of-mission status.
The heyday of brazen spoils politics had passed by the
time FDR became President.

The open display of patronage

dispensation by Jim Farley attested more to the strength of
FDR's electoral mandate in 1933 than it presaged popular
acceptance of a return to the spoils system of an earlier
era.

Moreover, Secretary Hull's recommendation to FDR to
o

divide the diplomatic appointments about equally between
career and noncareer appointees revealed more than a fear
of flagrant patronage:

Hull's suggestion also reflected

the precedents established and followed during the 1920s.
While less unfavorable publicity attended FDR's use of
patronage than would later plague his successors, its use
was no longer followed by general public

acquiescence.

Roosevelt discovered as much soon after his inaugura
tion.

On March 29, 1933, George McAneny, president of the
93

In 1955 Congress created the rank of Career Minister,
thus providing some merit coverage protection to FSO's who
became chiefs-of-mission. Whether this protection, like
that afforded academics through tenure, is desirable is
another matter altogether.
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National Civil Service Reform League (NCSRL) —

a citizens

organization comparable, in the context of its time, to
Common Cause of today— wrote FDR on behalf of the League.
McAneny enclosed a list of Foreign.Service career officers
94
and urged FDR to retain them as chiefs-of-mxssxon.
Roosevelt responded circuitously.

Faced with pressure

from an attentive citizens group, his reply was also devious.
Thank you for your letter...with its
memorandum.
Some day I hope to have
a chance to talk over the Foreign Ser
vice with you. May I suggest that as
one
who helped in getting the'career
service' established, I am anxious that
it be maintained— nevertheless, the
situation is not so delightfully simple,
so far as merit and good government are
concerned, as the memorandum suggests 1^5
Since 1908 FDR, himself, had belonged to the League and its
predecessors.
creation of a

He may have offered more support for the
"career service" than the average League

member, who probably limited his support to writing a letter
96
to his congressman.
If so, the record is strangely sxlent.
94
95

Notation in Nixon, FDR and Forexgn Affaxrs, I, 40.

FDR to McAneny, Aprxl 4, 1933, Nxxon, FDR and Forexgn
Affairs, I, 40.
96
.
.
For xnstance, there xs no mentxon of the Forexgn
Service or of professional diplomacy in Elliott Roosevelt,
ed., FDR: His Personal Letters, 1905-1928 (2 vols.; N.Y.:
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948). Nor are there any such
letters during the years 1928-1933 in the third volume of
E. Roosevelt's series.
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Roosevelt was cognizant, in any event, of the power of
precedent.

To ignore it would be to risk at least a modicum

of public disfavor as well as to court accusations that he
had failed to abide by the standards set in motion by his.
cousin, Theodore Roosevelt, thirty years earlier.

During his

press conference of July 12, 1933, FDR indirectly acknowled
ged the presence of precedent.

Career diplomats, as well as

deserving Democrats, he said, would receive consideration
for chief-of-mission assignments.
He then offered to elaborate.

With perhaps the

Carr-Phillips list or the NCSRL list sketched in his mind,
he remarked:
As a matter of fact, on the total thing
we filled quite a lot of places and there
are still quite a number going to be changed...,
there are quite a number of posts where the
individual who happens to be there, irrespec
tive of whether he is a political appointee,
is doing special work and I may want to keep
him on to finish up the special work. There
are half a dozen cases of that kind and, of
course, those political appointees will be re
placed in time.
I think I told Bill Phillips
to go ahead and make three or four changes.
If there is some political appointee carry
ing on special business..., I may want to
keep him on until possibly the fall and, when
he goes out, I may move a career diplomat from
some other place into his place....it means
that his place will be filled either by a
career diplomat, or by a political appointee.
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Roosevelt concluded that "it would take me probably the
balance of the year to get the diplomatic posts more or
97
less permanently straightened out."
IX
FDR never succeeded in "permanently" straightening
out the diplomatic assignments.

Numerous influences,

including his personal predilections, the demands and the
choices of political contributors, and the preferences of
the career diplomats kept him busy shifting and shuffling
chiefs-of-mission in almost spasmodic fashion.
Roosevelt played a variation of musical chairs with
United States legations and embassies.

In seven years,

from 1933-1939, he presented 132 chief-of-mission nomina
tions to the Senate for confirmation, 75 during his first
term and 67 during the first three years of his second.
Although great variations occurred in the length of each
appointee's tour, the average time spent in any single post
by a chief-of-mission amounted to 2.5 years.

A total of 84

individuals, 42 amateurs and 42 professionals, served in
chief-of-mission posts.

Of the career diplomats, 22

served in only one post, 15 served in two posts, three in
three posts, and two in four posts.
97

Of the amateurs, 2.6

Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 301.
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served in one mission, 11 in two missions, and five in
three missions.

Stated differently, 23 of the posts

changed chiefs twice, 18 posts experienced a change in
command three times, and six posts had four chiefs-ofmission.

In only six, or 10.5 percent of the missions,

did a single chief-of-mission serve the entire seven years.

98

One well-travelled amateur chief thought that FDR had
"borrowed [his appointment procedure] more or less from the
football field.
The process of appointing chiefs-of-mission basically
bored Roosevelt.

He focused his efforts on controlling

the effects of the Depression.

If and when foreign affairs

demanded his attention, he could, he believed, employ his
own diplomatic abilities to lead the nation.
follow.

Others would

If necessary, American technology— navy ships,

planes, lend-lease— might have to be used.'*'^
rewards to loyal supporters,

Except as

a retinue of ambassadors

98
Those missions were China, Egypt, Greece, Hungary,
Japan and Mexico. Amateurs headed all but China and Japan.
99stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 46.
^^Until at least the fall of 1941, FDR believed that,
if his personal diplomacy failed, American technology could
render all necessary assistance to American allies in their
battles against fascism.
See Dallek, Roosevelt and American
Foreign Policy, 138.
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and ministers was of little value to FDR.

For the most

part, the appointment of envoys was a necessary chore.
Sometimes, however, the chore appeared to be more
trouble than it was worth.

Secretary of Interior Harold

Ickes, for instance, recounted a conversation he held with
Roosevelt on March 26, 19 37!
The President called me last night from
Warm Springs.... The President said that
he was spending a dull evening trying to
shift a lot of ambassadors and ministers.
I told him that I had not supposed he
had many vacancies to fill. He said that
he hadn't but that many of those now
occupying diplomatic posts wanted to be
sent somewhere else. He didn't seem to
find it even amusing.
Hesitant about firing anyone, particularly campaign
contributors, and unwilling to appoint a greater number
of career chiefs, Roosevelt preferred to steer a middle
course.
Roosevelt often steered his course, however, without
benefit of compass and rudder. 102

A close examination of

FDR's appointments— who they were and how they came to
occupy the diplomatic missions— reveals neither a welldefined purpose nor an underlying pattern in the selection
of the nation's principal representatives overseas.
‘*'^'*'Diary entry, Secret Diaries, II, 102.
102
IV, 357.

., ,
Frerdel contends otherwise.

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

[FPR] chopped fcoh amba&&adon.&,
It seemed, Itkz a h o u A m t & z
zkoottng among apptzi ovzn, thz
tztzphonz.
1

John Gunther
5

THE CHIEF-OF-MISSION APPOINTMENTS:
DESERVING DEMOCRATS AND CAREER DIPLOMATS
No clear design or systematic search for talent guided

FDR in the appointive process. Reflective of his enigmatic
administrative methods, Roosevelt left the appointment of
chiefs-of-mission exposed to shifts in the wind of circum2
stances and the gusts of personalities.
Happenstance and
chance occurrence often were as decisive as any other influ
ence in determining who occupied which diplomatic post when.
Roosevelt in Retrospect, 128.
2

Herbert Fexs states about policy making under the New
Deal that "the flexibility of procedure they [FDR and Moley]
preferred left the formulation of our policies more exposed
to temporary shifts in the wind of circumstances and the gusts
of personalities." Characters in Crisis, 111-112.
Some historians contend that i'UK gave great care arid thought
to the selection of his top administrative officials, includ
ing his chiefs-of-mission. Most prominent among those histor
ians is Frank Freidel who states that the selection of FDR's
chiefs "was a task of large purport....They must be both loyal
and competent, yet their appointments must enable Roosevelt
to repay some of his political debts....while Roosevelt
measured candidates by standards of idealism in part, he
acted even more on the basis of common sense.... Roosevelt1s
appointments demonstrated that he basically favored inter
national cooperation....In his political appointments,
Roosevelt sent distinguished men'to the' more important posts."
Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 137, 359-360.
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Spoils politics and a score of factors unrelated to
foreign affairs determined the selection of most of FDR's
amateur chiefs-of-mission.

Roosevelt rarely considered or

attempted to predict the future performance of those amateurs
whom he annointed with diplomatic appointments.

For the

amateur candidate who possessed the appropriate political
credentials, the lack of any special diplomatic qualification
posed no barrier.
Beyond employing chief-of-mission appointments as a
patronage vehicle, FDR demonstrated little interest in the
selection of United States envoys.

In appointing career diplo

mats to a number of ambassadorial and ministerial posts,
Roosevelt generally relied upon the advice of his chiefs in
the State Department, principally Secretary Hull and Under
secretaries Phillips and Welles.
Within the State Department, bureaucratic politics— in
the cloak of the old-boy network— influenced the selection of
many a career chief-of-mission appointee.

More obscure from

public view and slightly less insidious than political pat
ronage, bureaucratic politics differed from spoils politics
primarily in its inherent outcome.

Those who achieved chief-

of-mission status through bureaucratic politics possessed—
by virtue of their positions as career Foreign Service offi
cers— experience and training in foreign affairs that most
amateurs lacked.
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Like many other processes peculiar to politics, the
appointment of chiefs-of-mission under FDR was systematic
only as to fundamentals.

As often as not, a host of influ

ences, none easily charted, dictated the results of the
appointive process.-

Neither political patronage in the case

of the amateur appointees nor merit, strictly defined, in the
case of the career appointees was necessarily the first or
only criterion in appointments.
Nor was President Roosevelt necessarily unique in his
approach to appointments.

Few presidential administrations

have employed systematic strategies in the selection of
chiefs-of-mission.

If anything, the story of FDR's appoint

ments reflects a model— a model of the use of spoils, of the
haphazard and diffuse influences that govern the process, of
the "subtle intricacies and...windfall patterns of the
appointive process."'*
3

Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies, 375. Commis
si oned'TyHEhe-uTsT-Senate~Trr-TT76^ this is the best single
study available on presidential appointments to major federal
positions.
N o ’single study exists on the appointment of chiefs-ofmission. But, examples abound, scattered throughout a number of
publications, of the unsystematic and haphazard manner in
which presidents have chosen individuals to represent the
U.S. abroad. For examples, see Etzold, Conduct of Diplomacy,
19-20; Werking, Master Architects, 10-11; Melosi, "Amateur
Diplomats During the Administrations of Woodrow Wilson," pas
sim; Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the
Fall of New York (N.Y~
Random House, 1975), 787; Ferrell,
American Diplomacy, 13; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Robert
Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,. 1978), 4 38;
"Ex-Nixon Lawyer Pleads Guilty to 2 Political Fund Charges,"
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Typical of the consideration Roosevelt accorded many
political appointments was his selection of Robert W. Bingham
4
for the prominent London embassy in 1933.
Colonel Edward M.
House had recommended Bingham, a millionaire Louisville news
paper publisher, for secretary of state.
was personally unfamiliar with Bingham.

Roosevelt, however,
In eliminating him

from consideration for the top post in the Department of
State, FDR told Moley that "frankly...he knew little or
nothing" about Bingham "except the facts" of his liberal
journalism and his substantial campaign contributions.

Moley

thought, nevertheless, "that Bingham's very obscurity, so far
as national politics was concerned, intrigued" Roosevelt.
The President "spoke laughingly

of the 'stiff dose for the
\

international bankers' Bingham's appointment" as secrjetary
5
of state "would be."
In appointing Bingham to London, perhaps FDR ha^ in mind
I

f

Great Falls Tribune [Montana] , February 26, 1974, 1; "Auction,"
The New York Times, April 24, 1973, 42; Roger Morris, "Diplo
matic Spoils," Harper1s, 25 7 (November 1978), 69.
^The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography (N.Y.:
James T. White, 1941), XXIX, 6; Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Six ty
Years on the Firing Line (N.Y.: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 4647.
5
Moley, After Seven Years, 111-113. See also Freidel,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 144.

the "international bankers," whom he found less than enchanting.

Bingham's two immediate predecessors to the Court of

St. James's were Charles G. Dawes and Andrew W. Mellon— both
well-known multimillionaire financiers selected by Hoover.
That Bingham was one of the few newspaper publishers to sup
port FDR's candidacy may also have influenced the President's
decision.

Roosevelt always was acutely sensitive to
7

the press .

Bingham's principal qualification, nonetheless, was his
high standing on the Preferred List.

An original member of

the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" or RBC group, Bingham had
mailed a contribution of $1,000 to FDR on October 31, 1931,
one of the earliest donations to the New York Governor's bid
Q
for the presidential nomination on the record.
Bingham
followed his early gesture of support with a more generous
C.

For example, see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV,
397; Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, An Untold Story:
The Roosevelts of Hyde Park (N.Y.: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973),
—

7

On FDR and the press, see Richard W. Steele, "The
Pulse of the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Gauging
of American Public Opinion," Journal of Contemporary History,
9 (October 1974), 195-216, and "Franklin D. Roosevelt and
His Foreign Policy Critics," Political’ Science Quarterly,
94 (Spring 1979), 15-32.
8

Elliott A. Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt and the Brain
Trust: From Depression to New Deal (N.Y.: Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1977), 23, 385 ftn. 19.
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offering of $15,000 in 1932.

q

Bingham, thus, was available,

and Roosevelt wanted to replace Hoover's ambassador to London
as quickly as possible.

The World Economic Conference was

scheduled to convene in London in July, and the president
wished to disassociate himself from his predecessor, symboli
cally if not substantively.^

More perplexing was Roosevelt's appointment of Joseph P.
Kennedy to succeed Bingham.

Seriously ill, Bingham returned

to the United States for treatment late in 1 9 3 7 . Bingham's
resignation was imminent— he soon died— but not yet official
when Kennedy began lobbying to replace him.

Roosevelt,

9
Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 782.
■^Early in March 1933, FDR penciled a note to Hull:
"How about inquiring if Judge Bingham will be acceptable as
Ambassador to Great Britain? If OK I can appoint him at once
& the quicker he goes over the better— don't you think so?"
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 360.
Huir agreed. "H«- later, stated: "Daniel C. Roper [Secre
tary of Commerce] and I had been interested in Bingham in
view of his fine career generally and his great support of
Roosevelt.
I never knew whether our recommendation was the
influence that tipped the scales for Bingham's appointment
to London, or whether Mr. Roosevelt had made the decision on
his own at the same time." Hull, Memoirs, I, 182.
^^During Bingham's tour, Norman Davis, one of FDR's early,
official, roving ambassadors-at-large, conducted the major
share of diplomacy with the British, leaving the Louisville
publisher with only secondary diplomatic duties. For examples,
see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 105-106, 114-116, 130131, 359, 372-38C .
At one point, Bingham had: had 337 days of home leave in
less than three years. Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III,
569 ftn. 1.
:
:
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almost inadvertently, yielded to his blandishments.
Roosevelt personally disliked Kennedy.

Only grudgingly

had the president agreed to appoint him to a position in the
administration in 1934.

Kennedy, however, had contributed

substantially in money and in time to Roosevelt's presidential
campaign.
Kennedy was one of the few influential members of the
business community to actively support FDR's first bid for
the presidency.

The son of an Irish-Catholic immigrant, born

and raised in Boston, Massachusetts, Kennedy pursued a
spectacular career in the world of finance.

12

had amassed a fortune of nearly $10,000,000.

By 1930 he
Nominally a

conservative Democrat, he sided with Roosevelt in 1932 be
cause he knew that Hoover would lose and that the New Deal
would demand reform in the financial practices of Wall
Street.

"It was," Kennedy said, "good politics to be on the
13
side of the angels."
12

For details on Kennedy's life and career, see Richard
J. Whalen, The Founding Father; The Storv of Joseph P. Ken
nedy (N.Y.: New American Library, 1964); David E. Koskoff,
.Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times (Englewood Cliffs*
Prentice-Hall, 1974); Roger Bjerk, "Kennedy at the Court of
St. James," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State
University, 1971); and Michael R. Beschloss, Kennedy and
Roosevelt: The Uneasy Alliance (N..Y.: W.W. Norton, 1980).
In describing Kennedy's diplomatic appointment, each of these
authors relies heavily upon Moley's recollections.
"^Whalen, Founding Father, 128-129, 137; Moley, First
New Deal, 380-382.
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Kennedy expected a reward for his campaign efforts.
had good reason.

He

He contributed $25,000 directly to the

Roosevelt coffers, lent the Democratic party another $50,000,
and raised $100,000 more among his friends, many of them Wall
Street financiers.

14

In addition, the aggressive and shrewd

Irishman proved valuable in mollifying the fears of William
Randolph Hearst, the isolationist newspaper magnate, concern- .
ing FDR's alleged internationalism, and he helped persuade
Father Charles E. Coughlin, the Detroit radio priest, to
support the Roosevelt cause.

For his endeavors, Kennedy

wanted and anticipated the position of secretary of the
15
treasury.
President Roosevelt, however, hesitated to admit Kennedy
into the administration.
and too strong-minded.

He thought Kennedy too independent
Kennedy, Roosevelt told Farley, could

not have the treasury post because he "would want to run the
Treasury in his own way, contrary to my plans and views.
(

Whether Kennedy would receive any position in 19 33
14

Whalen, Founding Father, 119; Beschloss, Uneasy Alli
ance, 75.
15
Whalen, Founding Father, 113-128; Beschloss, Uneasy
Alliance, 70-78; Moley, First New Deal, 380-382.
16
James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt
Years (N.Y.: Whittlesey House, 1948), 115.
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appeared doubtful.

Roosevelt's personal secretary and close

confidant, Louis McHenry Howe, detested Kennedy, as did the
President's wife, Eleanor.

Together, they formed a formidable

wall between Kennedy and government service.

For several

months following the inauguration, President Roosevelt com17
municated only infrequently and informally with Kennedy.
The New Deal administration's neglect of him irritated
Kennedy.

He privately exchanged abuse of FDR with William

Hearst, and he confided to Raymond Moley his amazement that
he had ever supported the President.

Still, a position in

the upper echelon of government would help relieve the frus
tration that Kennedy, the Irish immigrant, always felt at
failing to be accepted as a social equal by the Boston
Brahmins.
Kennedy continued to seek a position in the New Deal.
He requested Moley's assistance.

He even offered to supple

ment Moley's income so that the Assistant Secretary of State
could live in Washington in a manner more suitable to his
status.18
17
18

Whalen, Founding Father, 131.

Moley, First New Deal, 381-382. Moley quickly adds
that he did , not regard Kennedy's offer as a bribe.
See
also Whalen, Founding Father, 138-141? Beschloss, Uneasy
Alliance, 79-88.
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Mo ley eventually secured Kennedy's entrance into the
administration.

Believing that Kennedy richly deserved a

reward, Moley repeatedly reminded FDR of his "obligation"
to the generous financier.

Finally, in June 19 34, an oppor

tunity to help Kennedy appeared.

Moley "was able to override

both the prejudice of Howe and the reluctance of Roosevelt."

19

Kennedy became Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis
sion, a new agency created to oversee Wall Street operations.
Service as head of the SEC and, in 1936, as chairman of
the United States Maritime Commission failed to satisfy Ken
nedy's ambitions.

He continued to hope for a cabinet post.

Barring that, he sought a prestigious embassy.

In 1936 he

again campaigned vigorously and contributed handsomely to
Roosevelt's election.

20

A year later, when Bingham became incurably ill, Kennedy
moved quickly to claim the London embassy.

He bluntly in

formed James Roosevelt, the President's eldest son whose
friendship he had assiduously cultivated, that he wanted the
London ambassadorship when Bingham died or resigned.

James

"^Moley, First New Deal, 381-382, 519.
Of)

Beschloss, Uneasy Alliance, 123-128.
Business support for FDR was less in 1936 than in 1932.
Business campaign contributions to FDR's campaign, which
were 25 percent of FDR's total in 1932, amounted to only 4
percent in 1936. Kennedy was one of the few prominent busi
nessmen who continued to support the President. Manchester,
Glory and Dream, 139.
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prompt ly delivered the message to his father and personally
endorsed Kennedy's candidacy.
President Roosevelt apparently consented to Kennedy's
wishes without much thought.
nedy.

Besides, he had tired of Ken

He considered him a "prima donna."

He often complained

to his associates that "the trouble with Kennedy is you always
have to hold his hand...he calls up and says he is hurt be21
cause I have not seen him."

Perhaps the thought flashed

through FDR's mind that a Kennedy in London was preferable
tp a Kennedy in Washington.
FDR soon had second thoughts.

Liberals within the

administration, having learned of Kennedy's pending appoint
ment, urged the president to select someone else.

They re

garded the business tycoon as a rich man, untrained in diplo1macy, who aspired to be the first Catholic

President of the

United States. 22
!
'
)
a
j

Roose
jfevelt momentarily yielded to the pressure.

Employ

ing James as an emissary, he suggested that Kennedy accept
21

.

Diary entry, October 9, 1936, Ickes, Secret Diary, I ,,r
692. See also, diary entry, April 13, 1935, Blum, Morgenthau
Diaries, I, 241; Farley, Farley's Story, 198. ..
22

For instance, see diary entry, April 17, 19 38, Ickes,
Secret Diary, II, 370, and Krock, Firing Line, 399.
Hull clearly indicates that Kennedy was not his choice. Hull,
Memoirs, I, 200.
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the secretaryship of commerce instead of the ambassadorship.
Kennedy reacted angrily.

"You know what Jimmy proposed!"

Kennedy exclaimed to New York Times columnist Arthur Krock.
"That instead of going to London, I become Secretary of
Commerce!

Well, I ’m not going to.

FDR promised me London,

and I told Jimmy to tell his father that's the job, and the
23
only one, I ’ll accept."
James Roosevelt, in the meantime, authorized Krock to
publish

the fact

of Kennedy's appointment.

It was a big

news story, for Kennedy was the first Roman Catholic chosen
to represent the United States at the Court of St. James's.
Kennedy was also Irish.

Traditionally, presidents had ap

pointed men of Anglo- Saxon

ancestry and of Protestant faith

to London.
The publication of Kennedy's appointment infuriated FDR.
Bingham had not yet resigned.

When Bingham died shortly

afterwards, the President accused Krock of hastening his
death by publishing the story of his replacement.

24

Roosevelt, nevertheless, commissioned Kennedy to succeed
Bingham.

His son, James, who made promises that seemed to

“^Krock, Firing Line, 333.
24Farley, Farley's Story, 126; Krock, Firing Line, 333.

have special authority but did not, had guaranteed Kennedy
the London vacancy.

Having given no prior consideration to

Bingham's replacement, the president confirmed, without much
reflection, his son's pledge.
Had FDR reflected upon his choice of Kennedy, he might
have realized the inappropriateness of dispatching an Irish
Catholic, who was also liberally profane, to London.

Perhaps

the very inappropriateness of Kennedy's appointment amused
Roosevelt.

The President was not above wagging the. British

lion's tail.'

That Kennedy was a Democrat and campaign con

tributor should not have weighed heavily with FDR in 1937.
Then, the theoretical maximum for any President was two terms.
Unless FDR already contemplated a third term, Kennedy's sup
port was not needed.

The precise reasons, if any, for Ken-

nedy's appointment remain securely buried.
25

25

Kennedy's biographers offer an assortment of reasons
for his appointment, most of which cite Kennedy's business
and administrative qualifications.
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,.re
corded in his diary on December 8, 1937, that FDR "considered
Kennedy a very dangerous man and that he was going to send
him to England as Ambassador with the distinct understanding
that the appointment was only good for six months and that,
furthermore, by giving him this appointment, any obligation
he had to Kennedy was paid for." Beschloss, Uneasy Alliance,
157. Kennedy remained in London for nearly 3 years, until
October 1940.
'
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The first envoy chosen for the historically important
embassy in Paris possessed solid political credentials.

The

circumstances that compelled the designation of Jesse Isidor
Straus, however, were accidental, if not fortuitous.
Straus fully anticipated a position in the New Deal
administration, although not the Paris embassy.

A lifelong

friend of FDR's and president of Macy's department store,
Straus had organized the Roosevelt Business and Professional
Men's League in 1932 and had contributed $10,000 to the Democratic coffers.

26

Through Louis Howe, Roosevelt had promised

Straus the secretaryship of the Department of Commerce, a
cabinet seat the department store executive coveted.

His

uncle had held the same position in Theodore Roosevelt's
27
administration.
The old Wilson wing of the Democratic party, however,
wanted one of its own to receive the top post in the Commerce
Department.
Roper.

They pressured Roosevelt to appoint Daniel C.

Early in March 1933 Roosevelt succumbed.

Unfortunately, no one bothered to inform Straus of the
change in FDR's intentions.
26
27

When Henry Morgenthau, Sr., who

Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 782.

Alfred B. Rollins, Jr., Roosevelt and Howe (N.Y.: Al
fred A. Knopf, 1962), 374-375; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hop
kins, 32, 34.
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had been denied the chief post in the Department of Agricul
ture, told Straus that he, too, would not be in the cabinet,
Straus became irate.

Upon learning of Morgenthau's unauthor

ized communication and of Straus' resultant displeasure,
Raymond Moley immediately informed Roosevelt.
The President in turn hastily phoned Straus.

In an

effort to soothe his friend's vexation, Roosevelt offered
Straus the prestigious ambassadorship to France.

Straus

hesitated for a few days, consulted with his family, and
finally accepted the appointment.

28

The president's impulsive decision to appoint Straus to
Paris evidently confronted him with another embarrassing
situation.

Reputedly, he had offered the Paris embassy to as

many as two other aspirants.

29

One of them-— William C. Bul

litt— had hoped for the appointment and had received the
recommendations of at least two of the President's friends.
Bullitt later contended that he withdrew his claim to the
P a n s mission so that Roosevelt could appoint Straus.

30

How-

28

Moley, After Seven Years, 12 4-125, and First New Deal,
73, 75, 271. See also Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV,
145, 152-153.
29
According to Louis B. Wehle, FDR had slated someone
else for the Paris post as early as December 1932. Wehle,
Hidden Threads, 119.
■^Colonel Edward M. House to Bullitt, February 23, 1933,
Bullitt, For The President, 30-31. See also Farnsworth, Bul
litt and the Soviet Union, 86-87. At a minimum, Howe appears

-210-

eve r accurate Bullitt's contention, his worldly experience
and friendship with FDR made him a likely successor to Paris
when Straus died of cancer in 1936.
William C. Bullitt was no diplomatic neophyte.

Although

technically not a career diplomat, he had experienced a wide
31
and spectacular involvement in the diplomatic world.
Born
into a wealthy and prominent Philadelphia family in 1891, Bullitt
was

graduated from Yale, attended Harvard Law School, and

traveled extensively in Europe as a correspondent for the
Philadelphia Public Ledger.
Upon returning to the United States in 1916, the short,
prematurely bald, and vivacious journalist met President
Wilson's chief adviser, Colonel Edward House.

Impressed with

Bullitt's background and exploits, House secured him an
appointment as a special assistant to Secretary of State
Robert Lansing in 1917.

Two years later

Bullitt accompanied

President Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference as chief of
the American delegation's Division of Current Intelligence.
The Peace Conference proved to be a portentious diplo
matic sojourn for Bullitt.

In February 1919 President Wilson

sent him on an "unofficial," secret mission to Moscow to

to have led Bullitt to believe that he would receive the
Paris embassy.
31

For details on Bullitt's career, see Farnsworth, Bul
litt and Soviet Union.
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determine the conditions under which the Bolsheviks would
negotiate peace.

Three weeks later

Bullitt returned to

Paris with what he believed was a realistic Soviet proposal
for peace.

He had negotiated directly with Valdimir Lenin

and Leon Trotsky.

For reasons still obscure, Wilson declined

to receive his secret emissary, and David Lloyd George, the
British Prime Minister, publicly repudiated Bullitt.

Bitter

and disillusioned, Bullitt resigned from the American peace
delegation.
Bullitt's pique toward Wilson knew few bounds.

Since

the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917, he had fol
lowed closely the activities of the Bolsheviks.

Idealistic

and intensely romantic, he pictured the Bolshevik movement
as the vanguard of world liberalism.

He envisioned the Soviet

as a "brotherhood, a spiritual conversion, indeed a state of
grace."

Bullitt concluded that Wilson had failed to under

stand his own pronouncement that Russia was "the acid test"
32
of the good will of the allies.
He believed that the fail
ure of the allies to reach a modus Vivendi with the Bolsheviks
planted the seeds of international chaos and doomed the League
of Nations to failure.
32

Ibid., 12-14. Farnsworth states that Bullitt's report
on the Bolsheviks "was the product of a one-week sojourn and
a preconceived belief that what he would see, he would like."
She also quotes the reaction of the British diplomat-historian Harold Nicolson to Bullitt's trip and report. He said:
"I blink politely." Ibid., 44-46, 51, 54-55.

Bullitt decided to publicly castigate Wilson and the
League of Nations.

In the fall of 1919 he appeared before

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by the Re
publican Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge.
Bullitt's testimony proved valuable to Lodge, a critic of
Wilson, in his efforts to discredit the President, the Treaty
of Versailles, and the League.
Bullitt's act of indiscretion also proved to be his
nemesis.

Like many figures in classical antiquity, Bullitt

had tempted fate without thought of the consequence of his
action.

Whatever his

.motivations, he succeeded in his

appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
destroying a favorable impression he had created while work
ing in the State Department.

Many Democrats swore never to

forgive Bill Bullitt.
Retiring to Europe in 1920, Bullitt'planned to
loaf

and

watch the world

fail apart.

He resumed the

life of a dilettante, traveled extensively, married the widow
of the American Communist, John Reed, and collaborated with
Sigmund Freud on a critical psychoanalytical study of Woodrow
Wilson.

33

In addition, he remained abreast of foreign affairs

and formed a wide circle of highly-placed friends.
33

Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 196 7).
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Bullitt always hoped that his role in the events of 1919
would be forgotten.

With Republican domination of the White

House obviously at an end in 1932, he yearned to reenter gov
ernment service.

In October one of Bullitt's friends, Louis

B. Wehle, a prominent New York attorney and Harvard companion
of Roosevelt's, arranged an interview for Bullitt with the
Democratic presidential nominee.
Wehle judged that Bullitt and Roosevelt "immediately"
became friends.

He perceived that Bullitt shared a "temper-

mental congentiality" with FDR.

Like Roosevelt, Bullitt was

charming, brilliant but erratic, boldly intuitional, and
contemptuous of the traditional bureaucracy of foreign
affairs-. ^
Roosevelt, nevertheless, hesitated to include Bullitt in
his coterie of official advisers.

Following the November

electjion, he had sent Bullitt to Europe on two "unofficial"
fact-jfinding missions.

Bullitt had indiscreetly informed a

friend of his role as a secret emissary.

The press had

learned of Bullitt's trips and had reported them with ample,
and in Roosevelt's eyes, undesirable publicity.

Obviously

irritated, FDR may have recalled Bullitt's earlier trans
gression and suspected his reliability.

Bullitt feared that

34

Wehle, Hidden Threads, 112-115;
Bullitt and Soviet Union, 77-80.

Farnsworth,
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he had harmed irreparably his opportunity to obtain a diplo
matic post. ^
The man responsible for recruiting numerous New Dealers,
however, was "very favorably" impressed with Bullitt.

Raymond

Moley found Bullitt interesting, well-informed, and anxious
to serve the New Deal.

He thought Bullitt could "help infuse
36
new life into the career service."
To secure an appointment for Bullitt, Moley had to over
come the opposition of Undersecretary Phillips.

Late in

March, Moley prepared a memorandum concerning an appointment
for Bullitt, which the President initialled.

Thus armed, he

"went to Phillips, who thereupon showed more emotion than I
knew he was capable of."

Phillips "bitterly reminded" Moley

that Bullitt had been "disloyal" to the Wilson administration.
Moley retorted that Wilson had wronged Bullitt.

After further

"customary tussles," Moley and Phillips agreed that Bullitt
could be appointed as a special assistant to Secretary of
State Hull.

Moley's office prepared Bullitt's commission,
37
and on April 20 FDR signed it.
35

Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 84-87. See also
Bullitt to Governor Roosevelt, January 14, 1933, Bullitt, For
T.he President, 24-25.
36

Moley, After Seven Years, 102; Farnsworth, Bullitt and
Soviet Union, 88.
37 ,
Moley, After Seven Years, 102, 16 4.
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Phillips believed that Roosevelt allowed Bullitt into
the State Department in order to facilitate United States
recognition of the Soviet Union.

Early in the spring of 1933,

the Eiresident had decided upon recognition.

He may have re38
called Bullitt's earlier enthusiasm for the Russians.
Roosevelt apparently regarded Bullitt as a likely pros

pect for the Moscow embassy.

As early as December 1932, FDR

concurred with Louis Wehle that Bullitt would make a good
ambassador if and when the United States extended recognition
39
. . .
to the Soviet Union.
When recognition became imminent m
November 1933, Roosevelt sought and received Hull's approval
to appoint Bullitt as ambassador to Soviet Russia.

40

Asif

to relieve any doubts, Roosevelt detained Phillips after
signing the recognition documents on November 16 and asked
the undersecretary his opinion of Bullitt.

Phillips tact

fully praised Bullitt's role in the recognition negotiations.^
38
39

Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 88-89.
Ibid., 107; Wehle, Hidden Threads, 119-120.

40

Hull, Memoirs, I, 296, 302. others were not so approving.
Wilbur Carr confided to his diary on Bullitt's appointment:
"What a travesty and how extraordinary.
But it means his de
parture from the Dept, which will please Hull." Thomas R.
Maddux, "American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1969,
84.
41

Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 258.

The next day Roosevelt announced Bullitt's appointment as
the first American ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
Bullitt seemed a logical choice.

42

He had played a role

in the negotiations that led to the resumption of U.S.Russian relations.

He was familiar with many of the Russian

leaders and was well-regarded in Soviet circles.

Maxim

Litvinov, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, who negotiated
the recognition agreement for the Soviets, had expressed
to Bullxtt xn June his wish that Bullitt would be chosen. 4 3
His appointment to Moscow surprised Bullitt.

State

Department officials had discreetly groomed John V.A.
MacMurray for the Soviet post.

They had engineered his

appointment as minister to the "Russian affiliations" of
Riga, Estonia, and Lithuania in April 1933,
the fxrst leg on his journey to Moscow.
42

44

presumably

A respected career

Roosevelt Press Conference, November 17, 1933, Nixon,
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 494.
43
Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 108-109.
44

The New Dealers, 386.
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officer and former minister to China, MacMurray was wellversed on the Far East, an area of major concern to the
Soviets.

45

On the other hand, Bullitt, whose knowledge of

Western Europe was extensive, knew little or nothing about
the Far East.

He had hoped to be appointed to Paris, where

he had friends in influential circles and where the social
life was more palatable.
The Soviet assignment, nonetheless, delighted him.

Four

teen years earlier his government had repudiated his nego
tiations with the Bolsheviks.

Now that government had

selected him as its chief agent to establish cordial relations
with the Soviet Union.

This ironic twist in events appealed

to his romanticism, to his sense of diplomatic intrigue.

For

Bullitt, his second sojourn to Moscow represented a special
triumph.

46

Misunderstandings and personal differences, however,
soon led to an annulment of Bullitt's honeymoon with Russia's
leaders.

He became a bitter critic of the Soviet regime.

His expectations of grandiose accomplishments eviscerated,
45

See Thomas Buckley, "John Van Antwerp MacMurray: The
Diplomacy of an American Mandarin," in Richard Dean Burns and
Edward M. Bennett, eds., Diplomats in Crisis: United StatesChinese-Japanese' Relations, 1919-1941 (Santa Barbara: Clio
Press, 1974), 27-48.
46
For example, see Bullxtt to FDR, January 1, 1934,
Bullitt, For The President, 61-73.
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Bullitt decided late in 1935 that he would not remain in the
47
Soviet Union much longer.
Once again Bullitt focused his ambitions upon the Paris
embassy.

In March 1936, Assistant Secretary of State R. Wal

ton Moore told Bullitt that he had discussed with the Presi
dent Bullitt's desire to become the ambassador to France.
Two weeks later, Moore inquired of Bullitt:

"Veiy confidenti

ally, of course, I wish to ask you whether you would care to
go to Rome...with the prospect of going from there to Paris....
I think there is a probability of [Breckinridge] Long
[ambassador to Italy], and a possibility of Straus retiring."
Bullitt replied to Moore that he preferred Paris
"infinitely" to Rome.
Life in Italy would, of course, be extremely
pleasant in contrast to the extremely unpleasant
life here, and I should like the climate.
But I
do not feel that there would be any outlet for the
energy which is, at the moment bursting within me....
Another consideration weighs heavily with me
and is perhaps controlling: I want Anne [his daughter]
to have an American education and I want to be with
her....I should not hesitate to take Anne to Paris
where there are good American schools; but she
could not find an American education in Rome and I
47

R. Walton Moore to FDR, December 27, 1935, Nixon, FDR
and Foreign Affairs, III, 143-144.
See also Bullitt, For The
President, 115-163.
48

Bullitt, For The President, 157.
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am certain that she would not be happy thej|.
Paris, I should prefer infinitely to Rome.
He would wait until Paris became available.

In the meantime,

he would return to the United States to campaign for FDR's
reelection.
Bullitt possessed more impressive credentials for the
Paris ambassadorship than the usual amateur candidate.
Although a consistently controversial figure, he was conver
sant in German and French and, already in 1936, on intimate
terms with several high-ranking French officials.

Equally

important, he had developed a close relationship with the
50
President.
Bullitt had only to wait until Straus resigned
to realize his aspirations.
Without apparent reservation Roosevelt grafted Bullitt
carte blanche to succeed Straus in Paris.

On August 18, 1^36,

Straus tendered his resignation to the President.

Straus

had intended to retain the ambassadorship, but his physicijans
ordered him "to have a complete rest for six months," and Ihe
believed it was "imperative to keep the Embassy Istaff at /its
51
'
full complement."
On August 25, Roosevelt accepted Straus'
4^Bullitt to Moore, April 8, 1936, ibid., 158E.
50
Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 155-156.
51
Straus to FDR, August 18, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
Affairs, III, 389.
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resignation and announced Bullitt's appointment as the new
ambassador to France.

52

On that same day Roosevelt also granted Joseph E. Davies
his choice of available embassies.
Bullitt in Moscow.

Davies chose to succeed

Unlike the license granted to Bullitt,

however, Davies' contained no testimonials to diplomatic
experience.

His wife wanted to be an ambassadoress, and he

had rendered valuable services to Roosevelt's campaigns.

In

sending Davies to Russia, FDR repaid a political debt.
Handsome and gregarious, Joseph Davies combined a suc
cessful career as a businessman-lawyer with an active role
53
in Democratic politics.
Born m Watertown, Wisconsin,
he

was

graduated from the.University of Wisconsin Law

School in 1901.

Nine years later he became chairman of the

Wisconsin Democratic Central Committee and, in 1912, he
managed Woodrow Wilson's campaign in the midwestern states.
He then served as Wilson's commissioner of corporations and
as the first chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.

After

failing in a bid for a United States senate seat in 1918,
52

FDR to Straus, August 25, 1936, Roosevelt, His Personal
Letters, 1928-1945, I, 60 9-610. See also Eagles, "Ambassador
Davies," 80-81.
53
On Davies' life and career, see Eagles, "Ambassador
Davies," 1-25; "Ambassador Davies," Fortune, 16 (October 193^,
94-98; Eugene Lyons, "Moscow Likes Millionaires, " Current History, 44 (April 1937), 42-45; National Cyclopaedia of American
Biography, C (1930), 456-457.
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Davies resumed his lucrative law practice.
Davies again entered the political arena in 1932 to
campaign for Roosevelt.

While serving in the Wilson admini

stration, he had become an enthusiastic admirer of FDR.
Membership in the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" club
subsequently entitled Davies to a position in the New Deal
administration in 1933.

He refused an appointment, however,

prompting FDR's secretary to send him an autographed photo:
"To Joe Davies, the wonder man, who didn't want a job— with
54
tears of gratitude from Louis McHenry Howe."
Approximately
60 percent of Davies' fortune, estimated in the millions,
had evaporated in the 1929 stock market crash, and he preferr
ed to recoup his losses at law.
Three years later Davies' financial position changed
considerably.
him.

In December

1935, his first wife divorced

A few weeks later he married Marjorie Post Hutton,

the wealthy General Foods heiress.
Davies now prepared to assume his place in the Roosevelt
administration.

As vice chairman of the Democratic National

Committee, he worked vigorously during the 19 36 campaign.

He

and Mrs. Davies reportedly contributed $17,500 to the Roose54

.........
Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (N.Y.:
Schuster, 1941), xi-xii.

Simon and

-2 2 2 -

velt campaign chest.
During the campaign Washington buzzed with the rumor
that Davies' wedding present to the new Mrs. Davies would be
to make her an ambassadoress.

It was.

With Mrs. Davies

aspiring to enter Washington political life, the earlier
reluctance of Joe Davies to accept a political appointment
vanished.

At a dinner party in New York, he told Stephen

Early, the President's press secretary, that an ambassador
ship would be a suitable reward for a lifetime of Democratic
56
service.
Before the campaign ended Roosevelt casually permitted
Davies to claim the Moscow embassy.

On August 25, Steve

Early summoned the fifty-seven year old attorney to the
White House "to discuss" a diplomatic appointment with the
President.

During lunch, FDR asked Davies to name the

embassy of his choice.
or Germany."

Davies responded:

"Either to Russia

They were, in his opinion, "the two most

dynamic spots in Europe."

For many reasons, Davies continued,

"neither. Mrs. Davies nor I would like to go to Paris."
Roosevelt then said that he, himself, "would mighty well"
55

Bendiner, Riddle of the State Department, 133; W.M.
Kiplinger, Washington Is Like That (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers,
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like to see Russia.

He suggested that Davies proceed to

Moscow with the possibility of transferring to Berlin within
a year.

57

The announcement on November 16, 1936, of Davies' appoint
ment created a furor in the liberal press.

Several journal

ists predicted that Davies— the president of Washington's
swankiest country club, a millionaire corporation lawyer,
and an avowed "capitalist"— would clash violently with the
leaders of Soviet Russia.

Mrs. Davies supplied further fuel

to the journalistic outbursts when she commenced "the mission
to Moscow" by carting along 30 trunks, 50 pieces of smaller
luggage, 6 personal servants, 2,000 frozen Birds Eye pints
58
of cream, and 25 freezers.
Her display of conspicuous
consumption also elicited a comment from a Soviet spokesman
in New York.
are cows m

"Contrary to popular belief," he stated, "there
59
Russia."

Davies candidly attributed his appointment to politics and
57

Davies, Mission to Moscow, xi-xiii; Eagles, "Ambassador
Davies," 91.
58
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J.B. Lippincott, 1951), 94] Eagles,"Ambassador Davies," 92,
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to his friendship with the President.
to recommend him.

There was little else

His background touched only the periphery

of diplomatic experience.

Except for a brief stint as an

economic adviser to Wilson at Versailles in 1919, Davies could
claim experience in international affairs only through his
legal clientele.

His clients had included the governments

of Mexico, Peru, Chile and the Dominican Republic.
Davies, nevertheless, considered his legal work "a
training ground for diplomacy."

When queried about his

qualifications as he and Marjorie embarked upon their voyage
to Communist Russia, Davies replied:
lawyer with a liberal outlook."

"I am a corporation

Although he expected to be

in Russia only a short time— FDR had persuaded him to look
forward to the embassy in Berlin by the fall of 1937— he
also expressed optimism about his ability to induce a thaw
in the icy atmosphere that had marked United States-Soviet
relations since 19 3 5 . ^
Roosevelt was less sanguine.

He did not expect, in

1936, a significant amelioration in relations with Russia.
He had appointed Davies to Moscow to honor a political debt.
In announcing to his cabinet the appointment of Davies, the
president— who "would mighty well" like to see Russia him
self— laughingly remarked that "three or four months in
^Davies, Mission to Moscow, xi-xiii.
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Moscow would be all that Mr. and Mrs. Davies could stand
in that country."

61

When he suggested to Davies that he

consider an early transfer to Berlin, where the incumbent
ambassador was about to resign, FDR may have been thinking of
his earlier difficulties in finding an envoy to serve in
that post.

Filling the Berlin embassy in 19 33 posed special problems
for Roosevelt. 6 2

Democratic campaign contributors evinced no

interest in an appointment to Germany.

The glamour of the

Berlin mission had vanished with the ascent of the Nazis.

In

the course of three months, Roosevelt offered the German post
to four men and considered at least five others before he
appointed a southern historian with whom he was only vaguely
familiar.

None of the potential appointees was a professional

Diary entry, November 20, 1936, Ickes, Secret Diary,
II, 7.
62

The best account of FDR's search for an envoy to Ger
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diplomat.
The search for an ambassador to Nazi Germany began on
March 9, five days after the inauguration.

With the Berlin

embassy, Roosevelt hoped to appease the demands of the con
servative wing of the Democratic party for spoils.

He first

offered the embassy to James M. Cox, his presidential runningmate in the 1920 election.

Citing the obligations of his
63
publishing business, Cox declined.
FDR next approached
Owen D. Young, the millionaire founder of RCA and chairman of
the board of General Electric, who also declined. 64

He then

considered Newton D. Baker, an eminent corporation lawyer,
until Secretary of State Hull mentioned that the German gov
ernment might refuse to accept Baker.

Baker had served as

Woodrow Wilson's secretary of war during World War 1 . ^
\

A

f

i Roosevelt next concocted a clever patronage scheme.
With, one or two simple maneuvers, he would fill both the
Berljin embassy and a U.S. senate vacancy.

He would appoint

Senator Roya]/ S. Copeland of New York, a Hearst prote*ger, to
Germany; Governor Herbert Lehman of New York then would select
63

j

Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 187-188.
See also FDR
to Cox, March 9, 1933, Roosevelt, His Personal' Letters, 19281945, I, '337-338; Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs" I, 143 ftn. 1.
64
Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 188.
65
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FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 58.
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Edward J. Flynn, one of FDR's most trusted political advisers,
to replace Copeland in the Senate.

As the President stated,

in unveiling his plan to Flynn:
He had not yet appointed an Ambassador to Germany
....he had heard that Mrs. Copeland was rather
'fed up' with the life in Washington and that she
was very eager to have the Senator receive a major
diplomatic appointment.
If the German appointment
were offered Senator Copeland, the President felt,
he would most certainly accept it....This would
create a vacancy in the Senate, and Governor Lehman
...would have the power of appointment.
Flynn said he "should be happy to" accommodate the
president.

Copeland, too, agreed "to go along."

He would

accept the ambassadorship to Germany, subject to Roosevelt's
stipulation that Lehman first guarantee Flynn's senate
appointment.
The plot failed to materialize, however.
plan almost rebounded to Roosevelt's detriment.

Indeed, the
Lehman felt

obligated to obtain the approval of former New York Governor
Alfred E. Smith on the senatorial appointment.

Smith, who

harbored great animosity toward Roosevelt, equivocated in
sanctioning the nomination of Flynn.

When Smith finally

indicated that he wanted the Senate seat himself, FDR abruptly
aborted his scheme.
to Germany."

The President then "urged" Flynn "to go

After discussing the matter with his wife, Flynn,

like the others before him, declined.^
66

Flynn, You're The Boss, 146-148; Dallek, Democrat and
Diplomat, 188-189.
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When his patronage machinations failed to produce an
ambassador to Germany Roosevelt directed his political
advisers to find a candidate.

In May, two of them, probably

Louis Howe and Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
submitted to the President the names of four liberal acade. .
67
micians.
Obviously desperate, Roosevelt agreed to consider them.
On May 17, he asked Phillips and Hull what they knew of the
four individuals, three of whom were university presidents.
FDR added that he wanted a prompt reply.
Phillips responded.

The next day

Neither he nor Hull was personally

familiar with the four candidates. 6 8

Roosevelt, subsequently,

offered the Berlin post to none of them.
Nearly three months had lapsed since the search for an
ambassador to Germany began.

On June 7, Roosevelt conveyed

his frustration to a small group of advisers.

He faced in-

The four candidates were: Ernest M. Hopkins, president
of Dartmouth College; Glenn Frank, president of the University
of Wisconsin; William Mather Lewis, president of Lafayette
College; and Harry Emerson Fosdick, a theologian.
68

Phillips to FDR, May 18, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
Affairs, I, 142-143.
Why FDR failed to seek more information about;, or" to
consider further, William Mather Lewis is puzzling. As Phil
lips noted in his letter to FDR, Lewis was 5 3 years old, had
studied in Germany prior to the World War, was reputedly a
fine speaker and sound administrator, and was a wealthy Demo
crat.
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creasing pressure to fill the Berlin embassy:

Hoover's

ambassador to Germany, Frederic M. Sackett, had retired at
the end of March; if the Senate adjourned prior to confirming
a replacement, a new envoy would not receive a salary before
the next session of Congress.

The latter loomed as an impor

tant consideration in finding someone willing to $rve in
Berlin; several men of wealth had declined the nomination.
Nazi Germany, moreover, appeared hostile to the United States.
An ambassador, Roosevelt concluded, had to be found soon.
Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper immediately responded
to thePresident's expression of exasperation.
William Dodd?" he asked.

"How about

Dodd was a good friend of Roper's

and a fellow North Carolinian.

His specialty was American

history, but he knew Germany well, having acquired a Ph.D.
from the University of Leipzig in 1898.

"Dodd would be astute

in handling diplomatic duties," Roper told Roosevelt, "and
when conferences grew tense, he would turn the tide by quoting
69
Jefferson."
Roosevelt reacted enthusiastically to Roper's suggestion.
Although he only knew Dodd vaguely, if at all, and was unfami
liar with his reputation as an historian, FDR phoned him the
69

Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 190. See also Daniel C.
Roper, Fifty Years of Public Life [N.Y.: Greenwood Press,
1968), 334-335.
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next day, June 8.

"This is Franklin Roosevelt.... I want you
70
to go to Germany as Ambassador."
Overwhelmed, Dodd requested time to contemplate the

appointment.

He also wanted to confer with officials at the

University of Chicago, where he was a faculty member.
President replied:

The

"Two hours, can you decide in that time?"

Roosevelt added that Dodd's "work as a liberal and as a
scholar" were the main reasons for his "wishing to appoint"
him.

"I want an American liberal in Germany as a standing

example....You may return [to the United States] in the
winter of 1934, if the university insists."
Dodd's superiors at the university urged him to accept
the appointment.

Two-and-a-half hours later, on the after

noon of June 8, Dodd returned the president's call and
71
accepted the appointment.
The quest for an envoy to Nazi
Germany had ended.
The effort expended to find an ambassador to Germany
hardly matched the insignificance that Roosevelt attached to
70

Diary entry, June 8, 1933, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 3.

~^Ibid., 4. See also Martha Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes
(N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1939), 10-11.
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the Berlin post.

72

The President initially sought to pacify

the claims of conservative Democrats for patronage.

He

offered the post to Cox and to Young, and he considered Baker.
None of them was close to him personally.
particularly indebted to them.

Nor did FDR feel

Cox had supported Baker for

the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932, while Young
had remained neutral during the Chicago convention.

Of all

the candidates Roosevelt considered, only Flynn was a personal
friend, and FDR offered him the post only after his plot to
appoint Senator Copeland failed.

Roosevelt had wanted to see

Flynn in the &enate, not in the Berlin embassy.
Historian Frank Freidel unconvincingly argues other
wise. About the Berlin post, he states:
"For no other diplo
matic appointment were so many candidates so carefully con
sidered." Franklin D . Roosevelt, IV, 361.
About the selection,
FDR, himself^ publicly hailed Dodd's appointment to Berlin as
the end of a careful search for just the right man. Dallek,
Democrat and Diplomat, 190.
' Offner offers a slightly different assessment.
He
contends that FDR "delayed" his selection of an envoy to Ber
lin because "he wanted to get a closer look at the activities
of the new German government, and he regarded the Berlin post
as of "special importance."" American Appeasement: United
States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933-1938 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1969),54.
More accurate
is Franklin L. Ford who suggested in
1953 that FDR's precise reasons for appointing Dodd will
never be known.
"Three Observers in Berlin," 448.
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William E. Dodd became ambassador to Germany "by
default."

73

Unable to dispose of Berlin as a patronage plum

and anxious to appoint somebody, Roosevelt leaped at Roper's
suggestion of Dodd.

Yet, FDR hardly knew Dodd, and he was

not especially fond of Roper, whom he had appointed secretary
of commerce at the expense of his friend Jesse Straus.

Be

cause he nurtured a deep prejudice toward professional diplo
mats, Roosevelt never considered a Foreign Service officer
for Germany. 74
Amateur diplomats often are selected for reasons of
politics.

Dodd was a conspicuous exception.

His forays into

partisan politics had been brief and unobtrusive.

He had

participated actively in Woodrow Wilson's two presidential
campaigns.

In 1932 he had championed the nomination of \

Newton Baker and, after the convention, the election of FDR.
During the Democratic hiatus of the 1920s, Dodd had immersed
himself in the study of the past.

He was not, in 1933, well‘
/
j
known politically, and his donation to the Roosevelt causje
was a meager $25. 75
73
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The historical past more than the political present had
engaged Dodd's attention.

In thirty years he had produced

eight historical monographs, had edited six others, and had
published scores of articles.

From 1905 until his appoint

ment to Berlin, Dodd had taught at the University of Chicago,
where he had earned the respect of his colleagues for his
teaching ability and for his critical treatment of the weaknesses and virtues of his native South.

76

Prominent in Dodd's works was an abiding faith in the
common man and in the ultimate righteousness of democracy.
To Dodd, Thomas Jefferson, with his "boundless faith in the
77
masses," was the "greatest American idealist."
Dodd often looked nostalgically upon the rural simplicity
of America's Jeffersonian past.

He regarded the cities,

such as Chicago, as "no suitable place for humans," and he
once proposed, as the solution for the economic crises of the
1930s, the transfer of millions of people from the industrial
centers to the country.

He appreciated, however, that it

76
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would be "no easy job to transfer unwilling and miseducated
78
city folk to small farms all about the country."
At the time of his appointment to Berlin, Dodd appeared
destined to spend the remainder of his life in the quiet
pursuit of historical truths.

He had neither sought nor

expected a major diplomatic assignment in the New Deal admini
stration.

He was sixty-three years old, near retirement from

regular academic duties and had not spoken German on a
consistent basis for thirty-five years.

His colleagues had

just bestowed upon him one of the highest honors of the
history fraternity— the presidency of the American Historical
4
Association.
•

.'

7 9

Secretary of State Hull, moreover, expressed reservations
about Dodd's appointment.

Although Hull was well-acquainted

with and fond of Dodd, he questioned his effectiveness.

The

Secretary feared that Dodd, who was outspoken in his inter
nationalism, might "get out of bounds in his excess of enthu
siasm and impetuosity and run off on tangents every now and
78
Diary entry, October 24, 1917, W. Alexander Mabry, ed.,
"Professor William E. Dodd's Diary, 1916-1920," The John P .
Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College, n.s., 2
(March 1953), 49; Dodd to FDR, February 8, 1934, Nixon, FDR
and Foreign Affairs, I, 637. See also Roper, Fifty Years,
335.
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then, like our friend William Jennings Bryan."
Roosevelt ignored Hull's qualms.

80

He submitted Dodd's

nomination to the Senate, and that august body dutifully and
unanimously confirmed the history professor's appointment on
June 13.

In discussing the Berlin assignment with Dodd,

prior to the latter's embarkation for Germany on July 6,
Roosevelt encouraged the Jeffersonian-Democrat to believe
that his President wanted him to represent a "living sermon
81
on democracy" to the Nazi "Hun."
With Dodd's departure, Roosevelt figured he had finally
more or less permanently straightened out
appointment.

It was not to be.

the Berlin

More than any other diplo

matic assignment, the Berlin post became— for Dodd, for the
men subsequently offered it, for the man later appointed to
it— a source of unfulfilled expectations, unforgivable
effrontery, vindictiveness, personal tragedy, and cruel
machinations.

In the middle of the disorder and confusion

stood Roosevelt, the ringmaster praised by some and maligned
80
Hull, Memoirs, I, 182. To what extent Hull's qualms
might have been the product of hindsight is uncertain.
^Dallek, "Beyond Tradition," 233-2 34. See also, Ford,
"Three Observers in Berlin," 448; Dodd to FDR, October 13,
1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 425.
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by others for his haphazard methods of administration.
Throughout the course of events that enveloped the imbroglio
over American representation in Berlin, Roosevelt chose the
twisted path of uncertainty and appeasement over a course of
decisiveness and compassion.
Within six months of his arrival in Berlin, Dodd's
ambassadorship ensued upon a downward spiral from which it
82
never recovered.
A passionate Democrat of guileless
character who embodied the virtues of rural simplicity that
had bound him to the teachings of Jefferson, Professor Dodd
quickly found the Nazis totally repugnant.

Hitler "is such

a horror to me," Dodd remarked to British Ambassador Sir
Eric Phipps following the infamous Nazi Blood Purge of
83
June 30, 1934, "I cannot endure his presence."
From the
outset of his appointment, Dodd had mounted the crucible of
democracy against Nazi tyranny only to be met by protestations
of helplessness from the State Department and by displays of
mockery from German officialdom.

Six times during his four-

and-one-half year nightmare in Berlin, Dodd thought out loud
about resigning.
82

Each time he resisted the temptation, hoping

Although Dodd's biographers interpret his performance
differently, all agree that Nazi Germany exacted a heavy toll
on him psychologically and physically.
83
Diary entry, July 13, 1934, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 126.
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and Diplomat, 237.
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he could propel Germany— a country he loved— back on the
road to democracy and decency.

After 1935, however, he re

fused to speak to any of the high Nazi officials.

Despondent

and broken, Dodd, nevertheless, was reluctant to leave.
Roosevelt should have encouraged Dodd to resign.

84

He

permitted him to remain, although he was fully aware of the
deterioration in his ambassador's mental and physical well
being.

Instead, FDR quietly allowed it to be known in the

autumn of 19 36 that the Berlin post soon would be vacated.
He convinced Davies, upon appointing him to Moscow in November,
that he would be transferred to Berlin before the following
September.

85

About the same time, with Berlin in mind,

Ambassador Hugh Wilson in Switzerland wrote Hull to explain
that FDR personally had promised him one of the plum posts
available to a career Foreign Service officer.

86

By the

spring of 19 37 the enchantment of Moscow had worn thin for
the Davieses, especially Mrs. Davies.

They began to look for

ward to Berlin, the "nerve center" of Europe as Ambassador
84
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Davies described it.

87

In April Roosevelt set in motion

arrangements to fulfill Davies' desire.
Roosevelt's intentions, remained unknown to Dodd.

In

August the Anbassador returned to the United States for
consultations.

A tacit understanding existed between Dodd

and FDR that the former might elect to retire in the fall.
However, Dodd easily persuaded Roosevelt to allow him to
remain in Berlin indefinitely.

Dodd hoped that FDR would

agree to replace him with James T. Shotwell, a professor of
history at Columbia University and a known internationalist.
Hope sprang eternal in Dodd.

88

They did not establish a firm

date for Dodd's resignation.
A dilemma of Roosevelt's own making now presented itself.
What could he do with Davies, who was then in Washington,
about to leave on a

tour

of Europe, and who expected to

receive the Berlin post upon the conclusion of his journey?
Shortly before Davies' departure, Stephen Early, the Presi
dent's press secretary, took Davies aside and explained to him
that what he was about to say was not intended as a reflection
87

Davies, Mission to Moscow, xii-xiii, and diary entry,
May 7, 1937, 142; Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 237.
88

Diary entries, May 19, 1937, August 11, 1937, October 19,
1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 409, 426, 428-429. See also Dallek,
Democrat and Diplomat, 308-309; Offner, American Appeasement,
205.
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on FDR's character.

A busy President, Early continued, might

forget a promise to transfer a friend from one post to
another unless he had committed it in writing.

Berlin was

on

no longer a certainty. ^
Davies remained confident, nevertheless.

He assured

Early that he believed the matter would be settled to every
one's satisfaction once he returned to Washington from his
European trip.

Qn

Events and the President's personal predilections soon
conspired to produce a situation which satisfied no one.

The

press denounced Davies' voyage with satirical articles about
the "boondoggling" of "our freshman" envoy to Moscow.
Roosevelt reacted angrily: He insisted that Davies forget
\
*
about returning to Washington, that he concentrate on his
.
. i late fall. 9 1
Moscow assignment
until
'
i

In the meantime,

the German government confidentially

informed thejNew Deal^administration that Ambassador Dodd
would no longer be considered persona grata in Berlin.

How

ever morally correct, Dodd— who had not spoken with the Nazi
89

Eagles,

"Ambassador Davies," 238-239

9 0 Ib i d . ,

239-240.

91 Ibid.,

238-240.
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leadership in twenty-one months— impetuously objected in
September to a State Department decision authorizing official
United States attendance at a forthcoming Nazi Party Nuremberg
rally.

Dodd's strong letter of protest to Secretary Hull

appeared in the press, much to the Department's embarrassment
92
and the Nazi government's anger.
At the same time, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles
began maneuvering to install a career officer in Berlin.

In

October Welles presented a list to Roosevelt of potential
successors to Dodd.

Hugh Wilson's name headed the list.

Davies' name was not on the list at all.

93

Roosevelt procrastinated for nearly a month.
action.

94

Late m

He evaded

September he had informed the German gov

ernment that Dodd would be relinquishing his post before the
end of the year.

In early November he left Dodd with the

distinct impression that the Ambassador would be allowed to
92

Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 313; Offner, American
Appeasement, 208-209; diary entry, September 4, 1937, Dodd,
Dodd's Diary, 427.
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Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 240-241.
See also diary
entry, November 22, 19 37, Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 148.
Dodd reports that FDR told him that his eventual successor
to Berlin would be either James T. Shotwell "or a service
man, Hugh Wilson." Diary entry, October 19, 1937, Dodd,
Dodd's Diary, 428.
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remain in Berlin until March 1, 1938.

95

Dodd dxd not want
eg

the Nazis to believe that he had succumbed to their demands.
Neither Dodd, who had returned to Berlin, nor Davies, who was
still inhaling the ocean air, knew what the president had in
mind.

Neither, perhaps, did Roosevelt.
On November 22, 1937, Roosevelt acted.

In rapid suc

cession, he altered the complexion of three embassies.
Through the State Department he informed Dodd that, while he
regretted "any personal inconvenience which may be occasioned
you," the Ambassador must arrange to leave Berlin, "if
possible, by December 14 and, in any event, not later than
Christmas.''

97

Almost simultaneously, Roosevelt announced

Hugh Wilson as Dodd's replacement, offered Davies the embassy
in Brussels, and "fired" Hugh Gibson, then the ambassador to
Belgium.

98

The embassy in Moscow, where Davies had spent

very, little time, was to remain vacant until March 23, 1939.
^ Di a r y entry, November 3, 1937 , Dodd, Dodd1s Piary, 430.
96
Offner, American Appeasement, 209-210.
97
Hull to Dodd, November 22, 1937, Foreign Relations of
the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1937, II, 383. See
also Offner, American Appeasement, 210; Dallek, Democrat
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98
Eagles,
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The announcements stunned Dodd.
cheated.

He felt deceived and

With some justification, he blamed Welles and the

State Department— with whom he frequently had traded insults—
for his dismissal.

Dodd also came to realize that he was un99
suited to serve in Berlin.
By January 1938, he "doubted if

any American envoy who held his ideals of democracy could rep
resent his country successfully among the Germans at that
,,100
time.

Dodd never blamed the President.
role was disturbing.
before he acted.

However, Roosevelt's

He never informed Dodd of his intentions

Not everyone comprehended Roosevelt's pen

chant for indirection, least of all the university professor
from North Carolina who believed that his president wanted
him in Berlin.

FDR knew that Dodd, for his own welfare,

should have resigned long before he was summarily forced to.
At a minimum, Roosevelt could have offered to transfer Dodd
to another,
others.

less demanding post as he willingly did with

Perhaps, as one student of the period thought, FDR

"took curious delight in maintaining a Jeffersonian Democrat
in the Third Reich.
99
Diary entries, November 23, 1937, December 23, 1937,
Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 433-434, 443. See also Dodd, Through
Embassy Eyes, 358, 360.
100

Ford,

"Three Observers in Berlin," 454.

101Offner, American Appeasement, 211-212.
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Davies greeted the news of the offer of the Brussels
post with near disbelief.

He immediately cabled Hull.

While

he would serve wherever the President sent him, "certain
factors'.'— his wife's desire to reside in Berlin or Paris—
necessitated that he consult personally with FDR before con
senting to a change in assignment.

He said he would conclude

his trip promptly and return to Washington.

Upon conferring

with Roosevelt in December, Davies emerged despondent. He
102
had lost his case.
Roosevelt persuaded him to accept the
Belgium mission:

It was an "important listening post" on

European events, and the President needed him there.

103

Roosevelt's rationale for replacing Dodd with Wilson
offered Davies little solace.

During their conversation, FDR

explained that "it was perfectly clear that there was no
possibility of doing anything to divert the forces of Germany
which...were driving inevitably to war."

Under these circum

stances, Roosevelt argued, he wanted "the Berlin appointment
to be distinctly formal for conventional representation only.
A career appointment would be one that would" satisfy this
requirement.

Besides, the President intoned, "the appointment

of a colorless career man" would signal to Berlin that the
102

Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 240-241.

1^3Ibid., 289; diary entry, November 23, 1937, Davies,
Mission to Moscow, 254-255.
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United States had become increasingly dissatisfied with the
Nazi regime. 104
The State Department may also finally have persuaded
the President that nothing could be accomplished in United
States-German relations while Dodd occupied the embassy.
Since at least 19 34, officials in the Department had grown
tired of Dodd's habitual diplomatic transgressions, however
genuine his moral outrages over Nazi excesses, and of his
constant denunciations of the evils of the career service.
Early in 1936 Undersecretary Phillips pointedly asked FDR:
"What in the world is the use of having an ambassador who
refuses to speak to the government to which he is accredit-

Eleven months later, on November 8, Ambassador Bullitt
104 Diary entry, December 8, 1937, Davies, Mission to
Moscow, 255-256. See also Farley, Farley's Story, 112;
Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 241-242. Ambassordor
Dodd received word on November 30 that Hugh Wilson was to be
appointed to Berlin. According to Dallek, the State Depart
ment regarded Wilson as "a colorless, smooth career man"
who could "get contacts worked up again." Democrat and Diplo
mat , 314.
Petrov contends that Hull "vetoed" Davies appoint
ment to Berlin because he "did not want to have there a
strongly opinionated and unpredictable politician, not sub
ject to effective State Department control." A Study in
Diplomacy:- The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane (Chicago: Henry
Regnery, 1971), 96 ftn. 3.
^"^Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 271.
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chime d in with a recommendation.

A bitter opponent of the

Soviet regime, Bullitt then sought an improvement in Germany's
relations with the wastern democracies.
When Dodd leaves Berlin I think you should
select your man for that post with extreme
care. As Hitler does not speak anything
but German any Ambassador of ours there who
does not speak German perfectly will be use
less. That qualification rules out most of
the men who have been mentioned for the post.
(Incidentally, Joe Davies' German is, I
understand, lousy). I wish I had someone
better to suggest, but I can think of no one
better than Hugh Wilson, who has been for
many years our Minister to Berne. His German
is perfect and in spite of the fact that his
connections are largely Republican and that
his wife especially is no lover of the Demo
cratic Party or you or myself, I can not think
of anyone else who could begin to establish
the really intimate and confidential relation
ship we need with the bosses in Berlin, which
will be essential if we are to accomplish
anything.106
Whether Bullitt's suggestion affected Roosevelt's eventual
decision remains a mystery.

Perhaps Roosevelt simply consent

ed to the State Department's choice of Hugh Wilson because his
instincts told him that the chances of a rapprochement with
Germany were negligible.

10 7

106Bullitt to FDR, Bullitt, For The President, 181.
107

The State Department first urged the selection of Hugh
Gibson to replace Dodd, a move spurred, perhaps, by FDR's
intention to replace Gibson, then ambassador to Belgium, with
Davies. See diary entries, November 23, 19 37, November 30,
1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 434-435.
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Whatever FDR's inclinations, his appointment of Wilson
signaled no rapprochement with the career diplomats.

When

FDR assumed office in 1933, Wilson occupied a high place on
the Roosevelt-Moley "hit list."

Only the intercession of

Hull, Phillips, and Norman Davis kept Wilson from being ousted
along with several noncareer State Department officials who
8
had served under Hoover. 10 °

A member of the old-boy network

who had been on the Foreign Service Personnel Review Board,
Wilson became minister to Switzerland in 1927.^^

FDR retain

ed him in Berne until 1937, when the State Department re
called him and promoted him to assistant secretary of state.
A polished and steady, if undynamic diplomatist, Wilson
possessed the qualifications for affecting an amelioration
in United States relations with Germany were such an improve
ment a possibility.

Welles, undoubtedly, engineered Wilson's

appointment.
Whatever the Department's expectations, Hitler was
unamenable.

Relations degenerated rapidly.

In November 1938—

less than a year after Wilson received "one of the plum
posts"— the administration recalled him permanently as a pro^•®®Hull,' Memoirs, I, 182; Eagles, "Ambassador Davies,"
242 ftn. 76; diary entry, March 6, 19 33, Hooker, Moffat
Papers, 90.
|Q Q
On Wilson's career, see Wilson, Education of a Diplo
mat, 1-7, 10, 97-98; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 75-76,
137, 196; Offner, American Appeasement, 214-215.
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test over Nazi atrocities.
Davies fared much better in the meantime.

He satisfied

his wife's desires while simultaneously serving his country.
Barring Berlin, Mrs. Davies had much preferred Paris to
Belgium.

While accredited to Brussels, she and Mr. Davies

spent most of their time mingling amidst the high society
of Paris and London.
The envoy Davies replaced in Belgium suffered a less
fortunate fate.

Roosevelt abruptly requested his resignation.

He dutifully offered it.

In the process, the United States

lost the services of a superb diplomatist.
Hugh Gibson possessed an impressive diplomatic record.
Educated at the Ecole Libre.des Sciences Politiques in Paris,
he entered the Diplomatic Service in 1908.

During World War I,

he served as first secretary of the legation in Brussels,
where he met and became close friends with Herbert Hoover,
then in charge of United States humanitarian relief efforts
in Belgium.

Gibson's performance as secretary, along with

^•^Offner, American Appeasement, 89-90, 272-273; diary
entry, November 14, 1938, Hooker, Moffat Papers, 222.
Ill

Eagles,

"Ambassador Davies," 2 89.
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the recommendations of Hoover and Colonel Edward M. House,
convinced President Wilson to appoint him as the first
American

minister to Poland in 1919.

At thirty-six years of

age, Gibson was the youngest chief-of-mission in the Diplo
matic Service.

During the 1920s, Gibson held the minster-

ships to Switzerland and Belgium and represented the United
States in international disarmament negotiations.

His col

leagues also designated him as their chief spokesman in
testifying before Congress on the need for a career foreign
service, a task he performed with charm, wit, and inspired
eloquence.

112

Gibson received high marks from his peers and contempora
ries.

Jay Pierrepont Moffat: observed Gibson while serving

under him in Poland in 1919;
He had a scintillating mind and a razor
like wit...tempered by a keen sense of
fun. He knew Europe as did few Americans;
he was on terms of intimacy with the key
men in a dozen foreign offices; his use of
French was not only fluent, but so accurate
that he could convey shaded meanings.
sketches of Gibson are in Galpin, Hugh
Gibson, xii-xv; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 62, 71-72; Werking, Master Architects, 159, 16 8; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 21;
Pearson and Brown, Diplomatic Game, 173-175; Hooker, Moffat
Papers, 10-11.
- ^ ^ B i o g r a p h i c a l

113
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As one journalist, who more frequently than not criticized
career diplomats, wrote in 1939, Gibson "was not a diplomat
114
who needs to defend his credentials."
Gibson maintained a healthy perspective in regard to his
own career.

Unlike many of his colleagues, he possessed no

great reservoir of independent wealth.

Once, with the rumor

circulating among his peers— a rumor later regarded as a fact
by journalists and historians— that he had had to refuse an
appointment to the embassy in Paris because of the vast
personal expense that post entailed, he wrote a friend:

"No,

I did not accept the Embassy in Paris— and one reason which
helped me a lot to reach that decision was that it wasn't
offered to me.''^^

Unlike many an amateur diplomat, Gibson

suffered little from the vice of personal vanity— a necessary
"failing" given the course his career took under the New Deal.
FDR's ascendance into the White House in 1933 threatened
Gibson's career more than that of any professional diplomat.
114

Bertram D. Hulen, Inside the Department of State
(N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 77. See also The New York Times
and New York Herald Tribune editorials written upon Gibson's
death in December 1954 and reprinted in Galpin, Hugh Gibson,
161-163.
115 .
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Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 41.
One,
for example, who treats the rumor of Gibson's
appointment to Paris as a fact is Weil, Pretty Good Club, 21.
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See also Hulen, Inside the
Department, 100-101.
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As a close friend of Hoover's, Gibson was regarded as auto
matically anti-New Deal by Roosevelt and his coterie of loyal
Democratic advisers.
FDR had not always held Hoover and Gibson in such low
repute.

In 1919 the then Assistant Secretary of the N.avy

wrote kindly to Gibson about Hoover:
I had some nice talks with Herbert
Hoover before he went west for Christmas.
He is certainly a wonder, and I wish we
could make him a President of the United
States. There could not be a better on e . H ^
Much had changed in the intervening years.

In 19 33, with

Gibson's association with Hoover clearly in view, FDR tar
geted the diplomat for an early retirement.

There was,

Moffat recorded, much pressure for Gibson's job.

117

Phillips and Hull intervened to provide Gibson with a
reprieve.

Cognizant of his liabilities, Gibson wrote to

Phillips on April 5, 1933, requesting that he be transferred
to Istanbul in the event that he was removed from Brussels,
a post he had headed since 19 27.
layed Gibson's request to FDR.

To no avail, Phillips re-

lip

-i-^Krock, Firing Line, 129-130.
117

"I understand," Moffat confided to his diary on March
6, 1933, "that the pressure for Hugh Gibson's job is very
serious, and that there had even been some attempts to under
mine Hugh Wilson." Hooker, Moffat Papers, 90.
118phiiiipS to FDR, April 8, 1933, Nixon, FDR and For-
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The best Phillips and Hull could attain for Gibson was
the embassy in Brazil.

Hull had opposed Gibson's removal

from Belgium, Moffat wrote Hugh Wilson, "in the highest
quarters" of the government, "but other views prevailed."

119

As Allen Dulles informed Gibson, FDR demanded a clean break
with the policies of the past.

"I would guess that FDR felt

that you were so closely identified with carrying out Hoover's
policies in European disarmament and other matters that he
preferred to have you in South America."

120

Gibson had

spent only two of his thirty years in diplomacy in Latin
America.

I O I

speak it.

Although he read Portuguese, he could not
He accepted the new assignment.

The White House had announced Gibson's replacement to
Belgium without first informing him of his own fate.
FDR this was a common, if not painless, procedure.

For
On March

\

9, five days after the inauguration, iRoOsevelt told Hull
that David Hennen Morris would be sent to Belgium.

An old

friend of FDR's, Morris, a New York lawyer, was an original
member of the RBC group.

H;e contributed at least $5,000

to Roosevelt's nomination and election.

Deserving of a

eign Affairs, I, 50-51.
■^•^April 19 , 1933, Pratt, Cordell Hull, I, 396 ftn. 17.
120
121

April 20, 1933, Weil, Pretty Good Club, 72.
State Department Biographic Register, 1937, 190.
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choice post, Morris reportedly refused Berlin in favor of
Belgium.

He'served in Brussels until 1937.

122

Roosevelt eventually ousted Gibson from the Service
altogether.

For reasons that are obscure, FDR first returned

Gibson to Belgium in July 1937, about the same time he en
countered serious difficulties with Dodd and Davies over
Berlin.

From Paris, Ambassador Bullitt expressed great dis

pleasure with Gibson:
You may or may not remember that it was
your humble servant who, when everybody
else wanted Gibson kicked out of the
Service because he was Hoover's best
friend, stood up for him and advised
you to keep (ihim in the Service. I have
nothing personal against him but it
seems to me bad ball when an Ambassador
straight from headquarters does not coop
erate to the extent of coming in even for
a conversation.
Gibson, of course, loves
you, myself and all other Democrats in
the same manner that Mr. Hoover does and I
think that whoever sold you that baby as
an ambassador in Europe was not especially
wise.123
However influential Bullitt's pique, the end for Gibson was
near.
122

Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 782; Moley, After Seven
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123Bullitt to FDR, July 23, 1937, Bullitt, For The Presi
dent, 224.
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FDR announced Davies'appointment to Belgium ten months
after Gibson arrived in Brussels.

Whether Roosevelt consi

dered the appropriateness of sending the once-divorced-andremarried Davies to the Catholic court of Belgium is doubtful.
Once again, however, Gibson received no advance notifi
cation.

Instead, Gibson simply received a letter informing

him that his resignation— which he had not tendered— had
been a c c e p t e d . I n November 1937, Roosevelt had offered
Gibson the Berlin post.

Gibson had declined— either because

of his distaste for the Nazis or because of the Nazis distaste
for him.

In any case, the Nazi government evidently informed

the State Department in 1937 that Gibson was unacceptable.

125

Charles Thayer relates the story of the forced retire
ment of a career diplomat in the 1930s, a diplomat replaced by
a New York lawyer. Although Thayer does not identify the
career diplomat or the New York lawyer, one very logical sus
pect as the subject of his story is Hugh Gibson. Diplomat, 260.
Gibson officially resigned on June 30, 193 8, and Joe Davies,
a New York lawyer, prepared to depart for the Brussels embassy
on July 5, 19 38. State Department Biographic Register, 1938,
201; Davies, Mission to Moscow, 374.
125
See Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 90; Weil, Pretty
Goad. Club, 45.
Hull wrote to ■ Dodd in Berlin on November 20, 1937:
"The President has requested me to inform you that he desires
to appoint Hugh Gibson, at present, Ambassador to Belgium, to
succeed you as Ambassador to Germany." Foreign Relations of
the United States:
Diplomatic Papers, 1937, II, 383. However, Gibson's_appointment did not materialize. Ambassador
Dodd speculated upon the reason why:
"While evidence is want
ing, I believe the German Foreign Office refused to receive
Gibson. He had been an official in Belgium during the World
War and had also written a valuable book about German and
certain German leaders." Diary entry, November 23, 1937,
Dodd's Diary, 435. Dodd probably was referring to Gibson's
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Secretary of State Hull was powerless to prevent
Gibson's forced retirement.
Hugh Gibson was another Republican whom
I kept as long as I could, because of
his outstanding ability. But eventually
the President wanted him out— Gibson was
a close friend of Herbert Hoover, and
there were bitter feelings between Hoover
and the President.126
Gibson was fifty-five years old in June 1938 when Joe Davies
succeeded him in Belgium.
In contrast to the tragic-comic drama that enveloped
the Berlin assignment, light farce characterized FDR's
efforts to fill the Netherlands legation at The Hague.
Roosevelt promised the Netherlands' post to two people—
both of whom believed that they would begin serving in 1933,
and neither of whom knew anything about the other's claim.
Filling the post took an inordinately long time, although
Roosevelt decided at the outset to employ a direct approach
in resolving his dilemma.
Roosevelt determined to ask one of the claimants to
The Hague to serve for only one year.

On April 20, 1933, he

wrote to William G. Rice, an old friend and former member of
A Journal From Our Legation in Belgium (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, Page, 1917).
^ ^ Mem o i r s , I, 183.
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the New York State Civil Service Commission:
I would have written you before this in
regard to Holland but for the fact that
I have been trying to smooth out a some
what difficult situation, which I want you
to know of with perfect frankness.
I do
not need to tell you that I.wanted you to
go as Minister to The Hague, but it has
developed that there is another friend of
mine who is; most anxious to go and who, I
must tell you quite candidly, has at least
an equal claim. May I, therefore, ask you
to searve as Minister to the Netherlands
with the understanding that you come home
after a y e a r ? 1 2 7
Rice replied to the

Bresident three days later.

He

insisted on receiving the appointment with no conditions
attached to it.

Born prior to the American Civil War, Rice

was then a fiesty seventy-seven years old.-*-28
Roosevelt repeated his offer to Rice on June 16.
I know you will understand this is
written in the spirit of an old friend,
and also in regard to the exigencies of
many matters in Washington.
The number
of thoroughly competent men who are
available for diplomatic service, in
cluding those who are members of the
career service, far exceeds the number of
embassies and legations. In the case of
everyone of these men there is some very
definite reason for appointment....
May I also say that in going over these
127.
Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 58-59.
128rbid., 59 ftn. 1.

-256-

lists I have eliminated the names of three
or four people who are actually a good deal
younger than you are, on account of their
age, and...I have told a number of those
already appointed to foreign posts that I
might possibly or even probably ask them
to relinquish their post after one year....
I can therefore only invite you to go to
Holland as our minister on the same under
standing which I have with many other
appointees. 29
Once again, thirteen days later, Rice refused to accept
the President's stipulations.

At the same time, Rice insisted

upon his right to the post.
FDR decided upon one last plea.

On July 28, he informed

Ri ce:
I was somewhat surprised and much concerned
at your letter of June twenty-ninth....I
fear you have not understood that an ambas
sador or a minister holds an appointment
wholly and solely at the pleasure of the
President....
It was only as a matter of courtesy and
convenience to you and to a number of other
gentlemen that, in asking them to go to
a foreign post, I have told them it was
entirely possible that at the end of a
year or later, I might ask them to return
home....You were the only one, apparently,
who failed to understand that diplomatic
appointments are wholly personal with,...,
the President.
I think that I have made the situation
wholly clear. If you care to go to The
129Ibid., 242.
130rbid., ftn. 1.
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Hague as Minister...,1 shall be very glad
to make the appointment immediately, but
I must ask for an immediate decision.131
Rice resolved FDR's dilemma a week later.
the appointment.

He declined

He could not, he conveyed to the -president,

see his way clear to agreeing in advance to leaving a diplo132
matic post at the end of a year .
Roosevelt finally settled upon the selection of a
minister to the Netherlands with the appointment of Grenville
T. Emmet nearly a year after his first plea to Rice.

A

former law partner of FDR's, Emmet had hoped for the embassy
in Rome.

Failing that, he had asked for Berlin, Vienna,

Budapest, or Constantinople.

Emmet remained in Holland

until the summer of 19 37 when he transferred to Vienna.

13 3

George A. Gordon, a career diplomat then serving as minister
to Haiti, replaced Emmet.^ 4

jn selecting Gordon, perhaps

FDR recalled his earlier troubles in trying to satisfy the
desires of his friends.
131Ibid., 333.
132Ibid., 334 ftn. 2.
13 3

Ibid., 59 ftn. 2; II, 52 ftn. 1. See also Roosevelt
and Brough-,. An Untold Story, 113, 217.
134
State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 109.
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The appointment of an ambassador to Rome also presented
Roosevelt with some problems.

Several deserving Democrats

laid claim to the embassy in Mussolini's Italy in

stark con

trast to the situation FDR confronted in finding a representa
tive to Hitler's Germany.

Before Roosevelt settled upon

Breckinridge Long for Italy in April 1933, much maneuvering
occurred among the participants.

In the end, a temporary

meeting of minds between Moley and Phillips resolved the
issue.
Three Democrats initially vied for the Italian post.
Farley early championed the cause of James W. Gerard, a
faithful Democrat and former ambassador to Germany under
Woodrow Wilson.

135

Colonel Edward M. House urged the appoint

ment of James Michael Curley, the colorful mayor of Boston
who, in Moley's words, "presented unimpeachable claims to
the job in the shape of a record of early, energetic, and
powerful support of the Roosevelt candidacy."

136

The third

candidate, Clark Howell, publisher of the Atlanta Constitution, had long supported FDR.

137

Breck Long was not among

the list of contenders.
135Farley, Farley's Story, 56.
136First New Deal, 243. See also After Seven Years, 132.
Curley contributed $10,000 to FDR's 1932 campaign.
Overacker,
"Campaign Funds," 77 8.
137

Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 361.

Roosevelt never seriously considered Gerard.

The

President held a grudge against Gerard that dated from the
1914 New York senatorial primary campaign.

Supported by

Tammany Hall, Gerard had opposed Roosevelt and had won,
despite spending most of the campaign in the ambassador's
chair in Berlin.

138

That Gerard had performed his diplomatic

duties without distinction probably did not influence Roose
velt' s decision to ignore him.

Nor is it likely that Gerard

received no offer from FDR simply because a friend of the
President's suggested, in attempting to undercut the former
Ambassador, that Gerard wanted the post for only one year so
that he could add the experience to his memoirs.
had been selected on equally flimsy grounds.

Others

The best Farley

ever was able to produce for Gerard— after also pressing FDR
to appoint him to Paris— was a temporary assignment represent
ing the United States at the coronation of King George VI in
1937.139
Roosevelt also held grievances against Curley.

Although

the Boston 'Mayor had performed yeoman work in FDR's campaign,
he had led FDR into an early defeat.

Curley had convinced

FDR, who was then the Democratic frontrunner, that he could
beat Al Smith in the 1932 Massachusetts presidential primary.
138

Farley, Farley's Story, 56; Gunther, Roosevelt in
Retrospect, 64, 213, 263.
139

Farley, Farley's Story, 56.
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Despite the commitment of considerable resources, Roosevelt
140
lost by a 3 to 1 margin, a major setback at the time.
Curley, nevertheless, was the leading contender for the
Rome embassy.

In 1932 he had visions of becoming the secre

tary of the navy.

By early 1933 he had lowered his sights to

Rome, an ambassadorial post that he believed would increase
his popularity among Boston's Irish Catholics and enhance
future political opportunities.

Evidently he had received

assurances from Jimmy Roosevelt that the president would honor
him with an appointment to either France or Italy.

With

Gerard's candidacy no longer a reality, Curley also commanded
Farley s support.

141

Breckinridge Long now entered the Rome ambassadorial
sweepstakes.

A life-long Democrat with ancestors whose poli

tical involvements stretched back to the era of Thomas
Jefferson, Long was another member of the RBC group who had
found Washington, D.C., an uninviting place since the Republi
can takeover in 1920.

Under Woodrow Wilson, Long had served

as an assistant secretary of state, during which he had under
taken the task of eradicating all Republicans from the Diplo
matic Service— a role that had not endeared him to William
140
141

Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brain Trust, 19.

James M. Curley, I'd Do It Again (Englewood Cliffs;
Prentice-Hall, 1957), 248-250, 302.
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Phi H i p s , who also had served in the State Department at
that time.

With the end of the Democratic hiatus in 19 33,

Long anticipated a return to government.
Few Democrats were more deserving than Long.

A graduate

of Princeton and a lawyer, he possessed great wealth and a
favorable social and professional position.
loaned

In 1916 he had

the Wilson presidential reelection committee

$100,000.

In 1932 he repeated his performance, contributing

more than $1,000 a month to FDR's preconvention Victory Fund,
and lending the Democratic National Committee $10,000 three
days prior to the November election.

With justification,

Long expected to serve in FDR's cabinet.
Roosevelt had other plans for Long.

142

In February 1933

the Rresident offered Long his old berth in the State Depart
ment.

Long refused.

He would not serve under William

Phillips, his old antagonist, then the choice for under
secretary of state.

For a moment Long appeared headed for

a life of private pursuits.

Then, FDR, having offered Howell

both Brazil and Argentina, which the newsman rejected, penned
^■^James Francis Watts, Jr., "The Public Life of
Breckinridge Long, 1916-1944" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Missouri, 1964), 1-20, 37, 68-78; Fred L. Israel,
ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections From the
Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966),
xi-xxv.
143
Watts, "Public Life of Long," 72; diary entry,
April 22, 1942, Israel, War Diary of Long, 260.
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a note to Hull and Moley:

-

266

-

"Why not cut the Gordian knot in

regard to the Argentinian Ambassador by asking Breck Long
if he will take it?"'*'44
Long determined to hold firm in hope of a more presti
gious post.
for Rome.

Along with Curley/ he became a major contender
Howell, in the meantime, had declined offers to

serve in Turkey or Poland.

Eventually, Howell, like Gerard,

accepted a position of representing the United States to the
coronation of George VI— the only official overseas journey
he made under the New Deal. '*'4^
Phillips and Moley eventually agreed upon Long.
Curley and Long,
the evils.

Between

Phillips regarded Long as the lesser of

Long possessed at least a solid social background,

whereas Curley, a fellow Bostonian, was tainted by the Irish
tarbrush.

Certain that Roosevelt would not consider a career

diplomat, Phillips approached Moley.

He asked Moley to inter

cede with Farley to see that Curley was not offered Rome.
Moley consented.

He would ask Farley to offer Poland to

Curley if Phillips would agree to support Long for Rome.

14 6

■*-44Freidel, Franklin D . Roosevelt , IV, 361.
1 4 5 Ibid.

■*-4®Moley, First New Deal, 243, and After Seven Years,
132-133.
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The deal was consummated, Farley concurred, and Long became
the Ambassador to Italy.
Curley became incensed.

Not privy to the negotiations,

he reacted with characteristic outrage and Irish aplomb
when FDR offered him Poland.

He replied that "since Roose

velt considered this ministry [Poland] the most important
in the world," the President should resign and "take the post
himself."

Poland, Curley told FDR, was more fit for a

Republican, than a Democrat.

147

Long lasted three years in Rome.

Upon his arrival,

he immediately began to forward to FDR and the State Depart
ment enthusiastic dispatches about Mussolini and the Italian
fascists.

Following the Italian conquest of Ethiopia

in

1936, Long urged the New Deal to recognize formally
148
Mussolini's triumph.
Aware that Long suffered from a
147Curley, I'd Do It Again, 251-252. Prior to that talk,
FDR submitted Curley's name to the U.S. Senate as his nominee
for the Polish post on April 12, 1933. On April 15, FDR
withdrew Curley's nomination. Whether FDR had informed
Curley prior to submitting his nomination to the Senate is
not readily known.
Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs. I, 51 ftn. 3.

148

For example, see Long to FDR, June 27, 1933, Nixon,
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 255-259; Louis M. Howe to FDR,
October 18, 1935, and Long to FDR, June 23, 1936,
ibid., Ill, 28, 333-334.
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stomach ulcer and dearly missed the excitement of domestic
politics, FDR— who opposed recognition of the Italian
victory— persuaded Long to resign in 1936.

FDR later
149
appointed Long as an assistant secretary of state.
Roosevelt replaced Long in Italy with William Phillips.

Phillips had long coveted the Rome embassy.

His career had
150
not yet included a prestigious ambassadorship.
Moreover,
Roosevelt knew he could depend upon Phillips to preserve the
delicate line between United States recognition and non
recognition of the Italian escapade in Ethiopia, whatever
151
the career diplomat's personal preference.
Phillips
survived in Rome until the United States declared war on the
Long to FDR, March 13, 1936, Long to FDR, June 15,
1936, and FDR to Long, June 18 , 1936, ibid., ill, 254-255.
324-325, 330-331.
Long returned to the State Department in
September 1939 as a special assistant to the secretary.
From 1940 through 1944, he was an assistant secretary of
state. Israel, War Diary of Long, xxiv.
150pratt, Cordell Hull, I, 17; Schulzinger, Diplomatic
Mind, 114; Washington Merry-Go-Round, 149; Brice
Harris, Jr., The United Stares and the Italo-Ethiopian
Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 143;
Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic Appointments," 297 ftn. 8.
151
See Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 325 ftn. 2;
Phillips, Ventures in' Diplomacy, 178-179; John R. Diggins,
Mussolini and Fascism: The View From America (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1972), 278.
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Axis powers in 1941.

Next to Rome the embassy in Madrid ranked as the most
important European post along the Mediterranean.

Revolution

had punctured Spain's three-hundred year history on countless
occasions.

In 1931 the Spanish people overthrew the monarchy

of King Alfonso XIII and installed a liberal, republican
government.
began

Although the Spanish experiment in democracy

without bloodshed, class discontent, conflict, and

factionalism loomed near the surface.

152

In selecting an

American representative to the infant republic, Roosevelt
paid more attention to party patronage than to Spanish
history.
Spoils politics and high irony marked the selection of
Claude Bowers as ambassador to Spain.

A native of Indiana,

a popular historian, and a practicing journalist, Bowers
also was a staunch Democrat with a national reputation.

153

For years Bowers had wielded a devastating pen in support of
Democratic causes.

In 1932 he unleased his

upon the Hoover administration.

talents

"There was," Bowers confes

sed, "an embarrassing richness of material" that Depression
•^^Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (N.Y.:
Row, 1961), 4-5, 21-22.
153

Harper &

National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, LXIV
(1962), 80-87.
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year.

Roosevelt considered Bowers' newspaper columns "a

bulwark of strength."

Hoover's staff concurred:

Bowers'

editorials, one of them commented, "were the most damaging
of the campaign."

154

In addition to his credits as a

purveyor of purple prose, Bowers enjoyed a friendship with
the President-elect.
Bowers wanted a reward for his years of Democratic
service.

Fifty-nine years old in 1933, he hoped to obtain

a leisurely diplomatic post where he could continue to write
history.
Democrat.

Like William E. Dodd, Bowers was a JeffersonianThe author of two works on southern history,

Bowers intended to turn his attention to a study of Jeffer
son.
Roosevelt and his advisers early agreed to place Bowers
on the Preferred List.

In a meeting late in February, FDR,

Moley, and Farley discussed where to send Bowers to reward
him with "his heart's desire"— a serene diplomatic mission.
They decided upon Belgium.
Undersecretary Phillips was horrified.

Bowers combined

an intensely partisan ideology with an extremely sloppy
manner of dress.

He would cast disparagement upon the diplo

matic profession in any post, but especially in Belgium.
■^4Bowers, My Life,

249-250.
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Phi H i p s expressed his objections to the president.
Roosevelt hesitated for a moment.
Bowers should be sent to Spain.

He. then decided that

"Claude is a funny-looking

fellow," he told Moley and Farley. "T.he Belgium court is
very fastidious.

So let's send him to Spain, where there

w o n ’t be much to do."
Brand

As an afterthought, FDR recalled that

Whitlock "had once sought urbanity, leisure, and

quiet," and "had wound up in an invaded and devastated" land
as ambassador to Belgium in 1914.

Yes, the President de

clared, Bowers definitely should journey to Spain instead of
, .
155
Belgium.
Three years after Bowers arrived in Madrid, Spain
erupted into a bloody and cancerous civil war that soon
engulfed Europe.

From 1936 to 1939, Bowers watched and

reported upon the civil war from an outpost in San Sebastian
on the northern coast of Spain.

He also managed to complete

one monograph on Jefferson in 1936 and to begin work on
155

Moley, First New Deal, 243, and After Seven Years,
132. Note also, FDR to Hull, March 9, 1933, Nixon, FDR and
Foreign Affairs, I, 21.
According to Bowers, FDR, in phoning him about his
nomination, said he was embarrassed by all the people from
New York he had appointed to posts in the administration.
FDR then asked Bowers, an Indiana native residing in New
York, to claim residence from some state other than New York
for the record. My Life , 262.
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Roosevelt's three appointees to the Irish Free State
resembled many other New Deal diplomats in at least two
respects.

All were amateurs whose careers had failed to

touch even the periphery of diplomatic experience.
supported FDR's campaigns.

All had

In many other respects, they

formed a motley group of no great distinction.
The first appointee, however, appeared to be a parti
cularly inappropriate choice.
Baptist of Scotch ancestry.

William W. McDowell was .a
His father, one generation

removed from Scotland, had served in the Tennessee Senate
where he had authored that state's first prohibition law.
A wealthy and loyal Democrat, William McDowell migrated to
Montana near the turn of the century, amassed a considerable
fortune as a shareholder in the Anaconda Copper Company and
other mining ventures, and found time to serve two. terms as
speaker of the Montana House of Representatives and seven
years as lieutenant governor.

His service from 1930 to 1933

as chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee undoubt
edly enhanced his opportunity to acquire
post,

a diplomatic

along with, perhaps, the aid

^--^Bowers, Jefferson in Power: The Death Struggle of
Federalists
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1936), and The
Spanish Adventures of Washington Irving (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1940).
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of U.S. Senator Burton K. Wheeler.

Then sixty-six years

old, McDowell was in the twilight of his public career.
That Scotchmen were never popular in Ireland appears to
have escaped Roosevelt.
abruptly.

In any event, McDowell's tour ended

One month after his arrival in Dublin, he collaps

ed, dead from a cardiac arrest, while responding to a toast
offered in his honor at a banquet held by the president of
. 157
the Irish Republic.
A contender for the Irish post appeared almost immediate
ly.

On April 11, 1934, two days after McDowell's death,

Richard Wasburn Child offered himself as a successor.

In a

letter to Roosevelt, Child stated that he was qualified to
deal with the Irish "on something more than a fox-hunting
basis."158
Roosevelt had asked Child after the 1932 campaign "if
there was anything" he "wanted."

An amateur ambassador to

Rome under Harding and Coolidge and a member of the
establishment-oriented Council on Foreign Relations, Child
had directed the Republicans For Roosevelt National League in
1932.

Following his victory, FDR had queried Child about his

^National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXIX
(1941) , 152-153; State Department Biographic Register, 1934,
284.
158

Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 650-651 ftn. 1.
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interest in a diplomatic post, mentioning Russia as a possi
bility.

Then, Child had declined to specify a position.

However, at Roosevelt's suggestion, he had consented to
investigate economic conditions in Europe as a special
adviser to Hull, a task he commenced on March 5, 1934.

159

Now, one month later, he named Ireland as his just reward.
Roosevelt evidently thought well of Child's offer to
head the Irish legation.

In a note to Hull accompanying

Child's letter of April 11, FDR wrote:

"What do you think

of this rather happy thought?"

the Secretary of

1GO What

State thought is unclear.
The President's casual enthusiasm for Child quickly
waned.

FDR never acknowledged the prospect of Child serving

in Ireland, a slight that clearly miffed Child.

On August 30,

1934, he wrote Roosevelt of his displeasure:
When I returned from Europe on the
mission [you] inspired I was told by
your secretaries that you would not be
able to talk with me. This was an unusual
decision.... I did not ask for that assign
ment.
When after the campaign I had con
scientiously as a Republican enlisted for
the purpose of urging Republicans to elect
you, you asked me if there was anything I
159

Ibid.; Child to FDR, August 30, 1934, ibid.,
II, 192-193.
160
I b i d . , I, 651 ftn.

1.

wanted....
You spoke of Russia. Thank God that
you did not ask me to serve you there.
Your appointment of another without notifica
tion to me caused me embarrassment, which
loyalty in me would never have caused you.
To-day [sic] any spirit of loyalty I
may have is certainly connected with no
more request for favor than I have ever
made, except when I suggested that I might
serve you in Ireland after the death of
McDowell— that loyalty is somewhat put in
to confusion.
Unfailingly pompous and arrogant, Child proceeded to ponti
ficate on his disapproval of many of FDR's advisers and New
Deal programs.

Nevertheless, he was prepared to serve Roose

velt, if only the President would but respond to his many
letters.
FDR replied five days later, perhaps with a view to
the,1936 campaign.

In a letter that began "Dear Dick,"

Roosevelt expressed his surprise at Child's letter.
not know that you had asked to see m e ."

"I did

He then congratulat

ed him on his "very excellent trip" to Europe.

He assured

Chiild that he could arrange with "Mr. [Marvin H.] McIntyre,"
162
personal secretary, a date to talk with him anytime.

hi/s

161Ibid., II, 192-193.
■^^September 4, 1934, ibid., II, 205. Since Child filed
no written report about his trip, and since he did not talk
with FDR, it must have been difficult for FDR to decipher that
Child's trip had been an "excellent" one. Ibid., II, 193
ftn. 2.
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Roosevelt ignored the subject of Ireland.

Instead, he

noted his own heavy schedule with the Congress.

Support for

FDR's candidacy, afterall, did not qualify everyone for an
automatic reward, especially one so liberally disparaging of
the New Deal as Richard Wasburn Child.
Roosevelt next considered appointing a man to Ireland
who was almost as illogical a choice as McDowell.

Anthony J.

Drexel Biddle, Jr., was a Democrat who richly deserved a
reward.

He reportedly contributed a healthy $.33,700 to

FDR's 1936 campaign.

He was also an Episcopalian, and a

divorced and remarried man.
FDR never announced Biddle's appointment to Ireland.
Headed by the revolutionary leader Eamon de Valera, the Irish
government refused to accept Biddle.

Ambassador Bullitt

16 3
Bendiner, Riddle of the State Department, 133; Kiplinger, Washington Is Like That, 260.
In’1932, Biddle contributed heavily, in many.way3 "to
the Pennsylvania Democratic Party...and in 1934 campaigned
extensively for George H. Earle, the first Democratic gover
nor of Pennsylvania elected in more than one hundred years."
Perhaps Earle, FDR's minister to Austria in 1933, suggested
Biddle to the President. Philip V. Cannistraro, Edward
Wynot, Jr., and Theodore P . Kovaleff, eds., Poland and the
Coming of the Second World War: The Diplomatic Papers of
A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., United States Ambassador to Poland,
1937-1939 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 4.
164

.
.
Cannistraro, et. al., Diplomatic Papers of Biddle,
2-4; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, LIII (1961) ,
14.
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surmised as much in a letter to the President on April 12,
1935:
As the appointment of Tony Biddle to
Dublin has not been announced, .1 assume that
the difficulty of obtaining the agreement of
the Irish Government to the appointment of
a divorced and remarried man proved to be
insuperable.
Bullitt then suggested that the President consider transfer165
ring John Cudahy, his minister to Poland, to Ireland.
Cudahy, at least, was of Irish-Catholic descent.
second generation Irishman— his father

A

emigrated from Callan

County— John Cudahy also presented impressive political
credentials for the Irish post.

Nominally a Republican,

the millionaire playboy and heir to the Cudahy Meat Packing
Company had become convinced, during a fit of prescience,
that the Grand Old Party had no chance in 19 32.

His conver

sion to the Democratic Party and his subsequent donation to
the Roosevelt cause— more than $3,000— earned him the Polish
embassy in 1933, a post several other candidates had reject-

165

Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 478; Bullitt, For
The President, 111. Transferring chiefs willy-nilly was common.
Biddle became the minister to Norway on July 22, 19 35, re
placing Hoffman Phillip, a career officer appointed by Hoover
to Oslo’ in 1930. On the same day, Phillip became ambassador
to Chile, a post he held until his retirement in 1937. State
Department Biographic Register, 1938, 210.
166

E. Wilder Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extra
ordinary (Washington, D.C.?Public Affairs Press, 1961), 222225; Louis Fischer, Men and Politics: An Autobiography
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Cudahy soon pined for his ancestral homeland.
found the atmosphere in Warsaw drab and dreary.

He had

He "had

only one wish in life," he told Bullitt in April 1935, and
that was "to be appointed Minister to Ireland."

Bullitt

believed, as he wrote the President, that Cudahy "would make
an admirable Minister to Dublin.

He loves to hunt and is a

very attractive fellow of the type that the Irish like and
his private life is as blameless as the Pope himself could
desire.
Roosevelt finally granted Cudahy his "one wish" in May
1937.

When Bullitt related to Cudahy in February 1936 that

the Irish post would be his after the fall election, the
Irishman "was in Paradise [sic]."

He is eager to return to

the United States "to campaign and promises 3,000,000 Polish
votes!" Bullitt wrote the President.
In the interim between McDowell's death and Cudahy's
(London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1941), 275; Thayer, Diplomat,
256; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXXIII
(1947), 496-497; Kiplinger, Washington Is Like That, 261.
*1 /T 7

April 12, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, 11,478.
16 8
February 22, 1936, ibid., III, 206, and Bullitt, For
The President, 145.
According to Secretary . ickes— Cudahy's brotherin-law— the Irishman soon became bored with Ireland, too.
Diary entry, September 30, 1938, Secret Diary, II, 481.
In
1940, Cudahy became ambassador to Belgium.
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appointment, Roosevelt bestowed upon Alvin M. Owsley his
desire to serve anywhere but Bucharest by transferring
him to Ireland.

A Texas Democrat, attorney, and friend of

Vice President John Nance Garner, Owsley had complained of
profound unhappiness since his arrival in the Rumanian
capital in June 1933.

Bereft of diplomatic experience,

Owsley had accepted FDR's offer of a ministership in 1933,
although he initially believed that he was being offered a
position in a church.

He served in Ireland from May 1935

until July 1937."^^
Several of FDR's other amateur appointees to Western
Europe were similarly without bold distinction.
Claibourne

Herbert

Pell, for example, headed the mission in Portugal

from 19 37 to 1941.

An old next door neighbor of the Presi

dent's, his friendship with FDR dated to their days together
at Harvard and spanned nearly twenty years of active parti
cipation in New York politics.

Pell's service as a congress

man, state Democratic party chief, and vice chairman of the
Democratic campaign committee to reelect Roosevelt in 19 36
added to his claim on a diplomatic pos t . ^ ^
169

FDR to Bullitt, April 26, 1935, Bullitt, For The Presi
dent, 114. Thayer tells the story of an appointee, who fits
Owsley's description, who thought he was being offered the
ministership of a church. Diplomat, 250.
170Roosevelt and Brough, Untold Story, 150; Schlesinger,
Age of Roosevelt, III, 92; State Department Biographic
Register, 1940, 66.
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Expediency appeared to dictate FDR's third selection to
Canada.

Two professional diplomats.--War.ren Delano Robbins

and Norman Armour— had held the Canadian p o s t . S i n c e

the

latter's transfer to Chile in January 1938/ however, no
chief-of-mission represented the United States in Ottawa
until the arrival of Daniel C. Roper in May 1939.

The delay

in nominating a successor to Armour is inexplicable.

However,

when FDR learned in April 1939 that the King and Queen of
England would visit Canada shortly, he hastily began looking
for an envoy.
Roper's appointment surprised him.

He recently had

retired as secretary of commerce, in part because of the
President's executive reorganization plan, which took some
responsibilities away from his department.

He was available,

however.
After leaving the President's official
family [Roper recalled], I had no idea
that I would ever again hold an official
position.
Then, on April 26, 1939, came
one of the great surprises in my life.
It began with a telephone call from the
State Department.
'The Secretary wishes
to see you,' I was told. Within an hour
I was in conversation with Secretary Hull,
my friend of many years.
'I've just had a
long-distance conversation with the President
at Hyde Park.' He informed me that he would
171

Robbins was a first cousin to FDR. He died in 1936.
Moley, First New Deal, 27, 433. On Armour, see State Depart
ment Biographic Register, 1940, 56.

like for you to accept the position of
Minister to Canada for a period of about
two months— the period, in other words,
of the visit of the King and Queen of
England.1
He went on to say that their Britannis
Majesties would arrivsin about ten days.
Would I accept, and would Mrs. Roper and
I proceed to the post immediately upon
confirmation so that we might reach
Canada in advance of the royal couple?....
Without hesitation, I told the Secre
tary... that we would accept, and proceed
to Ottawa immediately.
Roper thought that Roosevelt had chosen him because, as the
President informed him, he possessed a fine sense of pro172
priety.
Roosevelt was not particularly fond of Roper, however.
Roper's appointment as secretary of commerce in 19 33 had
caused the President considerable embarrassment-— he had
promised that cabinet post to Jesse Straus.

Moreover, FDR

had suggested earlier to Farley that Roper might be persuaded
to resign his cabinet seat— to which Roosevelt eventually
appointed Harry Hopkins— in return for a diplomatic

m i s s i o n .

-*-73

Furthermore, Roper confessed that he lacked ceremonial
acumen, and that he received invaluable instruction in pro172

Roper, Fifty Years, 351.
Roper contributed $1,000 to
FDR's 1932 campaign. Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 781.
173
157.

Farley, Farley's Story, 114.

See also 126, 134-135,

tocol from his legation counselor in Canada.

174

Perhaps FDR experienced a spell of guilt over his
earlier treatment of Roper.

Or perhaps he required Roper's

support, if not silence, for the 1940 presidential campaign.
In any case, Roper was a sound politician with a distinguished
record of public service, and he was available immediately.
The mission at Berne, Switzerland/ was the only diplo
matic post in Western Europe commanded by career officers
for the entire period of FDR's first two terms.

A pleasant,

serene place, surrounded by majestic scenery, Berne also was
the headquarters of the League of Nations.
U.S. chief-of-mission at Berne as an

The role of the

observer

and unofficial,

participant in the deliberations of the Council of the League
required the presence of a proper and delicate diplomatist
who would not embarrass or commit the United States to any
European entanglements.
That Roosevelt selected Hugh Wilson and Leland
Harrison, both distinguished and sober diplomats, to occupy
the Swiss legation, respectively, was thus unextraordinary.-*-^5
174
175

Roper, Fifty Years, 353.

Of Wilson, Hull stated:
"I formed a high opinion of
him then and in later years as an experienced and capable,
though not necessarily a model, diplomat." Memoirs, I, 182.
On Harrison, see Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 38, 119-120;
Villard, Affairs at State, 199.
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Nor did it presage a change in FDR's view of professional
diplomats.

From 1920, when the League of Nations established

its headquarters in Berne, until 1951, when the United Nations
headquarters in New York was completed, no amateur headed
the Swiss mission.

Since 1951, only one professional diplo176
mat has held the post, and then for only four years.
II
The selection of chiefs-of-mission to Scandinavia
differed little from the appointment of envoys to Western
Europe.

Political loyalties and presidential whimsy were

the dominant criteria.

Diplomatic qualifications and ex

perience in foreign affairs were secondary considerations,
when they intruded into the selection process at all.
The first minister appointed to the attractive legation
in Stockholm, Sweden, possessed solid political and social
credentials.

Born into a prominent New York Jewish family

with a long tradition of membership in the state Democratic
organization, Laurence A. Steinhardt moved comfortably in
177
the highest social circles.
Wealthy and cultured, a
United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, 14 8.
177

Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 2-26; David J. Alvarez,
"The Embassy of Laurence A. Steinhardt: Aspects of AlliedTurkish Relations, 1942-1945," East European Quarterly, 9
(Spring 1975) , 39.
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corporate lawyer by training and profession, Steinhardt was
an early member of the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" group.

His

contributions to FDR's bid for the Democratic nomination
178
totaled a tidy $7,500.
Steinhardt expected his financial largesse to secure him
a diplomatic assignment.

Prior to the November election,

Roosevelt had not allowed Steinhardt any indication that he
contemplated a position for him in the administration.

How

ever, Steinhardt had overheard FDR remark that, if he won,
he would count each dollar contributed toward his nomination
tenfold.

From his uncle, Samuel Untermyer, who wielded

considerable influence in Democratic circles, and from
administration insiders, Steinhardt also knew that he rank179
ed high on the President's Preferred List.
In February 1933 Steinhardt learned that he might receive
the legation in Switzerland or Sweden.

Roosevelt's intimates,

Steinhardt wrote his uncle, "agreed that Switzerland was :by
far the more important post, but this was held by a career
diplomat, Hugh Wilson.

And" the President, Steinhardt noted,

"had not yet decided how to handle the career situtation."
Steinhardt requested that his uncle refrain from apply-

■*-^Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 27-28.
See also Farley,
Farley's Story, 10; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, III, 172.
179

Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 33.
and Brown, Diplomatic Game, 344-345.

See also Pearson
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ing pressure to accelerate his entry into the administration.
The President-elect, Steinhardt informed his uncle, hated
being coerced into making an appointment, and besides,
Raymond Moley, who had expressed bitter opposition to the
career boys, might prove influential.

180

Roosevelt evidently considered Steinhardt for the Swiss
post.

The New York lawyer heard that he might be asked to

serve one year as an assistant secretary of state before
transferring to Berne.

At one point FDR penned a longhand

note to Hull concerning Steinhardt.*

"I have the man for you

for Assit. Scry in charge of legal work— ...excellent lawyer—
knows a lot about world affairs— I think this is the best
choice."

181

Instead, Steinhardt became the Minister to

Sweden.
His appointment to Stockholm delighted Steinhardt.

The

Swedish assignment, he wrote his sister, would provide an
opportunity to relax and to regain the health lost in the
past years of constant travel and difficult work.
States relations with Sweden were excellent.

United

Moreover, his

tour would be short— no longer than two years— and he anti
cipated that a diplomatic tour would enhance his corporate
■'■^^Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 35-36.
181

Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt,

IV,

362.
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law practice.

He had no intention of making diplomacy a

182
career.
Steinhardt, however, soon adopted the Foreign Service
as a career.

Although not ordained by training or experience,

Steinhardt immersed himself in the challenge of diplomacy
and quickly earned the respect of his colleagues.

18 3

He

became a well-traveled chief-of-mission, the only political
appointee to serve in that capacity throughout the entire
Roosevelt presidency.

184

Prior to disembarking at Stockholm in the summer of
19 33, Steinhardt attended the World Economic Conference in
London at Roosevelt's request.

There he noted that the Presi

dent's policy was one of constantly shifting and changing his
representatives.

This policy, Steinhardt thought, was

"borrowed more or less from the football field," an apt
commentary that Steinhardt could later apply to his own New
182

Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 38.

18 3
Amateur and career diplomats alike formed a strong
respect for Steinhardt.
See Hull, Memoirs, I, 603-604;
Israel, War Diary of Long, 225; Alvarez, "Embassy of Stein
hardt," 40; Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 380-389.
184

Steinhardt served m Sweden (1933-1937), Peru (19371939), the Soviet Union (1939-1941), and Turkey (1942-1945).
In addition, he served in Czechoslovakia (1945-1948) and
Canada (1948-1950) under Truman.
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Deal career, which included four assignments in twelve
185
years.
Three years proved long enough for Steinhardt in Sweden.
Bored and seeking more responsibility, he told FDR in 19 36
that he might resign from the diplomatic service unless
granted a more important post.

186

Looking around, Roosevelt

eyed Peru, the stage for an upcoming Pan American Conference,
as an assignment likely to satisfy Steinhardt's ambitions.
Without much fanfare, FDR sent Steinhardt to Peru and Fred
Dearihg, a career diplomat then serving in that post, to
Stockholm.
The simple switching of two diplomatic quarterbacks
reflected more FDR's desire to accommodate Steinhardt than
his wish to assign a professional diplomat to Sweden.

A

member of the first generation of professional diplomats, as
well as of the old-boy network, Dearing had spent twenty-three
of his twenty-six years in diplomacy in Spanish-speaking
countries.

Appointed to Peru by Hoover in 1930, Dearing*s

transfer to Sweden represented a demotion of sorts.

While

Peru was an embassy, Sweden held only the status of a lega
tion.

In 1938, a year after his arrival in Stockholm, Dearing
185
186

Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 46.

Ibid., 93-95. Steinhardt enhanced his credentials
with FDR by returning to the U.S. in 1936 and campaigning
for the President's reelection.
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retired from the Foreign Service.

187

Another career officer, Frederick A. Sterling, replaced
Dearing in Sweden.

Prior to entering the Diplomatic Service

in 1911, Sterling earned an A.B. at Harvard, attended law
school, and managed a cattle ranch.

His diplomatic experience

included a five-year tour as FDR's minister to Bulgaria.
Initially slated to head the mission in Latvia in 19 38,
Sterling proceeded instead to Stockholm upon Dearing's
4. 188
retirement.
Sterling held high marks as a solid diplomat from pro
fessionals and amateurs alike.

Florence "Daisy" Jaffrey

Harriman, one of two women chiefs-of-mission appointed by FDR,
wrote that Sterling knew the "intricacies of professional
diplomacy," kept an open mind,\maintained! an "amazing
patience, and commanded the complete devotion of his staff.
Herself an amateur, she constantly called upon Sterling for
1
189
advice. She knew "no better exlample of a career diplomat."
j

j

Few better examples of FDR's often/haphazard method of
selecting envoys exist than his appointment of "Daisy"
18 7

Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 96-105, 111; State
Department Biographic Register, 1938, 208.
1 go

State Department Biographic Register/ 1940, 188-189.
Florence Jaffray Harriman, Mission to the North
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1941), 271-272.
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Harriman either.

The announcement of her appointment as

minister to Norway in 19 37 completely stunned her.

A wealthy

Washington socialite, born into the high society of New York's
Fifth Avenue, and husband to J. Borden Harriman, a first
cousin to the Harriman

of railroad empire, fame, Mrs. Harriman

counted among her friends

the very rich and the very famous.

Known as "the godmother" of the Democratic party, she had
campaigned for Roosevelt in 1936 and had hosted a celebrated
"denounce-the-Republican" dinner.

190

Although she was know

ledgeable in foreign affairs, her diplomatic experience
hardly extended past the entertaining of diplomats in
Washington.

Nor was she a particularly avid, supporter of FDR's

domestic policies.
How and why she received a diplomatic appointment
mystified her.

"My Mission to the North, my appointment as

United States Minister

to Norway,"she wrote, "was utterly

unexpected.

it in the newspapers and only found

I read of

190

Florence Jaffray Harriman, From Pinafores to' Politics
(N.Y.: Henry Holt, 1932), 1, 8, 10-16, 22, 34, 61, 72-97,
112-116, 123, 159-161, 288-301, 342; "Women," Time (July 12,
1937) , 21; .
Washington Merry-Go-Round, 27; Spaulding,
Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 184-188.
191

In 19 32, Harriman informed FDR that she intended to
be neutral at the Democratic convention in her capacity as
the Democratic national committeewoman from the District of
Columbia. At the convention, she held out for Newton D, Baker
or Melvin Traylor, two of FDR's rivals.
Harriman, Mission to
the North, 28; "Women," 21.
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out that it was true by investigating the rumors."

192

A visit to the State Department confirmed the newspaper
reports.
I was immensely heartened to think the
President had considered me for such a
responsible position. That is, if he
had...[sic]. The next morning I went
to the State Department, and laid my
dilemma before an old friend, Sumner
Welles.
I couldn't, could I, go on
considering myself a prospective
Minister when no such job had ever
been offered to me, I said. At which
he laughed, 'That ±s_ funny. Do you
mean to tell me all the news you've
had of this has been through the
papers?' Then he assured me that all the
preliminary steps were over. I had only
to say 'yes' or 'no.'
Hesitant and uncertain about her qualifications, Mrs. Harri
man visited with several State Department officials "to find
out what I could about the Norwegian post" before finally
consenting to serve. 193
Harriman suspected that her appointment was related to
her. availability and her sex.

She noted that she was not "a

'first' in the Department's experience for, after all, Ruth
Bryan Owen had broken the ice, four years before."
192

Harriman, Mission to the North, 14..
son, Duty and Diversion, 22 0.
193
Harriman, Mission to the North, 37.
194

194

Mrs.

See also Patter-

Ibid. Harriman's influential friends and acquaint
ances, which included Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins and
Eleanor Roosevelt, probably also eased her appointment. More
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Harriman, a member of the women's suffrage movement since the
turn of the century, might have been correct.
No woman had held the position of chief-of-mission in
the American Foreign Service before Ruth Bryan Owen reached
Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1933.

Like most male-dominated organi

zations of its day, the Foreign Service was a bastion of male
chauvinism.

No friend of the Foreign Service, FDR may well

have taken great delight in placing a woman into the top ranks
of the old-boys club.

He was not immune, either, to the symbol

ism inherent in establishing

anhistoric

precedent.

Happenstance also played a large role in Owen's appoint
ment.

The daughter of William Jennings Bryan, himself a

three-time Democratic presidential candidate and a secretary
of state under Woodrow Wilson, Ruth Owen grew up in the
middle west and attended the University of Nebraska.

In 1925

she joined the faculty of the University of Miami, where she
also served on the board of regents.

Three years later the

fourth district in Florida elected Owen to Congress.

She

over, she apparently had served creditably as the only woman
appointee to the Federal Industrial Relations Commission under
Woodrow Wilson.
Contrary to E. Wilder Spaulding,
it is unlikely that
"the friendly support of...Senator Tom Walsh of Montana...
sufficed for the [Harriman] appointment to Norway." Although
Walsh was influential with FDR— the President slated him for
the cabinet slot of attorney general— he died prior to the
inauguration in 1933. Harriman was appointed in 1937.
Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 186. On Walsh's
death, see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 158.
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serve d two terms in the U.S. House before suffering defeat
at the polls in the 19 32 primary race, after which she cam
paigned vigorously for her fellow Democrat and family friend,
Franklin D. Roosevelt.

19 E

Owen became a prime candidate for a position in the New
Deal administration following FDR's victory in November.

The

Ttesident-elect first mentioned Owen to his advisers as a
possibility for his cabinet early in 1933.

He wanted to be

the first U.S. chief-of-state to appoint a member of the
female sex to a cabinet post. 196

Moreover, his wife Eleanor

and Mary W. Dewson, both stalwarts in the Democratic party,
exerted pressure upon the President to appoint more women to
important positions. 197

However, the selection of Francis

Perkins, FDR's commissioner of labor in New York, to head the
Department of Labor satisfied Roosevelt's quota of women
cabinet members.

When Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes,

the "old curmudgeon," objected to appointing Owen, or any
other woman, as his assistant, the diplomatic corps became a
198
not unlikely refuge for the great orator's daughter.
195spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary,
180-184; Washington Merry-Go-Hound,~21-29♦~
196
Moley, After Seven Years, 111, and First New Deal, 73.
197
Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 387-390.
198

Diary entries, March 11 and 13, 1933, Ickes, Secret
Diary, I, 5-6.
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Owen approached Raymond Moley for assistance in pro
curing a State Department position in March 1933.

She

informed Moley, possibly with FDR's blessing, that she enter
tained the ambition of becoming an assistant secretary of
state.

She impressed Moley:

He described her as "an extra

ordinarily attractive woman," noted his idolization of her
father, and pledged to assist her.

Like Ickes, however,

Secretary Hull was less than receptive to the idea of a woman
assistant, particularly one whose reputed oratorical talents
199
equalled those of her father's.
Soon thereafter she received the appointment to Denmark.
Besides being the first of the female species to attain the
diplomatic status of minister, she possessed solid political
credentials.

She was the daughter of a famous Democratic

politician, a firm supporter of the New Deal, and a defeated
congresswoman seeking government employment.

In appointing

Owen to the Danish legation, FDR established a precedent.,
but more by accident than by design.

Owen resigned from her

post in 1936 following her marriage to a Danish military
officer and subsequent acquisition of Danish citizenship.

200

Roosevelt seemed to. choose equally and haphazardly be
199
200
183-184.

Moley, First New Deal, 73.
Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary,

tween amateurs and professionals in selecting envoys to the
other Scandinavian posts.

Alvin Owsley./ a Texas Democrat who

had served earlier in Rumania and Ireland, succeeded Owen in
Copenhagen in 1936.

201

When he resigned on the eve of World

War II, Ray Atherton, a career diplomat of twenty-four years,
replaced■him.

As consul

general to the London embassy,

Atherton had earned the pique of Ambassador Bullitt who
described him to FDR as an "imitation Englishman."

202

What

ever Roosevelt's thoughts, Atherton enjoyed the respect of
William Phillips and other Foreign Service insiders.
Sandwiched between his appointment to Denmark were tours as
chief-of-mission to Bulgaria and Canada.

203

Roosevelt retained another career diplomat, Hoffman
Phillip,

in Oslo, NorwayJ until July 19 36, when he transferred

him to Chile.
OK
•1 -I ■
Phillip

m•

Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., succeeded

A
T
204
Norway.

201

FDR to Bullitt, April 26, 1935, Bullitt, For The Presi
dent, 114; State Department Biographic Register, 19 39, 224.
^^Bullitt to FDR, March 4, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
Affairs, III, 233. See also R. Walton Moore to FDR, November
25, 1936, ibid., 507.
20 3

Weil, Pretty Good Club, 203; State Department Bio
graphic Register, 1940, 56.
204
State Department Biographic Register, 1938, 210.
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FDR initially encountered difficulty in finding a
suitable diplomatic mission for

Tony

appointees were more deserving than

Biddle.
Tony.

Few political

A descendant of

the wealthy Biddle banking-house family of Philadelphia,

Tony

Biddle presented a charming, athletic, and socially prominent
appearance.
Democrat.

He also was an eager, intelligent, and active
However, in addition, he was

divorced, a fact

that disturbed his family and caused the Irish government to
refuse to accept him as FDR's choice for the Dublin legation
in 1934.

With the transfer of Hoffman Phillip to Chile in

1935, a move made possible by the resignation of Hal H. Sevier,
a political protege of Vice President Garner and then
ambassador to Chile, Roosevelt sent Biddle to Norway.
teen months.later, FDR shifted Biddle to Poland.

Eigbr

205

To Helsinki, Finland, FDR first sent an amateur and later
a professional diplomat.

Edward Albright, a former U.S.

marshal and Tennessee newspaper owner, devoid of diplomatic
experience, received the Finnish post in 1933.
month after his transfer to Costa Rica m

19 37.

He died one
206

H.F. Arthur Schoenfeld replaced Albright in Helsinki.

A

diplomatist for twenty years, Schoenfeld had resigned from the
205

FDR to Bullitt, April 21, 1936, Bullitt, For The
President, 113.
206
State Department Biographic Register, 19 37, 311.
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Service in 1930 after Hoover had canceled two of his mini
sterial appointments.

Reinstated in 1931 as minister to the

Dominican Republic, he remained there until the New Deal
administration shifted him to Finland in 1937.

207

Ill
The twelve countries of Central and Eastern Europe in
cluded some of the most politically sensitive and significant
diplomatic missions in the world.

Marked historically by a

melange of antagonistic ethnic and racial groups, Central and
Eastern Europe had proven a staging ground for events leading
to World War I .2 08 They came to reoccupy that ground during
the 19 30s as the Nazis sought advantage for their militaristic
aims by encouraging divisiveness among the diverse national
istic elements that comprised many of the Central and Eastern
European nations.
Roosevelt filled more Central and Eastern European posts
from the ranks of the Foreign Service than he had in Western
Europe and Scandinavia.

That professionals outnumbered

amateurs reflected less FDR's sensitivity to the importance of
207
208

Ibid., 1940, 179.

Two superbly written accounts of the events leading to
World War I are Laurence LaFore, The Long Fuse, An interpre
tation of the Origins of World War I (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott, 1965), and Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August
(N.Y.: Macmillan, 1962).
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these missions than the unattractiveness of most Central and
Eastern European capitals to amateurs.
Central and Eastern Europe often have appeared too drab,
too desolate, and too unglamorous to amateurs.

For instance,

neither Bucharest, Rumania— located near the Black Sea— nor
Prague, Czechoslovakia— an industrial hub city on the banks
of the Ultava River— have excited the campaign contributor
seeking a diplomatic post as a just reward.

Between 1915

and 1971, only eight amateurs accepted appointments to these
cities.

During the same period, by comparison, thirteen

amateurs and three career officers served in Paris, France,
while seventeen amateurs and no career diplomats headed the
London embassy.^09
One of the most important missions in Eastern Europe
during the 19 30s was Moscow.

Following United States recog

nition of the Soviet Union in 19 33, Roosevelt dispatched two
amateurs— first, William C. Bullitt and, then, Joseph E.
Davies— to represent the United States with the Soviets.
Davies departed for the Belgian court in June 1938.

Not

until March 23, 1939, did Roosevelt select his third ambass
ador to Russia, who was also an amateur.
Neither the President nor the State Department displayed
209

The statistics are from materials supplied to the author
in a letter from Frederick Aandahl, Director, Operations Staff,
Office of the Historian, Department of State, March 2, 1979.
See also United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-197,3, passim.
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any urgency in seeking a successor to Joseph Davies.

Upon

departing for his new assignment in Belgium/ Davies suggested
that Roosevelt appoint Sidney Weinberg, a New York lawyer and
colleague, to Moscow.

Roosevelt apparently concurred, and

offered the post to Weinberg, who declined for personal
reasons.

210

In the meantime, the State Department worked to

discourage other amateur applicants for the embassy.

One

aspiring candidate, Pierrepont B. Noyes, president of Oneida,
Ltd., wrote the Department to inquire about the expenses of
an ambassador to Moscow.

Not content to rely upon a written

response alone, a Department official undertook to dissuade
Noyes over lunch.
^

post.

Noyes evinced no further interest in the

211

The

President and the State Department likely had

different reasons for moving slowly to fill the Moscow
embassy.

The President's motivations probably reflected

domestic considerations; the State Department's a desire to
control foreign policy with the Soviets.

Increasingly cog

nizant and wary of an isolationist Congress/ Roosevelt may
have reasoned that it was best not to arouse Congress, that
it was best not to risk the immediate appointment of someone
like a Bullitt or a Davies who might too eagerly espouse
210
211

Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 284-285.
I b i d . , 285 ftn.

58.
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internationalist sentiments and who would have to pass U.S.
Senate scrutiny in confirmation hearings.

Or Roosevelt may

simply not have thought about it at all, preferring to
allow events to dictate an outcome.

On the other hand,

officers within the State Department, especially the "old”
Russian hands who held a deep and abiding distrust of the
Soviet leadership, were content to leave the Moscow embassy
to Loy Henderson, the charge d'affaires, until they could
exert influence in appointing the next ambassador.

Henderson,

a professional diplomat, shared the State Department's
suspicions of the Soviet regime; his reports reflected that
212
perspective in marked contrast to those Davies had propagated.

The President and the State Department eventually agreed
upon Laurence Steinhardt.

As ambassador to Peru, Steinhardt

had concluded early in 1939 that he deserved a more important
diplomatic assignment.

The physical conditions of the Peruvian
213
embassy were deplorable, and he was bored.
Certainly Roose
velt would not want Steinhardt, a member of a prominent New
York Democratic family, to become disenchanted.
212

At the same

For instance, see Thomas R. Maddux, "American Relations
With the Soviet Union, 1933-1941" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta
tion, University of Michigan, 1969), 210-211, 255-^256, 258;
Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 358-359; Kennan, Memoirs, 61, 81-83.
Born in 1892, Henderson entered the Diplomatic Service in 1922.
He served as secretary of embassy at Moscow from 1934 to 1938.
213
Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 156.
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time, Steinhardt had become a highly respectable diplomat by
State Department standards.

Speaking for his colleagues,

Hull noted that he had "always found Steinhardt to be alert
and very efficient as a diplomatic reporter, especially during
perilous times."

214

Besides, it may have been apparent that

Steinhardt, unlike Davies, shared the hard-line views of the
Soviet specialists in the State Department.
The president and the State Department welcomed Stein
hardt' s appointment.

Hull recalled that he "suggested to

the President that" Steinhardt "be transferred" from Peru "to
the higher and more responsible post at Moscow, to which Mr.
215
Roosevelt agreed."
Departing for Moscow in August 1939,
Steinhardt arrived in time to witness the conclusion of the
Nazi-Soviet Pact and the commencement of World War II.
Pior to the establishment of United States diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, the legation in
Riga, Latvia^ served as an important western window on the
Soviet border.

After 1933 its importance diminished.

Even

though the minister to Latvia also held accreditation to
914

Hull, Memoirs, I, 603-604.

2 1 5 Ibid.,

60 3.
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Estonia and Lithuania, the legation's activities were
limited:
protection

Few Americans whose interests required government
lived

in the area, and the passage of the Johnson

Act by Congress in 1934 all but ended the meac^r commercial
relations that existed.

216

Moreover, as the wife of one Foreign

Service officer said, Riga was a cold, dreary, and lonely
217
place "where amusements were scarce."
Riga provoked little excitement among campaign contribu
tors seeking their entitlements.

Between 1922 and the absorp

tion of Latvia into the Soviet Union as a constituent republic
in 1940, only one noncareer diplomat received the honor of
representing the United States at Riga.

218

Named after Senator Hiram Johnson of California, the
Johnson Act provided prohibitions against loans to countries
that were in debt to the U.S. government.
The act was aimed
at punishing those nations that had defaulted on loans made by
the U.S. during World War I. See Dallek, Roosevelt and Ameri
can Foreign Policy, 74.
217
Irena Wiley, Around the Globe in Twenty Years, (N.Y.:
David McKay, 1962), 92-93. See also Kennan, Memoirs, 28-31;
Petrov, Study in Diplomacy, 84.
218

Frederick W.B. Coleman of Minnesota, a noncareer diplo
mat, served at Riga from 1922 to 1931. From 1931 to. 1933, he
headed the mission in Denmark. United States Chiefs of Mission,
1778-1973, 41, 91.
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Three professional diplomats served Successively
Latvia under FDR.
grounds.

in

All three possessed solid diplomatic back

All had followed well-worn paths to careers in diplo

macy.
The first, John V.A. MacMurray, held degrees from
Princeton and Columbia.

He was a scholar and a veteran of

twenty-five years experience in Far Eastern Affairs, including
tours as chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Affairs
Division and as minister to China.

Dissatisfied with the

direction of U.S. Far Eastern policy under Secretary of State Henry
Stimson, MacMurray resigned from the Service in 1929 to direct
the new Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins'
University.

2 19

Prompted by friends in the Department, who

hoped to arrange his appointment as the first United States
ambassador to the Soviet Union, MacMurray reentered the Service
in 1933 to accept the assignment to Latvia, presumably the
first leg on the journey to Moscow.

He never saw service in

Moscow, although he held the ambassadorship to Turkey from
1936 to 1942.220
219
220

Buckley, "Diplomacy of an American Mandarin," 27-48.

The importance of the Far East in Soviet foreign
policy calculations and MacMurray's experience in the Far East
also made him a logical candidate for the Moscow embassy.
See
Phillips to FDR, April 8, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs,
I, 50-51., and The New Dealers, 386.
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Arthur Bliss Lane succeeded MacMurray in Latvia.

Prior

to entering the Diplomatic Service in 1917., Lane tyas graduated
from Yale and studied abroad at the Ecole de L'lle de France.
During the New Deal, he became one of FDR's, most-widely
traveled diplomats.

Bright, active, and sometimes impetuous,

Lane was in 19 33, at the age of thirty-nine, the youngest
chief-of-mission in the Service.

Sandwiched around his stint

in Latvia were tours as minister to Nicaragua and Yugoslavia,
all engineered by the State Department.

221

John C. Wiley followed Lane in Latvia in 1938.

Born in

France of American parents, he attended Georgetown University
Law School prior to enrolling in the Service in 1915.

As a

young diplomat, Wiley received high praise for his work as
consul

to the embassies in Moscow and Vienna.

His appoint

ment to Riga represented a just promotion in the eyes of his
colleagues.

222

One amateur diplomat did serve a tour as minister to
Lithuania under FDR.

He achieved the distinction of being the

only American envoy ever to serve solely as the minister to
that country, his predecessors having been accredited also to
Estonia and Latvia while residing at Riga.
221

Petrov, Study in Diplomacy, 1-10, 8 3-85, 97.
resigned from the Foreign Service in 194 7.
222

Lane

For instance, see R. Walton Moore to FDR, November 25,
1936,Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III,
508.
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Owen J.C. Norem, a Lutheran pastor and resident of
Montana, proceeded to Kaunas, Lithuanians minister in 1937.
He remained there until the U.S.S.R. annexed Lithuania in
194 0.

Although the reason for his appointment is obscure,

Senator James E. Murray of Montana may have been instrumental
in securing his nomination.

A Democrat and avid supporter of

the New Deal, Murray later penned a brief forward to a book
authored by Norem, Timeless Lithuania, in which he lauded the
Montanan's accomplishments.

223

No mystery enshrines FDR's appointment of two amateurs
to the embassy in Warsaw, Poland.

John Cudahy, who served in

Poland from 1933 to 1937 prior to obtaining the Irish post,
and Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., who served from 19 37 to
19 39 following a tour in Norway, were generous campaign contri
butors.

Cudahy's donations totaled more than $10,000, while

Biddle's reached $33,700, both sums worthy of especial
224
notoriety.
Little sense can be gleaned from FDR's selection of
envoys to the legation in Prague, Czechoslovakia.

The first

two men to head the post in Czechoslovakia— a highly industria
lized nation located strategically in East-Central Europe—
22 3
Timeless Lithuania (Chicago:
224

Amerlith Press, 1943).

Kiplinger, Washington Is Like That, 260-261.
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possessed extensive diplomatic experience in Latin American
affairs.

The third, while also a career officer, had never

held a diplomatic post outside of Washington, D.C.
Francis White occupied the Czech legation from June to
November 1933, when he resigned from the Service.
Ph.D., White entered the Service in 1915.

A Yale

Twelve of his

seventeen years in the Service, prior to Roosevelt's election,
225
were spent in dealing with Latin American relations.
White
was highly regarded as a Latin American specialist.

As harsh

a critic of the Foreign Service as Fobert S. Allen described
White as "a peacemaker in Latin American disputes."

226

As minister to Czechoslovakia, White also impressed William E.
Dodd, the ambassador to Germany, who usually found little to
like about career officers.

Dodd wrote that White was "a

loyal, industrious official" who, however, was "not well227
informed about Europe m any way."
White initially balked at the prospect of an appointment
to Czechoslovakia.

Although the State Department regarded

Prague as one of the more important posts in Europe, White
225

State Department Biographic Register, 1 9 34, 2 74;
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 95; Pearson and' Brown,-' Diplomatic
Game, 288-290.
226
Washington Merry-Go-Round, 155.
^ ^ D iary entry, September 22, 1933, Dodd, Dodd's Diary,
40.
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feared for the health of his children, he told Undersecretary
Phillips, "on account of the climatic conditions and the
apparent impossibility of living in the legation, which is in
228
an almost impossible condition."
To no avail, Phillips
suggested that FDR consider sending White to Hungary, which
presumably offered better living accommodations.
Why the New Deal administration failed to slate White
for a post in Latin America is uncertain.

Perhaps Sumner

Welles, intent upon sidetracking a potential rival for
supremacy in U.S.-Latin American relations, engineered
White's exile to Eastern Europe.

The careers of Welles and

White contained elements that hint at rivalry.
was

graduated

from Harvard,

and

White- from

Both entered the Service together in 1915.

Welles
Yale.

Both quickly

attained solid reputations in Latin American affairs.
weie only forty-one years old in 19 33.

Both

At the time of his

commission to Czechoslovakia, White was the Assistant Secre
tary of State for Latin American Affairs.
assumed

that

responsibility

When Welles

in April 1933, another

position had to be found for White.

That Welles could have

employed his considerable influence with the President to
find White a suitable post in Latin America, instead of
Eastern Europe, appears plausible enough.
22 8

That he did not

Phillips to FDR, April 8, 19 33, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
Affairs, I, 50. See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 83.
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suggests that Welles may have played a role in White's
transfer to Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, the White House regarded White as a
Republican.

Jay Pierrepont Moffat, then chief of the Division

of Western European Affairs, wrote to Hugh Wilson on April 19,
1933, that White, as well as Hugh Gibson, probably would be
transferred because, as a prominent Democrat revealed to
him, "they have both been too intimately tied up as exponents
of the previous administration in their particular fields."

229

Soon thereafter, White, a Latin American expert, sailed for
Prague, while Gibson, a European specialist, went to Rio de
Janerio.
Joshua Butler Wright succeeded White in Prague in 1934.
\

Then minister to Uruguay, Wright entered the diplomatic corps
in 1909 following graduation from Princeton land brief careers
230
in banking and cattle ranching.
, A diplomat
of the old
j

\

school, described by a colleague alb "handsome, charming,
debonair...a model of manly eleganjce," who /"talked to all
classes of people," Wright's expertise was' principally in
229

Pratt, Cordell Hull, I, 23.
White left the Service on November 30, 1933. He
later returned and served, in among other positions, as
President Eisenhower's ambassador to Mexico and Sweden.
United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, 227.
2 30
State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 228;
Vfeshington Merry-Go-Round, i4>>.

Latin American affairs.

2 31

In 1937 he became FDR's ambassador

to Cuba, a post he held until his death two years later.
Wright's transfer from Czechoslovakia to Cuba occurred
amidst a major shifting of United States envoys abroad.

2 32

Between April and August 1937, 30 of the 55 American
embassies and legations opened their doors to new chiefs-ofmission,

ten on July 13 alone.

With the exception of the

early months of FDR's first administration, when the Presi
dent made 31 changes in the missions overseas, this period
saw the largest single turnover of posts abroad prior to
World War II.

Not surprisingly, this period also coincided

with the advent of Roosevelt's second term.
Somewhat surprising, however, was the announcement on
July jl3, 19 37, that Wilbur J. Carr would succeed Wright in
Czechoslovakia.

Carr had labored for forty-five years in the

bureaucratic labyrinth of the State Department.

As the chief

architect of the professional Foreign Service, he was legendary
i

xn the consciousness of every career officer.

233

Carr was

also sixty-seven years old in 1937, planned to retire shortly,
2 31

Beaulac, Career Ambassador, 147-148.
Villard, Affairs at State, 138.
2 32

See also

See Ickes, Secret Diary, II, 102; Heinrichs, "Bureau
cracy," 197.
233

Kennan, Memoirs, 89.
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and possessed no overseas diplomatic experience.
The volatile confrontation brewing between Nazi Germany
and Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1937, moreover, appeared
to dictate the need for a first-rate, experienced diplomat
in Prague.

From France, Ambassador Bullitt advised Roosevelt

on May 5 that "Czechoslovakia will be a post of the most vital
importance during the next twelve months."

The United States,

Bullitt stated, "shall need at Prague a man who knows Germany
,234
and Czechoslovakia intimately and has guts.
The administration evidently paid little heed to Bul
litt's warning.

In June Roosevelt directed Hull to inform
2 35
Carr that "the President wants you to go to Prague."
Once before, in November 1933, FDR had suggested the Prague
post for Carr, if Carr wanted it.

Then, Carr, who did not

want the appointment, asked Phillips whether the President
definitely wanted him to go.

Phillips replied, "no," and

informed Roosevelt that Carr "could not be spared" from the
—. . i
. 2 36
Department.
Once again Carr hesitated to accept the Czech assignment.
23^Bullitt, For The President, 212.
235

Crane, Mr. Carr, 329.

236Ibi d . , 325.
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He had no desire to be a chief-of-mission at this late date
in his career.

Concerned about his own lack of qualifcations

for the job, Carr confided to his diary that "I do not know
the language and have little knowledge of world affairs."
Many of his friends, moreover, urged him to decline the
appointment, arguing that it represented no promotion for a
man who had led the Foreign Service establishment.
Carr eventually accepted, however.

He always had placed
237
loyalty to his government ahead of personal considerations.
Besides, Carr assumed that Roosevelt, in appointing him,
believed that the Germans would arrive in Prague before he
did, thus forcing him into a belated and well-deserved retire238
ment.
However, Carr was to serve m the explosive Prague
environment for nearly twenty months, until the.Nazi takeover
of Czechoslovakia in March 19 39', at which time he retired
from the Service.
State Department officials may have directed Carr's
appointment.

According to George F. Kennan, then a secretary

at the Prague post, the staff at the legation strongly sus
pected that Carr's superiors had engineered his appointment
to Czechoslovakia "as a well-deserved tribute to a long life
237
2 38

.
Ibid., 329.
Heinrichs,

"Bureaucracy," 184-185.
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of unassuming service, and as a suitable way of rounding it
O ■3Q
off.'
Less than enthusiastic about having to reconcile
the demands of contributors and professionals for chief-ofmission assignments, Roosevelt simply may have acceded to
the wishes of the Department in Carr’s case.
Less laudatory motivations also may have played a part
in the Department's "tribute" to Carr.

During the mid-1930s,

the organization of the Foreign Service began to evolve along
lines incompatible with Carr's methodical bureaucratic
administration.

The younger, post-Rogers Act officers com

plained that Carr's administrative methods were too rigid,
too unimaginative, and too unresponsive.

They actively urged

a restructuring of the Service that would be more responsive
to professional abilities and less reliant upon compliance
with bureaucratic rules.

The movement for change and the

often thinly-veiled criticisms of his out-dated methods hurt
Carr's feelings and may have compelled him to intensify his
240
v
"bureaupathic behavior."
Compounding Carr's difficulties was Roosevelt's penchant
239
Memoirs, 89.
.
As the- situation :in Prague became more acute
September 1938, Moffat recorded in his diary that "poor old
Mr. Carr who was supposed to be having a quiet post in which
to pass his declining years certainly seems to have been
forced into the thick of it." Hooker, Moffat Papers, 201.

xn

240

Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 185.
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for encouraging loose and even chaotic administrative habits
among his subordinates.

For Carr, guiding the Foreign Ser

vice under FDR was unpleasant at best and humiliating at
worst.

The "tribute" thus conferred upon the old man by his

colleagues may have been recognition of his right to chiefof-mission distinction as well as recognition of the end of
his usefulness as the venerable Father of the Foreign Service.
In any event, the precise reasons for Carr's appoint
ment remain entombed with President Roosevelt.

Unlike many

a political appointee, however, Carr could be expected to
rely upon the counsel of his subordinates in the legation—
all career officers— in reporting upon events and in advising
his government.
The same could not be said for FDR's first appointment
to the important post in Vienna, Austria.

George H. Earle,

III, had little to commend him to diplomacy.

Scion of a

wealthy Main Line Pennsylvania Republican clan with large
holdings in the sugar business, Earle joined the Democratic
party in 1932 and contributed substantially to Roosevelt's
241
campaign coffers.
Rewarded with the legation in Austria,
he soon earned the reputation among State Department officials
241

State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 95;
"Mi 1estones," Time (January 13, 1975) ,

TE~.
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as "a master of indiscretion and inaccurate statements."
In March 1934 Earle solved the problem of how to ease his
retirement from diplomacy by resigning to run successfully
for governor of Pennsylvania.
Earle's resignation coincided well with the aspirations
of George S. Messersmith.

Following fourteen years as an

instructor and administrator in the Delaware public school
system, Messersmith had entered the Consular Service in 1914.
Newly-wed in 1913 he had feared that his career in education
would not satisfy his financial needs or the interests of
his bride.
consul

By the mid-1920s

general

he had attained the rank of

and was recognized by his colleagues as the

dean of the consular branch of the Foreign Service.

By late

1933 Messersmith longed for an appointment as a chief-ofmission.

Such an appointment would secure his transfer to

the diplomatic wing of the Service and ease his advance to
242
Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 102.
Others found Earle similarly unimpressive.
Dodd,
for instance, described Earle as "one of the rich men appoint
ed to foreign posts who know little history of their own or
any other country." Diary entry, January 16, 1934, Dodd's
Diary, 71-72.
243
When, in 1939, Earle was once again looking for
employment, Bullitt urged FDR to find a position for him.
FDR to Bullitt, May 16, 1939, Bullitt, For The President, 353.
Earle subsequently served as minister to Bulgaria (1940-1941),
and as U.S. naval attache' in Istanbul where he reportedly
romanced a woman in the employ of the Nazi intelligence
services. Petrov, Study in Diplomacy, 141.
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higher posts in the State Department.

244

Messersmith held impressive credentials that supported
his ambitions for promotion.

Often described by contempora

ries as a diplomat who demonstrated a cool temper, grasp of
details, logical exposition, and analytical insight, he
commanded respect from Foreign Service insiders and out245
siders.
As consul general in Berlin in 19 33, Messersmith
was the first officer to warn the State Department, with
prophetic lenses, that Hitler had no desire for peace unless
it was a peace that would be at the expense of complete
compliance with German demands.

A trusted reporter from his

vantage point in Berlin, he believed his record made him an
eligible candidate for a ministership.

He also encouraged

his colleagues and friends to lobby the State Department and
the President on his b

e

h

a

l

f

.

\

1

His promotion to head the Austrian legation? in 1934 was

jOn March 19

largely the work of State Department officials,

Roosevelt nominated Messersmith for the position] of minis,/ter
i

244

Kenneth Moss, "George S. Messersmith: An American
Diplomat and Nazi Germany," Delaware Hi story, 27 (Fall-Winter
1977), 236-237, and Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 1-99, 101.
See also Dallek, "Beyond Tradition," 233-244.
245
Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 124. See also
Beaulac, Career Ambassador, 148-149.
246

Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 5 5-120.
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to Uruguay.

Although Messersmith would have preferred a

mission closer to events in Europe, he had spent most
consular career in Latin America
tion pleased him. 2 4 7

of his

and the prospective promo-

With the resignation of Earle on

March 25, another opportunity presented itself.

Among others,

Undersecretary Phillips persuaded the President that Messer
smith 's intimate knowledge of Nazi psychology could better
be employed from the helm m

Vienna.

FDR readily concurred.

24

Whether Roosevelt fully appreciated Messersmith1s
qualifications is uncertain.

The

idea

ofMessersmith asa

minister delighted Roosevelt— but

less

itseemed from a

recognition of Messersmith's abilities than from the Presi
dent's own disdain of professional diplomats.

As John

Gunther, then a European correspondent for. the Chicago Daily
News, recalled from an interview with the President in 1934,
Roosevelt had asked him whether he knew Messersmith.
had replied, "yes."

Roosevelt broke out laughing.

a good joke on the State Department, wasn't it!
what the career boys will say!
a diplomatic post."
247
248
249

Gunther
"That was

Just think

I've put a lonely consul into

249

Diary entry, March 10, 19 34, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 92.
Moss, Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 102-103.
Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect,

23.
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A few members of the old-boys club evidently believed
that it was unjust of FDR to bypass diplomatic personnel in
favor of a consul.

Most State Department officials, however,

agreed that Messersmith's appointment was wise.

Moffat, for

instance, thought that Messersmith was the right man for a
250
"frightfully complicated situation."
Indeed, so highly
were Messersmith's talents regarded that the Department
recalled him in 1937 because it believed his great knowledge
of Central European affairs would be of more value in Washing
ton.

He subsequently became the Assistant Secretary of State

for departmental administration, replacing Carr, while also
retaining a strong

voicein policy

matters. 251

In Messersmith's stead to Vienna Roosevelt sent Gren
ville Emmet.

A former law partner of the President's, then

fifty-six years old and minister to the Netherlands, Emmet
evidently desired a change.

An amateur, he possessed little

or no expertise in Central European affairs.

Perhaps FDR

determined that nothing could be accomplished in Vienna to
turn the tide against war.

In any event, Emmet died three
252
months after his arrival and was not replaced.
250

Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 103.

251

Ibid., 155-158; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to
Isolation, 21.
252

See Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 59 ftn. 2, and
II, 52 ftn. 1.
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The least important country in Eastern Europe was
Albania.

Prior to 1922 the United States had no formal

diplomatic relations with Albania.

A country of mild summers

and harsh winters, isolated from the main currents of European
affairs, and industrially primitive, Albania forbode an
unpleasant tour of duty for any appointee.

Albania was an

ideal place for exiling a disliked colleague or a troublesome
politico.

Since no campaign contributor stepped forward to

claim Albania, Roosevelt allowed the State Department to
exercise the perogative in selecting a minister.
The State Department chose to send Post Wheeler, one of
253
its own, to Albania.
A career officer, Wheeler was then
minister to Paraguay, a post he had held since late 1929.
Mutual disesteem and hostility characterized the relation
ship between Wheeler and his superiors in the Department.
1955 Wheeler and his wife publicly revealed their animosity
toward the Department and the Foreign Service in a then
controversial memoir:
Much of our thought [Mrs. Wheeler stated]
since he retired from the Foreign Service
at the statutory age limit [in 1934] had
been given to the story of that Service.
Not as we had once in our ignorance imagined
it, nor
its apologists have described,
but as we ourselves had found it in three

as

National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, LXII
(1958), 379.

In
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decades of unbroken experience.
That
story needed telling.
It should be written in cold blood....
And over-weighing all other considera
tions was the belief that the story must
bring both the State Department and
Foreign Service into disrepute....we
told ourselves that a Hercules must
appear to cleanse the Augean stables.
The failure of their friend, Senator Joseph McCarthy, to
substantiate his charges against the Department and the
Foreign Service in the early 1950s had convinced the Wheelers
254
to publish their "expose."
The antagonism between Wheeler and the Department
evolved over many years.

Prior to entering the Diplomatic

Service in 1906, Wheeler received an A.B. at Princeton and
taught briefly as an English instructor.

By inclination and

profession, he considered himself a poet, but had an "itch,"
his wife recalled, "for seeing what made government wheels go
round."

In embarking upon a diplomatic career, Wheeler was

the first candidate to ever take an entrance examination.

He

subsequently described himself as "the first 'career diplomat1
of the American Foreign Service."

Wheeler was "satisfied that

no Princeton, Yale, or Harvard senior could have passed it with
a grade over 65."

255

In fact, only two of 25 who took the

254

Post Wheeler and Hallie Erminie Rives (Mrs. Post
Wheeler) , Dome of Many-Coloured Glass (Garden City, N.Y.: Double
day, 1955), 1-2.
255
Ibid.,

200-205.
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exam between 1906 and 1909 received less than 70.

256

The examination, however, failed to gain Wheeler
admission to the Diplomatic Service.

As Mrs. Wheeler candidly

revealed, she approached her cousin, the powerful Speaker of
the U.S. House of Representatives, Joseph Cannon, who succeed
ed in persuading President Theodore Roosevelt to arrange a
257
diplomatic appointment for her husband.
By 1916 Post Wheeler had come to regard the State
Department and those who controlled its upper reaches with
profound disfavor.

Blessed with an abundance of arrogance

and paranoia, Wheeler had not attained the high rank in the
Service that he believed his talents warranted.

258

Mrs. Wheeler recalled her husband's transfer to the
Albanian legation in 1933 with much bitterness.

A phone call

came from Undersecretary Phillips in the spring of 1933:
I came from the bedroom as Wheeler took
up the receiver....He beckoned me close
so that cheek to cheek I got the whole
message:
'This is to advise you that
your transfer to another legation has
been decided upon.'
'Not an Embassy?' [Wheeler replied.]
256
257
258

Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 91-92.
Ibid., 89; Wheeler, Dome of Glass, 203.
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11 offer you the ministership to
Albania.1 Phillips stated.
'The smallest and least important
country in Europe,' mused Wheeler,
'the world's only country without a
rod of railroad....'
'Will you take it?'
'A famous Latin line comes to mind,'
said Wheeler.
'But perhaps, Mr. Phillips,
your studies at Harvard did not embrace
that language of culture?.... I will trans
literate it for you. My mountainous
labors of twenty-five years bring forth
a ludicrous mouse.'
'Do you take it? ' The voice at the other
end had a sudden edge.
'While I remain in the Service I carry
out my orders.'259
A year later Wheeler retired from the Service at the manda
tory retirement age of sixty-five.
The State Department also may have arranged the appoint
ment of Wheeler's successor to Albania.

Hugh G. Grant

served there from 1935 until the fall of 1939 when Italian
forces invaded and annexed thatnation.

A native of Birming

ham, Alabama, a graduate of Harvard and George Washington,
Grant was a veteran political journalist for southern news
papers as well as an instructor of history.

From 1927 to

1933, he worked as a private secretary for a U.S. senator,
who may have helped secure him, with Moley's assistance, a
position as a divisional assistant in the State Department
during FDR's first year in office.
259
260

26 0

As a "tribute" to

Ibid., 807.

State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 110;
Moley, After Seven Years, 134-135.
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Moley, who had left the Department in August 19 33, Department
officials, many of whom held Moley in low repute, may have
determined to exile Grant.

In any event, the Albanian post

attracted few eager adherents.
Two amateur political appointees, on the other hand,
elected to make Greece and Hungary their permanent homes
from 1933 to 1941.
FDR's campaigns.

Both were friends of and contributors to
Among the political friends FDR conferred

ambassadorial status upon, Lincoln MacVeagh, who served in
Athens, was unusual.

Besides graduating magna cum laude

from Harvard in 1913, he was proficient in six languages,
including Greek.

261

John Flournoy Montgomery, who went to

Budapest, was more typical.

Chairman of the International

Milk Company, he had been promised the post in Switserland
for his campaign efforts by William Gibbs McAdoo, then a
New Deal U.S. senator from California.

When the Foreign

Service managed to retain a hold on the Berne post for pro262
fessionals, Montgomery settled for Hungary.
Six professionals and one amateur split tours to the
261

Current Biography; Who's News and Why (N.Y.: A.M.
Wilson, 1952), 75. For indications of the FDR-MacVeagh
friendship, see Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 6, 94,
301-302.
Roosevelt Press Conference, June 9, 1933, Nixon,
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 219, 220 ftn. 2. See also
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 138.
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missions in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

Five of the

six career officers had served as chiefs-of-mission during
the 1920s; four saw duty in more than one country during
26 3
FDR's first two administrations.
The amateur, Alvin Owsley,
also headed the missions in Ireland and Denmark.

Of the

seven appointees, the case of Ray Atherton reveals the most
about the give-and-take between the White House and the State
Department over appointments.
Atherton was a solid and polished diplomat typical of his
generation.

A native of Brookline, Massachusetts, and a

Harvard graduate, he entered the diplomatic ranks in 1917
following ten years in the banking and architectural busines264
ses.
As consul of the embassy in London in 1936,
Atherton incurred Roosevelt's ire when Ambassador Bullitt
related to the P resident a remark b

the King of England

" (appropos of Atherton) about his w ish to see America reprei
265
sented in London by Americans, not imitation Englishmen."

j
FDR subsequently informed;Assistant Secretary of State R.
■.
/
266
Walton Moore that he wanted Atherton transferred from London.

I

263

See Appendices infra.

264 State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 56.
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Bullitt to FDR, March 14, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
Affairs, III, 234.
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A member of the old-boys club and a friend of Undersecretary
Phillips, Atherton found himself minister to Bulgaria ten
months later.

Roosevelt succeeded in removing Atherton from

London, but the consul's

friends in the Department also

succeeded in seeing that he received a promotion in the
process.

Two years later, Atherton became the Minister to

Denmark.
IV
Nearly another world removed from Europe were two diplo
matic missions of immense importance and concern to Washing
ton officials.

Although American statesmen traditionally

have viewed an Atlantic-first strategy as the key to national
security, events simmering across the Pacific would precipi267
tate United States entry into World War II.
When FDR
assumed office in 1933, the diplomatic crisis spawned by
Japan's invasion of the northeastern Chinese province of
268
Manchuria in 1931 commanded world-wide attention.
The delicate and potentially explosive situation in the
267

On America's historical Atlantic-first strategy, see
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present (N.Y.: Macmillan,
1949), 149-173.
26 R
See Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far
Eastern Crisis of 19 33-1938; From the Manchurian Incident
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
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Far East dictated the appointment of experienced and know
ledgeable individuals to Peking and Tokyo.

Forced to confront

the economic depression at home, Roosevelt, not entirely
unexpectedly, elected to recommission two highly-regarded
career diplomats and Hoover appointees— Nelson T. Johnson to
China and Joseph C. Grew to Japan.
That few, if any, deserving Democrats rushed forward to
claim either post only made FDR's decision easier.

In addi

tion, FDR respected Henry L. Stimson, Hoover's secretary of
state, under whom Johnson and Grew first served as envoys to
China and Japan, and who encouraged the President to retain
them.

Roosevelt also retained several other Stimson subordi

nates in the State Department, including Stanley K. Hornbeck
269
as chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
Finally,
both Johnson and Grew held superb diplomatic qualifications.
By 19 33 Johnson had behind him over twenty years of ex
perience in Chinese affairs.

Born of parents who pioneered

in Indiana and Oklahoma, Johnson ;was graduated frcm high school
in 1905.

He aspired to attend Yale, but insufficient finances

forced him to enter George Washington University.
his first yearj

he passed

the entrance

examination to

the Consular Service and never returned to school.
269

While in

He began

See Richard Dean Burns, "Stanley K. Hornbeck: The
Diplomacy of the Open Door," in Burns and Bennett, Diplomats
in Crisis, 91-117.
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his diplomatic career in 1907 as a student interpreter in the
Chinese capital of Peking.

Assigned as consul in cities from

Hankow to Chungking, Johnson rose to become chief of the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs in 1925.
During his years as divisional chief Johnson played a
large role in the formulation of United States Far Eastern
policy.

His conciliatory attitude toward China's demands

for greater national sovereignty accorded well with the views
of Secretaries of State Frank Kellogg and Henry Stimson.

In

November 1929, President Hoover appointed Johnson to succeed
John V.A. MacMurray as minister to China.
Johnson possessed impressive qualifications for the
Chinese post.

Widely read in history, the classics, and

geography, he knew China well, and he spoke the language
fluently.

He combined a friendly manner and quick wit, with

the patience necessary to conduct diplomacy in China.

The

Chinese who had known Johnson during his days as a consular
officer respected h i m . ^ ^
270
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Johnson viewed his appointment within the context of
)
the complex difficulties facing the Chinese. He did not
exaggerate his own self-importance in solving their problems.
"I feel confident," he wrote a friend before departing for
China, "that when my tour of duty is ended I shall leave my
successor as many problems as I shall find when I reach my
desk in Peiping, "271
President Roosevelt never seriously considered replacing
Johnson in 1933.2

In May 19 35, the legation in Peking was

raised to embassy status, and Johnson assumed the rank of
ambassador.

In 1937, however, FDR urged John V.A. MacMurray

to return to China as ambassador.

MacMurray preferred to

remain in Turkey; he informed the President that,he would
scarcely be persona grata to Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers.
Roosevelt quickly dropped the idea.
Only FDR, if even he, knew why he contemplated a shift
in envoys to China.

That he considered a radical change in

United States China policy is doubtful, and he never informed
Secretary Hull of any intention to replace Johnson.

273

271
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More than any other man of his era, Joseph C. Grew
exemplified and symbolized the best qualities of the American
diplomat who attained professional status during the formative
years of the Foreign Service.

Besides possessing the social

requisites for a career in diplomacy— economic substance,
New England ancestry, a Groton and Harvard education— Grew
entered the old Diplomatic Service in 1904 "without examina
tion, one of the last of the amateurs."

Advancing steadily

through the diplomatic ranks, he grasped every opportunity
to learn the craft of diplomacy.
of-mission status.

In 1920 he achieved chief-

By 1924 he was among those who were

"chiefly responsible for inaugurating the nation's first
fully professionalized Foreign Service."

Symbolic of his

involvement in the development of the career Service was his
marriage to Alice Perry, a direct descendant of Benjamin
Franklin and Commodore Oliver Perry:

Their union produced

four daughters, three of whom married Foreign Service
officers.
Grew's diplomatic career spanned nearly five decades.
He had the distinction to superintend the closing of the
embassies in Vienna and Berlin when the United States entered
World War I in 1917, just as he later would supervise the
closing of the embassy in Tokyo when the United States
entered World War II.

Following tours as head of the missions

in Denmark and Switzerland, Grew returned to Washington in
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1924 to serve as undersecretary of state, a position he held
until 192 7 and through which he exercised special care in
implementing the reforms outlined in the Rogers Act.

From

1927 to 1932, Grew held sway as the Aunbassador to Turkey.
Grew firmly cemented his reputation as a diplomatist
while in Turkey.

Popular with the Turks, he formed a lasting

friendship with Mustapha Kemal, Turkey's reformist president,
and he negotiated two treaties of historical significance in
United States-Turkish relations.

By 1932 Grew possessed a

wide range of experiences in nearly every facet of diplomacy.
Unabashedly, he considered diplomacy the "most splendid, the
most exhilerating, the most stimulating, the most satisfying
and withal the most useful form of service."
Nevertheless, Grew required more than experience and
ability to survive the "quadrennial roulette of diplomatic
assignments through eight administrations and forty years."
He worked hard to avoid displacement.
right places.

He lobbied in the

He also was a charter member of the old-boys

club, and the club always exerted special care in taking care
of its own.
Grew's appointment to Japan in 1931 was a case in point.
In November 1931, Assistant Secretary of State William R.
Castle— a close friend of Grew's, a former ambassador himself
to Japan, and a man of considerable influence in the Republi-

can administrations of the 1920s— asked Grew whether he would

like to be considered for the ambassadorship to Japan.

The

present A.mbassador, W. Cameron Forbes, a good-natured but
absent-minded appointee, would soon be leaving.

With his work

in Turkey completed, Grew jumped at this "chance of a life-
time."

Three months later Castle arranged for Grew’s nomina

tion to Tokyo.
Fortune had smiled upon Grew.

When the Democrats

assumed power in 1933, Grew was the new Ambassador to Japan
instead of the old Ambassador to Turkey.
fortuitous

He also had the

luck to have as President a man who shared with

him Groton, Fly Club, and Harvard Crimson experiences.

More

over, Grew's old friend Billy Phillips was Undersecretary of

Following Roosevelt's victory, Grew waged a campaign to
hold his post in Japan.

He reminded the President-elect of

their common social and educational background, and subtly
7 74

Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 8-9, 17, 92-108, 110120, 125, 132-154, 189-190, 358. See also Edward M. Bennett,
"Joseph C. Grew: The Diplomacy of Pacification," in Burns and
Bennett, Diplomats in Crisis, 65-87; Charles E. Martin, "Jo
seph Clark Grew:
'Decade of Infamy,'" in J.T. Salter, ed.,
Public Men In and Out of Office (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press), 36-52; Akira Iriya, "The Role of the
United States Embassy in Tokyo," in Dorothy Borg and Sumpei
Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor and History: Japanese-American
Relations, 1931-1941 (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1973),
107-126. On W. Cameron Forbes, Grew's predecessor, see
Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 136-137, 281.

-330-

but clearly conveyed his qualifications, wishes and loyalty
to the new administration.

He also advised Billy Phillips

and several prominent Democrats of his desires.
want to retire in his early fifties.

He did not

He believed that he

needed time in Tokyo to develop friendships and acquaintances
in order to be able to interpret Japan to the United States
and the United States to Japan.

2 75

Grew had little cause for concern.

Moffat judged Grew
276
the "safest" of all the career officers.
Phillips, who
had recommended Grew for undersecretary of state in 1924,
again mentioned his esteem and confidence in the Ambassador's
ability.

And former Secretary of State Henry Stimson added

his praise.
Tokyo was never an open mission.

Late in March 1933,

Grew received a telegram from Secretary Hull informing him
that the President was satisfied with his work in Japan and
wanted him to continue.

Grew confided to his diary that he

had not "expected such a message....This is really tantamount
to a definite appointment under the new administration and it
2 75
2 7c

Heinrichs,

American Ambassador, 188-189.

Diary entry, March 6, 1933, Hooker, Moffat Papers, 90.
About Grew, Hugh Wilson remarked that "I have never heard the
rightness of one of his appointments questioned." Education
of a Diplomat, 165.
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makes us very happy to know definitely that we are to carry
,,277
on."
Like his colleague in China, Grew was emminently quali
fied.

Although almost totally deaf, and unfamiliar with the

Japanese language, Grew knew several languages fluently.
had acquired a complete command of diplomatic protocol.

He
He

regarded patience and integrity as the essential ingredients
of sound diplomacy.

As important, Grew understood that a

diplomat might be operating under intelligent instructions
and favorable conditions, but unless he could inspire confi
dence and respect, his success was in doubt.
Only time could demonstrate the value of Grew's diplo
macy.

Grew had spent much of his career in posts where

stability and order were the norms of experience.

278

All

indications were that he would perform splendidly in the
increasingly volatile world of Far Eastern diplomacy.
The other six missions in the Far East and Africa paled
in significance alongside Peking and Tokyo.

To them, Roose-

277Diary entry, March 23, 1933, Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years
in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and
Papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan,
1932-1942 (N.Y. : Simon and Schuster, 1944) , 8 3.. See also
Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 189-190; FDR to Hull, March 9,
1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 21.
2 78
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155-157,

161,

165.
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velt dispatched six Foreign Service officers and four
amateurs.279
Typical of the amateur appointees was Bert Fish.

A

native of Indiana who taught in public schools prior to
obtaining a law degree, Fish served without distinction as
a Florida county criminal court judge from 1910 to 1917 and
from 1931 to 193 3.

In between he traveled extensively and

invested heavily and successfully in the citrus grove
business.

Besides contributing to FDR's election, Fish's

greatest qualification was his service as the financial dir
ector of the Democratic National Committee.
he received the post in Cairo, Egypt.

As his reward,

280

Typical of the career appointees was Leo J. Keena who
served as minister to the Union of South Africa from 1937 to
1942.

A native of the midwest, he attended the University of

Michigan prior to joining the old Consular Service in 1909.
Still mired in the consular wing of the Foreign Service in
1934, then as consul general in Paris, Keena impressed
Ambassador Straus, who recommended him to FDR for promotion.
279

281

See Appendices infra.
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In 1935 Roosevelt responded by appointing Keena as minister
to Honduras, the latter's first chief-of-mission post.
V
The Roosevelt administration appointed substantially
more career diplomats than political appointees to missions
in Latin America.

Within the administration, Secretary of

State Hull and Assistant Secretary of State Welles were
particularly active in shaping United States Pan American
policy. 282

Although cool cordiality characterized the Hull-

Welles relationship, they agreed upon the necessity of
installing competent professionals in Latin American posts,
and they played a large role in the placement of chiefs-of- ■
mission to the Southern Hemisphere.

Even then, however, the

apparent haphazardness with which FDR chose amateurs to some
posts more than matched the relatively routine selection of
career officers.
The manner in which FDR selected an ambassador to Mexico
City, for instance, more than equaled the impulsive and un
predictable manner in which he chose Jesse Straus to head the
embassy in Paris.

After promising the Mexican post to one

political supporter, Roosevelt abruptly chose another.

In

selecting Josephus Daniels, Roosevelt also ignored the sensi282

See Robert T. Beck, "Cordell Hull and Latin America,
1933-1939" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University,
1977) .

billties- of the Mexican populus and the
hension of the Mexican government.

attendant appre

As much as any other

factor, a multiple lapse of memory by FDR determined the
appointment of America's representative to Mexico.
Josephus Daniels and Franklin Roosevelt formed a strong
friendship dating to their days together in the Wilson admi
nistration.

Few men who became close friends, however, were

as different as Daniels and Roosevelt.
Daniels was seventy-one years old in 1933 and FDR's
senior by twenty-one years.

He had spent much of his life

in rural North Carolina as owner and publisher of the Raleigh
News and Observer, consistently attacking corporate interests-especially northern, Yankee capitalism— -in his editorials.
As a feisty populist crusader, Daniels supported the leftwing of the Democratic party
Woodrow Wilson in 1912.

and vigorously campaigned for

Wilson rewarded Daniels by appointing

him secretary of the navy.

As his assistant, Daniels chose a

young man, Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he had met only a few
months earlier.

During their eight years together in the

Navy Department, the patrician Roosevelt came to regard
Daniels, whom he had first described as "the funniest looking
hillbilly I had ever seen," with great affection.

Then, and

later as President, FDR always referred to Daniels as "Chief,"
and Daniels was one of the few who called Roosevelt "Franklin"
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with the latter's blessing.

Naturally, Daniels was among
283
FDR's earliest and staunchest supporters in 1932.
Daniels anticipated an opportunity to return to his old
berth as secretary of the navy under the New Deal administra
tion.

His friendship with -the President-elect, his previous

experience in the Wilson administration, and his support of
FDR's candidacy made him a logical choice for the navy post.
Roosevelt had other plans, however.

A naval enthusiast,

himself, he considered Daniels too independent for the navy
job.

Their relationship, moreover, was too paternalistic—

FDR being the patronizer— for the President to allow Daniels
a seat in the cabinet.

Instead, Roosevelt slated Senator

Claude A. Swanson of Virginia for the navy secretaryship.

A

reliable, non-reform-minded party\ wheelhorse, Swanson had
\

j

staunchly supported the Navy Department in Congress.

284

To Daniels the President offelred the minor position of
J

chairman of the U.S. Shipping Boaifd.
Daniels declined that post.

Without hesitation,

Skeptical Of independent agencies

28 3
Carroll Kilpatrick, ed., Roosevelt and Daniels; A
Friendship in Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1952), vii, xi-xii; E. David Cronon, Josephus
Daniels in Mexico (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press,
1960), 4-6; Joseph L. Morrison, Josephus Daniels: The Sitialld Democrat (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1966), 44-45, 49, 163-166.
^ ^ N e w Dealers,

295-300.
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and opposed to government subsidies to big business,
Daniels characteristically responded to FDR's offer by
285
recommending that the shipping board be abolished.
Roosevelt then assured his old boss that another position
would be found.

In the meantime, Daniels— realizing that a

cabinet slot was unavailable— advised his friend and Secre
tary of Cbmmerce, Daniel C. Roper, that he preferred Mexico
to any other diplomatic mission.

Roper dutifully carried

that message to Roosevelt . Soon thereafter, and without
advance

warning, FDR announced from the White House his

nomination of Daniels to the Mexican embassy.

286

The announcement of Daniels' appointment startled and
28 7
bewildered Vice President Garner and Jim Farley.
At
Garner's urging and with the President's concurrence, Farley
had promised the Mexican post to Ralph W. Morrison.

A

wealthy San Antonio Democrat, utility magnate, and retired
banker, Morrison held sterling credentials.

He had bank

rolled Garner's unsuccessful bid for the presidential nominaation in 1932, and later had contributed $25,000 to FDR's

_

Kilpatrick, Roosevelt and Daniels, 129-130; Cronon,
Daniels in Mexico, 6-7.
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, ..
288
election.
No one had bothered to inform Garner or Farley of the
switch in FDR's intentions.

No one had known but the presi

dent, and he had decided upon Daniels only suddenly.
Roosevelt had completely forgotten the promise to
Morrison.

He apologized to G a m e r and Farley.

He had deter

mined, he said, that Mexico would be a fine tribute to
Daniels, who wanted the post and whose work for the country
and the party they all knew about.

289

Later, Roosevelt

wrote a friend that he had selected Daniels because he wished
to place in Mexico a man "who would personify those qualities of
290
neighborliness on which I have placed such emphasis."
FDR's qualities of neighborliness, however, failed to
include courtesy and a sensitivity to history.

In appointing

Daniels, FDR had neglected, contrary to diplomatic protocol,
to first ask the Mexican government for its reaction to his
choice.
288

With a view to history, Mexico, predictably, regarded

Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brain Trust, 263;
Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 9; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 778.
289
Farley, Farley's Story, 97-98.
29D
FDR to Clark Howell, May 14, 1934, Wilfred Callcott
Hardy, The Western Hemisphere:
Its Influence on United States
Policies to the End of W o r l d war II (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1968), 332.
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the appointment of Daniels as an incredible insult, if not
as one more example of myopic Yanqui arrogance.

As secretary

of the navy in 1914, Daniels had ordered the U.S. Marines to
invade Vera Cruz, resulting in 126 Mexicans killed and 195
291
wounded.
Daniels presented other attributes that appeared to make
him an inappropriate selection.

He spoke nary a word of

Spanish, and his knowledge of Mexico was scarcely encylopedic.
Whereas Mexico was predominantly Catholic and reportedly
flowing With pulque and tequila, Daniels was a devout Southern
292
Methodist and a teetotaler.
The Mexican government, nevertheless, assented to Daniels
appointment.

To its credit and with some risk to its credi

bility with the Mexican public, the government decided not to
return the insult to the newly-elected United States presi
dent.

It hoped, instead, for continued improvements in

Mexican-U.S. relations, and it was not disappointed.

Daniels'

sympathy for the goals of the Mexican revolution, his passion
ate interest in Mexico, and his informal manner and unassuming
personality soon overrode whatever deficiencies he may have
possessed for the post.
291
292
293

293

Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 15-16.
Ibid., 13; Morrison, '
Small-d' Democrat, 65-66, 169-170.

Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 13; Morrison., Small-d Demo
crat, 169-170.

-339-

Ralph Morrison, on the other hand, soon proved that he
would have been a disasterous choice for the post to Mexico
or to any other nation.

To assuage Morrison's pique, Roose

velt dispatched him as a last-minute delegate to the London
Economic Conference in the summer of 1933.

In naming Morri

son, as well as the several other delegates, FDR failed to
consult with Hull.

Poignantly ignorant of foreign affairs,

Morrison asked newspapermen at a press conference in London,
v
2 94
"Who is Benes?"

Conference participants later could

295
only describe Morrison charitably as a "boob."
Another protege" of Vice President Garner— Hal H. Sevier—
fared slightly better.

He became the Ambassador to Chile.

A former Texas legislator, Sevier and his wife, who was known
as the "Mother of the Alamo," were solid Democrats and knew
Garner well.

Although Sevier had served on the Creel Committee

on Public Information to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and
Uruguay during World War I, and thus possessed some experience
in Latin American affairs, his appointment under FDR was
clearly political.
Roosevelt hardly knew Sevier.

When Garner insisted that

Sevier receive the Chilean embassy, FDR readily complied.
294
296

Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 263.

Moley, First New Deal, 407-408.
See also Dallek,
Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 51.
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Two years later, in 1935, Sevier resigned his commission
following his second recall by the State Department for
296
behavior incongruent with the dignity of his office.
Roosevelt evidently
Braden to Chile.

Of all

had intended to appoint Spruille
the amateurs FDR singled out for

diplomatic assignments, Braden, with whom he was barely acquaihted, was perhaps his most enigmatic choice.
Spruille Braden held almost none of the standard quali
fications for diplomatic

appointment. He was neither a pro

fessional diplomat nor a New Dealer.

By his own account,

he

was a conservative Republican; he never contributed financially
to FDR's campaigns; he was an isolationist.

By 1938, at the

time of his appointment as FDR's minister to Columbia, he
regarded the president's domestic New Deal policies as
"irresponsible."

297

Seldom was one so ill-suited, politically

or professionally, rewarded with a diplomatic post.
Braden commanded influential friends, however.

He also

could have, had he desired, contributed handsomely to any
296

State Department Biographic Register, 1935, 294;
Stuart, Department of State, 316; Spruille Braden, Diplomats
and Demogogues: The Memoirs: of Spruille Braden (New Rochelle,
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political campaign.
A wealthy copper magnate, born in the Montana mining
camp of Elk Horn, Braden followed his father into the mining
business after his graduation in 1914 from Yale's Sheffield
Scientific School.

Moving rapidly through the world of

corporate finance, he acted as the principal representative
of his father's and Anaconda Copper's interests in Chile until
1922.

Residing in New York during the 1920s, he served on

the boards of several corporations, including American Ship
and Commerce, W.A. Harriman Securities, Pennsylvania Coke and
298
Coal, Monmouth Rug Mills, and the Capital Theatre Corporation.
Despite his Republican allegiances Braden cast his ballot
for Al Smith in the 1928 presidential election.
he stated, had cooled his "Republican ardor."

Prohibition,
He also saw

much of his sizeable and easily made fortune swept away in
the crash of 1929.

In 1932 he voted for Roosevelt.

Braden approached several influential figures in the
Democratic party following FDR's victory.

He was, he said,

"more or less footloose and wondering what to do next."
Two of his friends were members of Roosevelt's cabi298

Ibid., 1-6, 23-24, 31, 38, 48-49, 61-80, 86-90;
Joseph Newman, "Diplomatic Dynamite," Collier1s , 116 (November
10, 1945), 11, 43-45; "Democracy's Bull," Time, 44 (November 5,
1945), 42, 45-47.
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net.

They suggested that he consider diplomacy.
Braden "liked the idea of" a diplomatic post.

Whether

or not someone had offered him Chile, he anticipated receiving
that assignment:
Things were completely dead in the
business world. It might be pleasant
to go to Chile as Ambassador for a couple
of years. The Chilean exchange had gone
off badly, and living there would be
extraordinarily cheap for Americans.
While there in 1931 we had given a couple
of extravagant parties and found the cost
absurdly low. The United States Ambassador
to Chile, I knew, could maintain his embassy
very creditably without using up his entire
salary and bank account.
Along with his friends, Braden believed that his marriage to
a Chilean and his many Chilean mining contacts "especially
qualified" him for the appointment.

When his nomination

appeared imminent, he sold most of his Chilean copper
, 301
stock.
Chile went to Sevier, however.

As with Morrison, FDR

evidently sought to soothe Braden1s disappointment with
another appointment.
to

He named him as a United States delgate

the Seventh Pan American Conference to be held in Monti-

video, Uruguay,in December 1933, the only delegate, peharps,
that Secretary Hull, who chaired the delegation, did not
^^Ibid., 96.
301

I b i d . , 97-98.

Braden's friends are unidentified.
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select. 302

Two years later Roosevelt again considered Braden for
an embassy.

Peru was mentioned.

Instead, FDR appointed

Braden to replace Hugh Gibson as chairman of the United
States delegation to the Chaco Peace Conference in Buenos
Aires, Argentina.

Stalled in directing U.S. efforts to

mediate a settlement between Bolivia and Paraguay over Chaco,
Gibson had requested that he be relieved so that he could
return to Brazil to supervise a Brazilian-American trade
agreement.

303

Braden later complained that his "years"—

actually twenty-eight months— as chairman "cost me the
millions I would have made on the real estate development of
my Stonehurst property."

304

Braden finally landed a legation in April 1938.
reasons best

For

known toFDR,

Braden became the Minister to
305
Columbia, a post he held until 1942.
As a New Deal diplo
mat, Braden— a large, heavyset, profane, and outspoken enemy
of Latin American dictators— earned high praise from Henry
302
303
304

Ibid., 98.

See also Beck, "Hull and Latin America," 74.

Beck, "Hull and Latin America," 286-320.
Braden, Diplomats and Demogogues, 146.

^^Braden also served as ambassador to Cuba (1941-1945),
as ambassador to Argentina (194 5), and as an assistant
secretary of state (1945-1947).

Luce, the owner of Time magazine, and from other corporate
306
friends of freedom.
Perhaps FDRneeded Braden1s presence
to mollify the American right-wing.
A variety of other amateur envoys filled posts in Latin
America.

For example, an Indiana novelist and friend of

Claude Bowers, Meredith Nicholson, sixty-seven years old in
1933, found life in the embassies in Paraguay, Venezuela, and
Nicaragua comfortably retiring.

307

Leo R. Sack, a Washington

correspondent for the Scripps-Howard chain and a Roosevelt
admirer, who contributed $2,500 to FDR’s first campaign,
landed the Costa Rica post in 1933.

308

Fay A. Des Portes,

a

three-term member of the South Carolina legislature and a
wealthy businessman, received appointments to Bolivia and
309
Guatemala.
A few other amateurs, such’ as Boaz Long, who
had served as deputy administrator of the Puerto Rican Nation
al Recovery Administration prior to his appointment to
Nicaragua in 1936, had some previous experience in Latin
310
American affairs.
Most also were loyal Democrats.
"Democracy's Bull," 42, 45-47.
307
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Professional diplomats appointed to Latin American
nations also reflected a generous cross-section of career
types.

Veterans of the pre-Rogers Act era, as well as younger

officers, received assignments to Latin America.

Nine of the

fourteen officers who attained their first chief-of-mission
post under FDR served their first ministerial tour in the
311
Southern Hemisphere.
Five later moved on to posts m
other geographical regions.

Of the 42 individual career

chiefs-of-mission, 21— or 50 percent— held a Latin American
post at one time or another from 1933 to 19 39.
Professionals monopolized the appointments to the Carib
bean countries.

Strategically located at the entrance to the

Caribbean Sea, the nations of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic had concerned nearly every administration.

When, in

May 1933, another revolution appeared imminent in Cuba, Roose
velt dispatched his trusted adviser, Sumner Welles, to Havana
as his ambassador and trouble-shooter.

Compared to any number

of amateurs FDR might have selected, Welles was a known and
respected commodity.
311

Eight months later, upon the conclusion

Does not count Wilbur Carr or Francis White, both of
whom held high-level State Department positions prior to
receiving first-time chief-of-mission posts under FDR.
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of a mission of mixed success, Welles returned to Washing312
ton.
His successor, Jefferson Caffrey, ranked high as a diplo
matist in the eyes of his colleagues.

A minister to El Sal

vador and Columbia under Presidents Coolidge and Hoover,
respectively, Caffrey had twenty-two years of diplomatic
experience.

In July 1933, Roosevelt appointed him assistant

secretary of state with the intention of sending him to Cuba
313
upon the completion of Welles' mission.
Earlier Undersecretary Phillips had suggested to the
President that Caffrey "might appropriately be promoted" to
the ambassadorship to Brazil.

"Such a promotion will be well

received throughout the entire Service."

Phillips rated

Caffrey as "one of the best men in the Service in the mini
sterial rank."314
Several works evaluate the Welles mission to Cuba.
Two of the most recent and most critical are Luis E. Aguilar,
Cuba 193 3: Prologue to Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Universi
ty Press, 1972), and Irwin F. Gellman, Roosevelt and Batista:
Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Cuba, 19 33-1945 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1973).
313
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From 1937 until 1944, when he became the first career officer
ever chosen to head the prestigious Paris embassy, Caffrey
held the Brazilian post.
The recommendation by Phillips to promote Caffrey to
Brazil was also part of the Undersecretary's efforts to pro
tect and accommodate the interests of another career officer,
Hugh Gibson.

A highly regarded diplomat, Gibson confronted

the prospect of an early retirement from the Service in 1933.
Because of his close friendship with Hoover, Gibson ranked
high on FDR's purge list.

Then the ambassador to Belgium,

Gibson asked Phillips to engineer his transfer to Istanbul
in the likely event that he would be ousted from Brussels.
In the meantime, Roosevelt, unable to overcome the objections
of Hull and Phillips to Gibson's removal from the Service
altogether, had discussed sending him to Brazil.
Phillips moved directly to fashion Gibson's transfer to
Turkey.

On April 8, in a letter replete with subtle sugges

tions for maneuvering prospective diplomatic appointments,
Phillips suggested to FDR that he consider Gibson for Istanbul
instead of Brazil.

"Inasmuch as Mr. [Mayor James] Curley [of

Boston] is slated for Poland, I suggest that we send Caffrey^
whom we discussed for that post, to Brazil in the event that
31S

Childs, American Foreign Service, 103, 147-148.
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Gibson goes to Turkey."

116

In effect, Phillips was treating

Gibson's appointment to Istanbul as a fact.
Another candidate for the Brazilian post also appeared
on a list that accompanied Phillips' letter to FDR.

Based

upon earlier discussions with the President, Phillips included
a memorandum listing potential diplomatic appointees along
side various countries.

The undersecretary asked Roosevelt

if he would write "the word 'approved' after each country or
indicate such other wishes as you desire."

Much too canny

to commit himself to diplomatic appointments before necessity
dictated that he do so, Roosevelt made only one notation on
the memorandum.

Under Brazil he wrote:

"Weddell— of Va

Pollard's man ? " ^ ^
Alexander Weddell was a career diplomat with strong ties
to his native Virginia.

John Pollard, an active Deirocrat,

was then governor of Virginia.

The families of bott men

shared common backgrounds— aristocratic Virginia w jalth,
, 318
clergymen fathers, Democratic political involvements.
Whether the Pollard connection cemented a chief-of-missim
^■^Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 50.
317
318
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A.N. Marquis,
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post for Weddell is uncertain.

319

He held solid qualifica

tions for a mission to Latin America.

A student of litera

ture and history, fond of Spain and fluent in Spanish, he
had acquired a broad background in Latin American affairs
since entering the diplomatic corps in 1908.

On June 3, 193^,

Weddell became the Ambassador to Argentina, not Brazil.
What is certain is that Phillips' efforts to protect
Gibson met with only partial success.

Under Roosevelt's

orders, Gibson was transferred to Brazil rather than Turkey
on May 11.

However, he was not then dismissed from the

Foreign Service.
Among the other career chiefs to Latin America worthy of
special mention was Norman Armour.

A graduate of Princeton

and Harvard, and two generations removed from the founders
of the Armour Chicago meat-packing fortune, he joined the
Diplomatic Service in 1915 and quickly moved from one responsi320
ble position to another.
Hull rated Armour as "one of the
most capable, yet unpretentious diplomats" in the entire
319

Beaulac states that Weddell's appointments to Argen
tina (1933-1938) and Spain (1939-1942) were the result of
"political considerations." Career Ambassador, 184.
320
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Service.

321

.
322
His colleagues echoed those sentiments.

A

highly successful negotiator, Armour became FDR's most
widely traveled chief-of-mission .323

Besides Haiti, he also

headed the missions in Canada, Chile, and Argentina.
Other career officers received well-deserved, first
time chief-of-mission promotions to Latin American countries.
For instance, Douglas Jenkins, at the age of fifty-nine,
became minister to Bolivia in 19 39.

As a diplomatic secre

tary and consul general in London and Berlin during the 1930s,
he had impressed his immediate superiors.

State Department

officials also had marked him for promotion.

324

Still other career chiefs-of-mission were less fortunate.
Sometimes they contributed to their own demise.

Sheldon

Whitehouse, for example, balked at being transferred from
Columbia to the malaria-infested environs of Panama in 1934.
A veteran of twenty-four years in the diplomatic ranks,
Whitehouse evidently also had complained about his assignment
321Hull, Memoirs, II, 1377-1378.
322
323

Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 101.

On Armour's negotiating ability, see Phillips to FDR,
August 3, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 343-345.
324
R. Walton Moore to FDR, November 21, 1936, ibid.,
III, 498. Leo J. Keena was another. Straus to FDR, ibid.,
II, 465, 467.
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as minister to Columbia.

Having spent most of his career in

the more comfortable posts of Europe, he expected better
treatment.

32 5

He may have been among that group of officers

about whom Moffat wrote in his diary on February 5, 1934:
"All together, the impression is gaining ground, in quarters
where it ought not to, that our people are childish and all
together above themselves."

326

In the case of Whitehouse,

Roosevelt responded to his complaints by placing him on the
"waiting list.”

32 7

Soon thereafter, Whitehouse, then fifty-

one years old, resigned from the Service.
VI
To discern FDR1s precise motivation for any diplomatic
appointment is difficult, if not impossible.

In reflecting

upon the criteria— geographical balance, personal and philo
sophical affinity— that presidents normally appear to employ
in selecting their cabinet officers, Raymond Moley concluded
in 1937 that the criteria used by FDR were elusive;
So far as I could see, there was
neither a well-defined purpose nor
^ ^State Department Biographic Register, 19 35 , 277.
"^^Weil, Pretty Good Club, 82.
■^^FDR to Hull, October 29, 19 34, Nixon, FDR and Foreign
Affairs, II, 248.

underlying principle in the selection
of the Roosevelt Cabinet.
It was
shaped by a score of unrelated factors.
And in some cases it almost seemed as
though happenstance played [as large a
role as any other]....
Perhaps the historians of the future
will be able to discover in the Roose
velt Cabinet some delicate pattern
overlooked by me.
If so, I wish them
well.328
To a large extent, the same could be said of Roosevelt's
diplomatic appointments.
The selection of Roosevelt's chiefs-of-mission—
particularly the amateurs— derived more from politics and
improvisation than from any system with its connotations of
method and regularity.

Political pressures and priorities,

informal human interactions, traditions, and unforeseen
events characterized the landscape of the Roosevelt appointive
process.

Rarely, moreover, did any single factor operate

exclusively to compel a selection.

Although some factors

clearly dominated others, more often than not a constellation
of influences combined to secure a prospective candidate an
appointment.
Partisan political considerations largely dominated
the appointment of amateur chiefs-of-mission.

Although

chance occurrence sometimes determined who served where, a
nearly endless list of amateurs— Tony Biddle, Robert Bingham,
■^^Ifoley, After Seven Years, 110-111.
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Claude Bowers, John Cudahy, Josephus Daniels, Joseph Davies,
George Earle, Bert Fish, Joe Kennedy, Breckinridge Long,
David Morris, Leo Sack, Hal Seiver, Jesse Straus, and
Laurence Steinhardt, to name but the most prominent— owed
their appointments to their participation, financial and
otherwise, in Roosevelt's campaigns.
Their participation in Democratic politics and FDR's
fortunes bought them access to the nomination process largely
denied to others.

In some appointments— such as those of

Joe Kennedy and Ruth Bryan Owen— the sponsorship of a power
ful political ally— such as Raymond Moley— proved vital.
Where partisan political acceptability and powerful connec
tions coincided, the absence of any expertise or special
diplomatic qualifications generally formed no barricade to
appointment.
Other influences also surfaced and prevailed from timeto-time.

Roosevelt's offer of the Netherlands to seventy-

seven year old William Rice, his subsequent appointment of
Grenville Emmet to The Hague and later to Vienna, and his
willingness to accommodate Josephus Daniels with the Mexican
mission riveted upon genuine friendship.
Still other appointments were enigmatic, resting upon
neither politics, loyalty,

or friendship.

Among many

seemingly inappropriate and untraditional selections— includ-
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ing the dispatching of an Irish Catholic to England and a
Scotchman to Ireland— Spruille Braden was perhaps the
strangest.

He was not particularly loyal to the New Deal,

although he evidently possessed well-placed friends in the
President's cabinet, and he never contributed to FDR's
campaigns.

Perhaps Braden's appointment reflected FDR's
329
way of placating big business interests.
That Roosevelt
simply sought to exile Braden, as is sometimes the motivation
behind an appointment, is doubtful.
The appointment of Daisy Harriman was also unique.
Although a loyal Democrat, she was not fond of FDR or his
New Deal policies.

More significantly, she neither sought

nor campaigned for a diplomatic post.

Given the large

number of active and deserving political contenders for
appointments, Harriman's unsolicited "windfall" selection to
Norway was a rariety.

Perhaps her appointment merely satis

fied FDR's quota— self-imposed or otherwise— for a woman
chief-of-mission.
By comparison, the appointment of career officers to
chief-of-mission positions followed more established, if
unwritten, rules and routines.
3 29

To the extent that choice posts

Perhaps Shirley N. Rawls, "Spruille Braden: A Poli
tical Biography," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of New Mexico, 1977), which this writer has not read, sheds
some light on Braden's appointment.
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were available to career officersf they went to those who
commanded respect within the old-boy network and who could
count well-placed colleagues in the State Department as their
friends.

Hugh Wilson's appointments to Berne and to Berlin

were perhaps the best examples.
Partisan political considerations also entered into the
appointment equation with regard to career officers.

The

possession of strong ties to the White House— as William
Phillips, Joseph Grew, and Alexander Weddell might have
attested— improved a Foreign Service officer's opportuni
ties for promotion to chief-of-mission status.

As often

as not, however, career officers were the victims, not the
beneficiaries, of partisan political winds.

Where an

amateur coveted a post held by a professional, the profes
sional often found himself demoted or transferred to a less
desireable mission.

If a professional were too closely

identified with a political rival of the President's, as
Hugh /Gibson w a s , the result might be ouster from the Service

I

altogether.
In many respects Roosevelt's manner of choosing United
States envoys represented no precedent shattering departure
from tradition.

Nearly all presidents have displayed

suspicion toward Foreign Service officers whose politics
and loyalties they are uncertain of; have installed indiv
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iduals loyal to their policies in ambassadorships; have
succumbed to the pressures of party patronage; have reward
ed political supporters and friends; and occassionally have
appointed political malcontents to posts abroad for no other
reason than to be rid of them.
Where Roosevelt largely differed from his predecessors
and successors was in the breadth and depth of his willing
ness to allow circumstance
selection of envoys.

and happenstance to direct the

With seeming imperiousness, he dis

patched amateurs to important posts without thought of
their aptitude for diplomacy, concocted after-the-fact
rationales to explain away haphazard and inappropriate
choices, offered minor administrative positions to some
appointees before sending them abroad to head prestigious
embassies, and flippantly suggested to intimates that he
did not expect some of his selections to last long in their
posts.

In the end, FDR's diplomatic appointments reflected

his ad hoc, disorganized approach to the affairs of govern
ment, as well as his scant regard for the Foreign Service
as an instrument of United States foreign policy.

One of his most exasperating idiosyn
crasies was his almost invariable
unwillingness to dictate any memoranda
of his conversations with foreign
statesmen or foreign diplomatic
representatives...as a record to
inform and guide those who were
running the Departmentof State.

Sumner Welles1

EPILOGUE: FDR's LEGACY TO PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY

Temperamentally ambiguous, consistent only in his in
consistency, disdainful of career diplomats, yet supremely
confident of his own diplomatic abilities, FDR never provid
ed any clear guidance to the experiment in professional
diplomacy inaugurated with the Rogers Act in 19 24.

In the

years prior to World War II, he displayed little concern
for the future of the Foreign Service, and he failed to
nurture it as an instrument of United States foreign policy.

■^Seven Decisions, 215-216.
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With the advent of war, he securely grasped the politi
cal-military machinery of the United States in his own
hands and shunted the diplomatic establishment aside,
isolating it from all but the most esoteric of tasks.
During the war, he excluded the State Department from any
systematic role in the planning, determination, and execution of wartime policy.

3

When Roosevelt died the position of professional
diplomacy in the United States was no more certain than
when he became President.

In some respects, it was more

uncertain, more insecure.

Although no one seriously pro

posed that the Foreign Service be abolished, the role of professional

^One observer described the isolation of the State
Department thusly:
"The State Department, which should
have been the vital instrument of our most important
national policy, had been relegated to the status of the
querulous maiden aunt whose sole function is to do all the
worrying for the prosperous family over the endless impor
tunities of the numerous poor relations living on the
other side of the tracks." Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins,
757.
3

David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Depart
ment Years (N.Y.; Dodd, Mead, 19 76) , '45. ' See' also
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 87, 88; John Paton Davies,
Dragon By The Tail: American, British, Japanese, and
Russian Encounters With China and One Another (N.Y.: W. W.
Norton & Co., 1972), 212; Wilson and McKinzie, "Masks of
Power," in Makers of American Diplomacy, 489.

Jr*'
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diplomats in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy
was left ill-defined and confused.

4

The question of whether

the United States would have a sound professional diplomatic
arm, capable of serving as a catalyst for American power,
FDR left to his successors to ponder and grapple with anew.
Nearly every administration since the end of World War
II has probed the question of organizing the government for
the purposes of formulating and conducting foreign policy.
At least a dozen major studies or proposals have been advanced,
most with some official sanction.

5

Many of them have called

for, among other things, the further "democratization" of
the foreign affairs community, and for extending recruitment
to include a greater cross-section of "mainstream" Americans.

6

Inexorably, too, or so it appears, the responsibility
for foreign affairs has become increasingly fragmented,
subject to the endeavors of nonprofessional diplomats.

Never

the dominant authority for foreign policy under FDR, the
4
Stein, "Foreign Service Act of 1946," in Public Admin
istration, 663, 666. See also Davies, Dragon By The Tail,
421; McLellan, Dean Acheson, 44-45; Steiner, The Wriston Report,
5; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 88.
^Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy,
16. Destler, who produced his study in 1972, cites 13
major studies in his note 2 to chapter one, 323-324.
6
Perhaps the most noteworthy study is the so-called
Wriston Report, a study commissioned by Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles under Henry M. Wriston, president of Brown
University, in 1954. See Steiner, The Wriston Report, and
Wriston, Diplomacy in a Democracy.

State Department watched the actual conduct of diplomacy pass
from its hands in 1940 to White House staffers, the military
services, and other special agencies."^ Today, in the 198 0s,
less than 17 percent of all government employees representing
the interests of the United States abroad are professional
diplomats -under the direction of the State Department.

The

remainder work for a host of agencies, including the Defense
Department, which operate independently of formal diplomatic
channels.

8

Frustrated and bitter, if not confused and bewil

dered, America's professional diplomats complain about being
mistrusted, ignored, and placed far from center stage in the
9
nation's foreign relations activity.
If FDR cannot be faulted for the lack of status of
professional diplomats

in today's labyrinthine diplomatic

organization, neither can he be credited with advancing the
cause of professional diplomacy during his presidency.

The

extraordinary turmoil, uncertainty, and diplomatic paralysis
wrought by the Great Depression, followed by the profound
change in the responsibility of the United States in inter
national relations brought about by World War II, would have
severely taxed any normal evolution of professional diplomacy
under any administration.

Yet, FDR's prejudice against

7
Wilson and McKinzie, "Masks of Power," in Makers of
American Diplomacy, 475; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 67.
g

Harr, Professional Diplomat, 12, 55-66; Destler,
Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, 10-11.
9
Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 125.
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career diplomats, combined with his frightfully loose style
of administration, seriously inhibited, if it did not pre
clude, a constructive approach to the advance of a sound
professional diplomatic structure.
In many respects, FDR blindly embraced the "chronic
distaste" of American democratic opinion for "the image" of
the professional diplomat.

He liked the consuls, whom he

judged to be toiling in the best tradition of democratic-capitalism in their discharge of commercial tasks.
engaged in concrete, productive endeavors.

The consuls

Toward their

diplomatic brethren, Roosevelt evinced little more than
scorn.

He regarded the professional diplomats as frivolous

socialites and undemocratic elitists, prone to foreign
mannerisms and modes of thought, with little to recommend
them beyond good educations, social breeding and manners.
Roosevelt tended, moreover, to credit the amateur over
the expert.

"He was quite willing to appoint qualified and

experienced Foreign Service officers as Ambassadors and
Ministers," Sumner Welles recounted.

"But it was very rare

indeed, that" the President "could be persuaded to bring
into" discussions "on foreign policy any of those State
Department specialists who had devoted a lifetime to the
study of some particular" area "and who could have given him
the detailed information and authoritative viewpoint that he
very frequently lacked.
■^Welles, Seven Decisions , 216.

Disdaining the expertise of foreign relations profes
sionals, FDR came to rely for advice on major diplomatic
issues on diplomatically inexperienced men in the White House,
and on a succession of amateur "special emissaries" whom he
superimposed on his regularly accredited chiefs-of-mission.
About one of the latter, General Patrick J. Hurley, Roosevelt
concluded that the United States needed "more men like him."
Hurley, the President told his son,Elliot, spoke in plain
language, unlike "the men in the State Department, those career
diplomats...half the time I can't tell whether to believe
them or not."

12

At the heart of any final evaluation of FDR's legacy to
professional diplomacy is the question of whether "those
career diplomats" were better diplomatists than the. amateurs.
The foundersof the Foreign Service advanced the presumption,
which they shared with other diplomatic theoreticians and
practitioners, that professionals are better diplomats than
amateurs by virtue of their training and experience in the

11

Loewenheim,Roosevelt and Churchill, 73. Many observers
and students have remarked upon FDR's use of special represen
tatives, a practice that while dating to the early years of
the American republic, FDR is said to have institutionalized.
For example, see Briggs, Farewell To Foggy Bottom, 295-296;
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 227.
*^Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade In China, 1938-1945
(N.Y.; Columbia University Press, 1978), 149. A prominent
Republican corporation lawyer, and secretary of war under
Hoover, Hurley was dispatched by FDR to China as a special
envoy in 1943. Hurley was woefully ignorant of the Far East.
See Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 493.
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art of diplomacy.

13

It is not an unreasonable presumption.

However, to fully test it againt FDR's diplomats— to evaluate
the performance of his career and amateur chiefs-of-mission,
for instance— requires another undertaking, one that would
beget additional questions, one that could wind and weave
along any number of different paths.
By what criteria, for example, should FDR's diplomats
14
be judged? By some set of "ideal" characteristics?
By their
handling of the major diplomatic functions— reporting and
analyzing events, negotiating agreements, representing United
States interests abroad, and protecting the lives and property
of American nationals?

Alternately, should the diplomats be

judged by the expectations they may have set for themselves?
Concurrently, how are the diplomats to be evaluated alongside
the context within which they had to operate— at home and

13

For example, see Villard, Affairs at State, 226;
Briggs, Farewell To Foggy Bottom, 38, 46.
"^Nicolson, for instance, postulates a set of "immutable
qualities"— moral and intellectual— that the "ideal diploma
tist" should possess. He also describes some "diplomatic
faults"— personal vanity "being the most common and disadvan
tageous," and the fear of expressing judgments— which suggest
another avenue for evaluating the performance of amateur and
professional diplomats. Diplomacy, 55-67. Gibson offers yet
another approach, at least with regard to amateurs, whom he
classifies as crusaders, reformers, spenders, and exhibition
ists. Road To Foreign Policy, 157. Still, Etzold provides
an incisive comment on the difficulty Americans have faced— •
given the brevity of their diplomatic experience, rejection
of European traditions, and the effects of egalitarian reform
in striking down the once durable standards of education,
breeding, and manners— in defining what, or who, is a good
diplomat. Conduct of Foreign Policy, 123.
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abroad?

15

What kind of training and experience

did Foreign

Service officers receive prior to FDR's presidency?
it prepare them for the events of the 193 0s?

16

How did

How did it

differ from the experiences FDR's amateur diplomats brought

15

The 1930s presented politicians and diplomats world
wide with enormous challenges.
In the words of Ferrell:
"Statesmen doubted, as they never had before, the advantage
of political solutions to international problems....The Great
Depression had, therefore, a catastrophic effect upon the
maintenance of world peace." American Diplomacy in the
Depression, 3. As war approached, politicians and diplomats,
amateurs and professionals alike, seemed paralyzed. Old
standards of international concord or ethics seemed unwork
able; certainly, Hitler, the world's principal protagonist,
abided by none. As Heinrichs states: "Diplomacy in the early
thirties lacked any clearcut character.
International rela
tions were atomized and featureless.
Such faith as existed
in the old formulas and arrangements drained away. The world
drifted as the weather changed."
"1931-1937," in Ernest R.
May and James C. Thomson, Jr., eds. American-East Asian
Relations: A Survey (Cambridge; Harvard University Press,
1972), 244. Nowhere, perhaps, was the featureless drifting
more evident than in the United States. Disillusioned,
turned inward, self-absorbed, and bound by the traditions of
a passive and incoherent foreign policy born of geographic
isolation and messianic ideals, the United States stood un
willing— though not necessarily complacent— to take immediate
risks to reduce the threats to peace. While pouring forth
calls for cooperation against international lawlessness, the
U.S. drew the line at foreign entanglements. How, thus, to
asses the performance of American diplomats— amateurs and
professionals— within the currents of their time poses some
special moral and intellectual problems.
"So far as diplomacy
served the ideal of accommodating differences between nations,"
Heinrichs stated, "the postwar years of nonentanglement were
a discouraging time to advertise that service [in the U.S.]."
"Bureaucracy," 171.
16

The best single work on the pre-1930 traditions, mores,
and thoughts of the career diplomats is Schulzinger, Diplomatic
Mind. See also De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 76, 202,
wherein he concludes that "the tendency to passivity and intel
lectual conformity" by career diplomats was exacerbated in the
1930s by the government's policy of noninvolvement, the cutbacks
in appropriations, and "the public's view of diplomats as ana
chronistic survivors from some mythological world" of frivolity.
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to their tasks?

Finally, what difference did it all make in

the development and execution of United States foreign
relations— then, in the years prior to World War II, and
later?
That FDR harbored deep prejudices toward the career
diplomats, prejudices reflected in American democratic
society at large, is clear.

Equally clear is that under

FDR the question of whether the United States would develop
a sound diplomatic corps was left unresolved, if not untested.
Much less certain is what it meant for the conduct of United
States foreign policy.

At best, perhaps, FDR's legacy to

professional diplomacy will be judged to be of dubious
distinction.

Appendix 1
Career Vs. Noncareer Appointments1
1908-1974
Percentage
Career

Year

Career

1908

5

34

13

1912

10

30

25

1916

3

36

8

1920

4

27

13

1924

13

34

28

1928

20

29

41

1932

25

26

49

1933

24

27

47

1934

25

26

49

1935

25

26

48

1936

25

27

48

1937

25

27

47

1938

24

27

47

1939

25

23

52

1940

26

26

50

1944

33

20

62

1948

41

24

63

1952

49

25

66

Noncareer

Career chiefs-of-mission include those who entered
the service by examination, and those who entered prior to
1906 with ten or more years experience in grades below mini
ster. Chiefs-of-mission accredited to more than one country
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Appendix 1 (continued)

Year

Career

Noncareer

Percentage
Career

1956

49

28

64

1960

63

71

71

1965

78

27

70

1968

71

32

63

1972

80

33

65

1974

88

35

68

are counted but once for each year for the years 1908-1940.
For the years 1944 to 196 0, chiefs-of-mission with dual
accreditation are counted twice.
Sources:

"Career vs. Non-CareerAppointments, 1906-194 0,"
American Foreign Service Journal, 17 (December,
1940), 678-679 for years 1908 to 1940; William
Barnes and John H. Morgan, The Foreign Service of
the United States: Origins, Development and
Functions (Washington, D C : Historical Office,
Department of State, 1961), 364, for the years
1944 to 1960; material from State Department files
supplied by Frederick Aandahl, Director, Operatiors
Staff, Office of the Historian, in letter to author,
March 2, 1979, for the years 1965 to 1974.

Appendix 2

Chiefs-of-Mis sion By Country
1933-1939
Country
Afganistan

Chief-of-Mis sion
2

Appointment

Termination

Career/N on- Ca reer

(See Persia)

Albania

Post Wheeler
Hugh G. Grant

8/26/33
8/9/35

11/1/34
9/27/39

Argentina

Alexander W. Weddell
Norman Armour

7/31/33
5/18/39

10/29/38
6/29/44

Austria

George H. Earle,III
George S. Messersmith
Grenville T. Emmet

7/14/33
4/7/34
7/13/37

3/25/34
7/11/37
9/26/37 (d.)

NC
C (1914)
NC

Belgium^

David H. Morris
Hugh S. Gibson
Joseph Davies

5/18/33
7/13/37
5/14/38

5/5/37
5/15/38
11/30/39

NC
C (1908)
NC

Bolivia

Fay A. des Portes
R. Henry Nor web
Robert G. Caldwell
Douglas Jenkins

8/19/33
4/25/36
5/4/37
6/22/39

5/1/36
6/15/37
6/23/39
10/3/41

NC
C (1916)
NC
C (1908)

Brazil

Hugh S. Gibson
Jefferson Caffrey

5/11/33
7/13/37

12/3/36
9/17/44

C (1908)
C (1911)

C (1906)
NC
C (1908)
C (1915)

Appendix 2 (continued)

Appointment

Termination

C are e r/N o n -C a re e r

Chief-of-Mission

Bulgaria

Frederick A. Sterling
Ray Atherton

9/1/33
7/13/37

6/30/36
7/5/39

C (1911)
C (1917)

Canada

Warren Delano Robbins
Norman Armour
Daniel C. Roper

5/11/33
5/22/36
5/9/39

3/28/35
1/15/38
8/20/39

C (1909)
C (1915)
NC

Chile

Hal H. Sevier
Hoffman Phillip
Norman Armour
Claude G. Bowers

8/19/33
7/22/35
1/17/3 8
6/22/39

5/4/35
10/31/37
6/10/39
9/2/53

NC
C (1901)
C (1915)
NC

China

Nelson T. Johnson1^

12/16/29

5/14/41

Columbia

Sheldon Whitehouse
William Dawson
Spruille Braden

7/15/33
12/15/34
4/27/38

12/8/34
11/16/37
3/12/42

C (1909)
C (1908)
NC

Costa Rica

Leo R. Sack
Edward Albright
William H . Hornibrook

8/17/33
4/22/37
7/2/37

1/10/37
5/25/37 (d.)
9/1/41

NC
NC
NC

C (1907)
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Country

Appendix 2 (continued)

Country

C h ie f-o f-M is s io n

Appointment

Cuba

Sumner Welles
Jefferson Caffery
J. Butler Wright

4/24/33
2/23/34
7/13/37

12/13/33
3/9/37
12/4/39 (d.)

C (1915)
C (1911)
C (1909)

Czechoslovakia

Francis White
J. Butler Wrig ht
Wilbur J. Carr

6/13/33
3/9/34
7/13/37

11/30/33
6/1/37
3/21/39

C (1915)
C (1909)
C (1892)

Denmark

Ruth Bryan Owen
Alvin M. Owsley
Ray Atherton

4/13/33
5/28/37
8/7/39

6/27/36
5/15/39
4/9/40

NC
NC
C (1917)

Dominican
Republic

H.F. Arthur Schoenfeld ^
R. Henry Norweb

8/1/31
4/22/37

4/27/37
2/13/40

C (1910)
C (1916)

Ecuador

William Dawson^
Antonio Gonzales
Boaz Long

5/9/30
12/10/34
3/22/38

2/27/35
3/30/38
5/1/43

C (1908)
NC
NC

Egypt

Bert Fish^

9/6/33

2/2 8/41

NC

Termination

C a re e r/N o n -C a re e r
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Appendix 2 (continued)

Country

Chief-of-Mission

El Salvador

Frank P. Corrigan
Robert Frazer

Estonia®

(See Latvia)

Finland

Appointment

Termination

Career/Non-Career

3/14/34
8/9/37

8/2 8/37
10/31/42

NC
C (1909)

Edward Albright
H.F. Arthur Schoenfeld

7/2 1/33
4/22/37

4/12/37
12/17/42

NC
C (1910)

France

Jesse Isidor Straus
William C. Bullitt

3/17/33
8/25/36

8/5/36
7/11/40

NC
NC

Germany

William E. Dodd
Hugh R. Wilson

6/13/33
1/17/38

12/29/37
11/16/38

NC
C (1911)

Great Britain

Robert W. Bingham
Joseph P. Kennedy

3/23/33
1/17/38

11/19/37
10/22/40

NC
NC

Greece

Lincoln MacVeagh

6/13/33

4/23/41

NC

Guatemala

Matthew Hanna
Fay A. des Portes

7/17/33
4/25/36

2/9/36
5/14/43

C (1917)
NC

Appendix 2 (continued)

Termination

C a re e r/N o n -C a re e r

7/25/32
6/5/35
7/13/37

3/2 1/35
7/21/37
11/20/40

C (1915)
C (1920)
C (1916)

Julius G. Lay4
Leo T. Keena
John D. Erwin

12/16/29
2/22/35
7/29/37

3/17/35
5/1/37
4/16/47

John F. Montgomery

6/13/33

3/17/41

Country

Chief-of-Mission

Haiti

Norman Armour4
George A. Gordon
Ferdinand L. Mayer

Honduras

Hungray

Appointment

C (1889)
C (1909)
NC
NC
\

4/9/34 (d.)
7/7/37
1/15/40

NC
NC
NC

4/24/33
8/4/36

4/23/36
10/6/41

NC
C (1903)

Toseoh O . G r e w 4

2/19/32

12/8/41

C (1906)

John Van A. MacMurray®
Arthur Bliss Lane®
Frederick. A. Sterling®
John C. Wiley

8/2 8/33
1/24/36
8/9/37
7/18/38

2/12/36
9/16/37
—
6/17/40

C
C
C
C

Irish Free State

W . W . McDowell
Alvin M. Owsley
John Cudahy..

Italy

Breckinridge Long
William Phillips

Japan
Latvia ^

9/13/33
5/15/35
- 5/28/37

(1907)
(1916)
(1911)
(1915)

Appendix 2 (continued)

Country

C h ie f-o f-M is s io n

Appointment

Termination

C aree r/N o n -C aree r

Liberia

Lester A. Walton

7/22/35

2/28/46

NC

Lithuania

Owen J.C.Norem

8/23/37

6/15/40

NC

Luxembourg* ^

(See Belgium)

Mexico

Josephus Daniels

3/17/33

11/9/41

NC

Netherlands

Laurts S. Swenson4
Grenville T. Emmet
George A. Gordon

2/2 8/31
1/15/34
7/30/37

3/5/34
8/2 1/37
8/15/40

NC
NC
C (1920)

Nicaragua

Arthur Bliss Lane
Boaz W. Long
Meredith Nicholson

7/31/33
1/24/36
3/22/38

3/14/36
4/1/38
2/27/41

C (1916)
NC
NC

Norway

Hoffman Phillip4
7/22/30
Anthony J. Drexel Biddlejr. 7/25/35
Florence J. Harriman
5/4/37

8/3/35
5/2 1/37
4/9/40

C (1901)
NC
NC

Appendix 2 (continued)

Country

Chief-of- Mission

Appointment

Termination

Siam (Thailand)

James Marion Baker
Edwin L. Neville

8/30/33
5/2 8/37

5/2/36
5/1/40

NC
C (1909)

Soviet Union

William C. Bullitt
Joseph E. Davies
Laurence A. Steinhardt

11/21/33
11/16/36
3/23/39

5/16/36
6/11/3 8
11/12/41

NC
NC
NC

Spain

Claude G. Bowers
Alexander W. Weddell

4/6/33
5/3/39

2/2/39
2/7/42

NC
C (1908)

Sweden

Laurence A. Steinhardt
Fred M. Dearing
Frederick A. Sterling

5/11/33
4/22/37
6/16/38

6/26/37
6/17/38
7/14/41

NC
C (1904)
C (1911)

Switzerland

Hugh R. Wilson^
Leland Harrison

2/26/27
7/13/37

7/8/37
10/14/47

C (1911)
C (1907)

Turkey

Robert P. Skinner
John Van A. MacMurray

6/13/33
1/24/36

1/16/36
11/28/41

C (1897)
C (1907)

Union of South
Africa

Ralph J. Totten^
Leo J. Keena

6/20/30
7/31/37

4/12/37
8/13/42

C (1908)
C (1909)

Career/Non-Career
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Country

Chief-of-Mission

Appointment

Termination

Panama

Antonio C. Gonzales
George T. Summerlin
Frank P. Corrigan
William Dawson

8/2 8/33
12/10/34
8/9/37
3/23/39

1/9/35
7/7/35
6/14/39
4/2 1/41

NC
C (1909)
NC
C (1908)

Paraguay

Meredith Nicholson
Findley B. Howard

8/19/33
8/20/35

2/3/35
1/16/41

NC
NC

Persia (Iran)**

William H. Hornibrook
Louis G. Dreyus, Jr.

12/12/33
7/7/39

3/16/36
12/12/43

NC
C (1910)

Peru

Fred M. Dearing^
Laurence A. Steinhardt

1/31/30
4/22/37

6/3/37
4/10/39

C (1904)
NC

Poland

John Cudahy
Anthony J. Drexel Biddlejr.

6/13/33
5/4/37

4/23/37
9/5/39

NC
NC

Portugal

Robert G. Caldwell
Herbert Clairborne Pell

6/13/33
5/27/37

5/28/37
2/3/41

NC
NC

Rumania

Alvin M. Owsley
Leland Harrison
Franklin M. Gunther

6/13/33
5/15/35
7/31/37

6/15/35
9/3/37
12/12/41

NC
C (1907)
C (1908)

Career/Non-Career

Appendix 2 (continued)

Country

Chief-of-Mission

Appointment

Termination

Uruguary

J. Butler Wright4
Julius G. Lay
William Dawson
Edwin C. Wilson

9/29/30
12/14/34
8/31/37
6/22/39

7/10/34
8/3 1/37
6/6/39
3/5/41

Venezuela

George T. Summerlin4
Meredith Nicholson
Antonio C. Gonzales
Frank P. Corrigan

9/11/29
1/22/35
3/22/38
1/20/39

1/15/35
4/14/38
2/8/39
9/5/47

C (1909)
NC
NC
NC

Yugoslavia

Charles S. Wilson
Arthur Bliss Lane

8/3/33
8/9/37

7/28/37
4/14/41

C (1901)
C (1916)

Career/Non-Career
C
C
C
C

(1909)
(1889)
(1908)
(1920)

-376-

^•If the chief-of-mission is a career officer, the date he entered the Foreign Service is in
parenthesis. For definition of career chief-of-mission, see (*) to Appendix 1.
^Ministers to Afganistan were also accredited to Persia. They resided at Teheran.
^Ministers to Belgium were also accredited to Luxembourg. They resided at Brussels.
^Chiefs-of-mission appointed by President Herbert Hoover and initially recommissioned to the
same post by FDR.
5Accredited also to Saudi Arabia. Resided at Cairo.
^Ministers to Estonia were also accredited to Latvia. They resided at Riga.

Appendix 2 (continued)

^Ministers to Latvia were also accredited to Estonia. They resided at Riga.
^Also accredited to Lithuania. Resided at Riga.
^Commissioned, but did not proceed to post.
*^Ministers accredited to Luxembourg were also accredited to Belgium. They resided at Brussels.
*^Ministers to Persia were also accredited to Afganistan. They resided at Teheran.

Sources:

State Department Biographic Register,,1932-1940
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1932-1940); United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973
(Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1973).

Appendix 3
C haracteristics of Career C h ie fs -o f-M is s io n
1933-1939

Countries
As C -o f-M

Name
Norman Armour ^

Ray Atherton ®

Jefferson C affery 4

W ilb u r J. C arr

6

W illia m Daw son4

Fred M . Dearing 4

Year of
Birth

Entered F . S /

Education ^

H a iti
Canada
C h ile
Argentina

1887

1915 (18)

Princeton

Bulgaria
Denmark

1883

1917 (16)

Harvard

Cuba
B razil

1886

1911 (22)

C ath olic U .

C zechoslovakia

1870

1892 (45)

Georgetown U.

Ecuador
Columbia
Uruguary
Panama

1885

1908 (25)

U . M innesota

Peru
Sweden

1879

1904 (26)

U . M issouri

Appendix 3 (continued)
Countries
As C - o f - M

Name

Year of
Birth

Entered F .S .

Education

i

r

Persia

1889

1910 (23)

Yale

El Salvador

1878

1909 (24)

M .I.T .

B razil
Belgium

1883

1908 (26)

H a iti
Netherlands

1885

1920 (13)

L'Ecole des
Sciences Politiques
Harvard

Joseph C . Grew 4

Japan

1880

1906 (27)

Harvard

Franklin M . Gunther^

Rumania

1855

1908 (22)

Harvard

M atth ew Hanna 4

Guatem ala

1873

1917 (16)

W e s t Point

Leland H arrison 4

Rumania
Sw itzerland

1883

1907 (24)

Harvard

B olivia

1880

1908 (25)

--

China

1887

1907 (26)

Louis G . D reyu s, Jr.
Robert Frazer

£

Hugh S . Gibson ^

George A . Gordon ®

Douglas Jenkins

6

N elson T . Johnson

4

ington U.

C

Leo T . Keena

George W ash 

Honduras
Union of South Africa

1878

1909 (24)

U . M ich ig an

Appendix 3 (continued)

Name
Arthur Bliss Lane

6

Countries
As C - o f - M

Year of
Birth

Nicaragua
Latvia
Yugoslavia

1894

Entered F .S .

1916

(17)

Education

Yale

Honduras

Julius G . Lay 4

Uruguary

1889 (44)

High School

Latvia
Turkey

1881

1907 (26)

Princeton

Ferdinand L . M ayer®

H a iti

1888

1916 (17)

Princeton

George S. M essersm ith 6

Austria

1883

1914 (19)

D elaw are

John Van A . M acM urrayS

College

Edwin L. N e v ille ®

Siam

1884

1909 (24)

U. M ichigan

R. Henry Norweb ®

Bolvia
Dom inican Republic

1894

1916 (17)

Harvard

Norway
C h ile

1872

1901 (32)

Cambridge U

Ita ly

1878

1903 (29)

Harvard

Hoffman P h illip

4

W illia m P h illips ®

-3 8 0 -
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Name

Countries
As C - o f - M

Year of
Birth

Entered F .S .

Education

W arren D elano Robbins^

Canada

1885

1909 (24)

Harvard

Dom inican Republic
Finland

1889

1910 (21)

George W ash 

H .F . Arthur Schoenfeld

4

ington U.

Turkey

1866

1897 (36)

H igh School

Bulgaria
Latvia
Sweden

1876

1911 (2 2 )

Harvard

Venezuela
Panama

1872

1909 (24)

W e s t Point

Ralph J. T o tte n 4

Union of South A frica

1880

1908 (25)

Business School

Alexander W . W e d d e ll^

Argentina
Spain

1876

1908 (20)

George Wash

Robert P. Skinner
Frederick A . Sterling

4

George T . Summerlin 4

ington U.

Sumner W e lle s 5

Cuba

1892

1915 (15)

Harvard

Post W h eeler

Albania

1869

1906 (27)

Princeton

C zechoslovakia

1892

1915 (18)

Yale

Francis W hite

4
6

Appendix 3 (continued)
Countries
As C - o f - M

Year of
Birth

Entered F .S .

Columbia

1883

1909 (24)

Yale

L atvia

1893

1915 (18)

Georgetown U

Charles S. W ilso n ^

Yugoslavia

1873

1901 (32)

Harvard

Edwin C . W ilso n ®

Uruguary

1893

1920 (13)

U . M ichig an

Hugh R. W ils o n ^

Sw itzerland
Germany

1886

1911 (22)

Yale

Uruguary
C zechoslovakia
Cuba

1877

1909 (24)

Princeton

Name
Sheldon W hitehouse
John C . W ile y

6

J. Butler W rig ht ^

4

Education

1 Indicates countries commissioned to as a c h ie f-o f-m is s io n under FDR.
2Number in parenthesis refers to years of diplom atic experience prior to appointment as c h ie f-o f-m is s io n
under FDR.
3 R efers, ip most cases , to place o f undergraduate education. Several officers attended two or more
u n iv e rs itie s , and several received advance degrees. Nelson T. Johnson and George S. M essersm ith
attended the un ive rs ities noted but did not graduate.
The primary purpose o f this column is to
indicate whether the o ffice r attended a public or private in stitu tio n of higher education.
^Indicates that o ffice r was a c h ie f-o f-m is s io n under President Hoover a t time of FDR's inauguration and
was retained in a sim ilar capacity by FDR, though not n ecessarily in the same country.

Appendix 3 (continued)

5M acM urray and Robbins were serving in the State Department a t time of FDR's inauguration. P hillips
and W e lle s were tem porarily resigned from the Foreign S ervice. A ll four had prior experience as c h ie fs o f-m is s io n .
^Indicates officers who received firs t appointment as a c h ie f-o f-m is s io n under FDR. Two of them— Carr
and W h ite — held high positions w ith in the State Department prior to their appointments.
Sources:

State Department Biographic R egister, 1932-1940 (W ashington, D . C . ; Government Printing
O ffic e , 1932-194 0); United States C hiefs o f M is s io n , 17 78-1973 (W ashington, D . C . :
Government Printing O ffic e , 1973).
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Appendix 4
C haracteristics of N on -C areer C h ie fs -o f M issio n
1933-1939
Countries
As C - o f - M

Year of 2
Birth

Residence

Finland
C osta Rica

1873(66)

Tenn.

Cumberland U.

' Publisher

Siam

1861(72)

S .C .

W offord C ollege

Librarian

Norway
Poland

1897(38)

Pa.

High School

Business

Robert W . Bingham

G reat Britain

1871(62)

Ky.

U . L o u isville

Publisher

Claude G . Bowers

Spain
C h ile

1878(59)

N .Y .

High School

Journalist;H istorian

Spruille Braden

Columbia

1894(44)

N .Y .

Yale

Business

W illia m C . B u llitt

U .S .S .R .
France

1891(42)

Pa.

Yale

Business, travel

Portugal
B o livia

1882(54)

Tex.

Princeton

Professor

Name
Edward Albright

James M . Baker
Anthony J. D rexel
Biddle, Jr.

Robert G . C a ld w ell

Education

Occupation

Name

Countries
As C - o f - M

Year of
Birth

Residence

Education

Occupation

M .D .

Business

El Salvador
Panama
V enezuela

1881(53)

O h.

W estern
Reserve U .

Poland
Iris h Free State

1887(46)

W is .

Harvard

Josephus D an iels

M exico

1862(71)

N .C .

U.North Carolina^ Publisher

Joseph E. D avies

U .S .S .R .
Belgium

1876(60)

D .C .

U . W isconsin

B olivia
Guatem ala

1890(43)

S .C .

N.C. A gri.C ollege B usiness;P olitician

W illia m E.Dodd

Germany

1869(64)

111.

U. Leipzig

Professor

George H . Earle, I I I

Austria..

1890(43)

Pa.

Harvard

Business; P o liticia n

G re n v ille T . Emmet

Netherlands
Austria

1877(57)

N .Y .

Harvard

Lawyer

Honduras'

1883(54)

Tenn.

High School

Journalist

Frank P. Corrigan

John Cudahy

Fay A . des Portes

John D . Erwin

Lawyer
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Appendix 4 (continued)

Name

Countries
As C - o f - M

Year of
Birth

Residence

Bert Fish

Egypt

1875(58)

F la .

John B. Stetson U.

Lawyer; Judge

Antonio Gonzales

Panama
Ecuador
Venezuela

1888(45)

N .Y .

George
W ashington U.

Lawyer

Hugh G . G rant

Albania

1888(47)

A la.

Harvard

Journalist; Professor

Florence Harriman

Norway

1870(67)

D .C .

Private Tutors

S ocialite

W illia m H . Hornibrook

Persia
Costa Rica

1884(49)

Utah

U .Michigan

Publisher

Findley B. Howard

Paraguay

1885(50)

N ebr.

U .Nebraska

L a w y e r;U .S .
Customs Agent

Joseph P. Kennedy

G reat Britain

1888(49)

N .Y .

Harvard

Business

Boaz Long

Nicaragua
Eduador

1876(57)

N .M .

S tM ic h a e l C ollege 3 Business

Breckinridge Long

Ita ly

1881(52)

M o.

Princeton

Lawyer; P o litician

Lincoln MacVeagh

Greece

1890(43)

Conn.

Harvard

Publisher; Business

Education

Occupation

Appendix 4 (continued)

Name

Countries
As C - o f - M

Year of
Birth

Residence

W .W , M c D o w ell

Irish Free State

1867(66)

M o n t.

Union C ity C ollege

Mining;Ranching

John F . Montgomery

Hungary

1878(55)

C a l.

Business School

Business

D avid H . M orris

Belgium

1872(61)

N .Y .

Harvard

Lawyer

M ered ith N icholson

Paraguay
Venezuela
Nicaragua

1866(67)

In d .

Private Tutors

Journalist; N o v e lis t

Owen J .C . Norem

Lithuania

1902(35)

M o n t.

S t. O la f

Lutheran Pastor

Ruth Bryan Owen

Denmark

1885(48)

F la .

U . Nebraska

Lecturer; P o liticia n

A lvin M . O w sley

Rumania
Iris h Free State
Denmark

1888(45)

T ex.

N. Texas State
Teachers C .

Lawyer

H erbert C lairborne P ell

Portugal

1884(56)

R .I.

Harvard

P o litic ia n

D a n ie l C . Roper

Canada

1867(72)

D .C .

Duke U .

Lawyer:

Leo R. Sack

Costa Rica

1889(44)

Pa.

U . M isso u ri

Journalist

Education

Occupation

Appendix 4 (continued)

Name

Countries
As C -o f-M

Year of
Birth

Residence

H a l H . Sevier

C h ile

1978(55)

T ex.

High School

Publisher

Jesse I . Straus

France

1872(61)

N .Y .

Harvard

Business

Laurence A . Steinhardt

Sweden
Peru
U .S .S .R .

1892(41)

N .Y .

Columbia

Lawyer

Education

Occupation

00
00

Laurts S . Swenson

Netherlands

1865(68)

M in n .

Luther C ollege

Banker

Lester A. W alton

Liberia

1882(53)

N .Y .

High School

Journalist

1 Indicates countries commissioned to as c h ie f-o f-m is s io n under FDR.
Number in parenthesis refers to the .age of the c h ie f-o f-m is s io n a t the time of his or her appointment under
FDR.
O

i
OJ

D id not graduate.

Sources*. State Department Biographic R egister, 1932-1940 (W ashington, D . C . : Government Printing
O ffic e , 1932-194 0); United States C hiefs of M is s io n , 1778-1973 (W ashington, D . C . ;
Government Printing O ffic e , 19 73).
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Appendix 5
Countries W ith Embassies and Legations
By Geographical Region
1933-1939
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W estern Europe

Scandanavia

Belgium 1
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Iris h Free State .
Ita ly
N etherlands
Portugal
Spain
Switzerland

Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden

C entral and
Eastern Europe
Albania
Austria
Bulgaria
C zechoslovakia
Greece
Hungary
Latvia 2
Lithuania
Poland
Rumania
Soviet Union
Yugoslavia •

Africa and
The East
China
Egypt
Japan
Liberia
Persia 3
Siam
Turkey
Union of South
Africa

Latin America
Argentina
Bolivia
B razil
C hile
Columbia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dom inican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
H a iti
Honduras
M exico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguary
Peru
Uruguary
Venezuela

Appendix 5 (continued)
■^Ministers to Belgium were also accredited to Luxembourg. They resided at Brussels.
^M in isters to Latvia were also accredited to E stonia. They resided at Riga.
3The M in is te r to Persia in 1935 was also accredited to Afganistan for that year o n ly . He
resided a t Teheran.

Appendix 6

C h ie f-o f-M is s io n Appointments by Geographical Region
1933-1939

Region
W estern Europe

Posts 1

Appointments

Career

N on-C areer

Percentage
Career

-391-

11

26

9

17

35

4

11

5

6

45

C entral and Eastern
Europe

12

27

15

12

55

Latin America

20

56

32

24

57

8

12

,8

4

67

Scandanavia

Africa and the East

Totals

55

132

69

63

*A fgan istan-P ersia, Belgium-Luxembourg, and E sto n ia-L ativia are counted as one post each.
The M in isters to these posts held dual accreditation.
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Berle, Beatrice Bishop, and Jacobs, Travis Beal, eds.
Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971; From the Papers
of Adolf A. Berle. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jcvanovich, Inc., 1973.
Blum, John Morton. From the Morgenthau Diaries. Vol.
I: Years of Crisis, 1928-1938. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1959.
________ . From the Morganthau Diaries. Vol. II:
Years
of Urgency, 1938-1941. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1965.
Useful volumes, especially on FDR's relation
ship with Kennedy, the Munich crisis, and on the
diplomacy of Hull and Daniels.
Bullitt, Orville H., ed. For the President: Personal
and Secret Correspondence Between Franklin D.
Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt. Boston: Houghton
'Mifflin Co., 1972.
A valuable source on a wide-range of Bullitt's
interests accompanied by an incisive assessment of
Bullitt in the introduction by George Kennan. The
letters enhance neither FDR's nor Bullitt's
reputations.
Cannistraro, Philip V.; Wynot, Edward, Jr.; and Kovaleff,
Theodore P., eds. Poland and the Coming of the
Second World War: The Diplomatic Papers of A. J.
Drexel Biddle, Jr., United States Ambassador to
Poland, 1937-1939. Columbus: Ohio State Univer
sity Press, 1975.
Contains some useful, previously unpublished
reports of one of the better amateur envoys whom
the editors lavishly praise in a biographical
introduction.
Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York:
Simon
and Schuster, Inc., 1941.
Reveals the author's incredible naivete.
Dodd, William E., Jr., and Dodd, Martha, eds.
Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938. New York:
Harcourt Brace, and Co., 1941.
An important and authentic source for all
aspects of Dodd's diplomacy.
Ferrell, Robert H., ed. Off The Record: The Private
Papers of Harry S. Truman. New York: Harper & Row,
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Publishers, 1980. Suggests that Truman was much less hostile
toward career diplomats than FDR.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. Ambassador's Journal: A
Personal Account of the Kennedy Years. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969.
Notes the high intelligence of individual
Foreign Service officers, while voicing now fam
iliar criticisms of the cumbersome and unwieldy
foreign affairs bureaucracy.
Galpin, Perrin C., ed. Hugh Gibson, 1883-1954: Extracts
From His Letters and Anecdotes From His Friends.
New York: Belgian American Foundation, Inc., 1956.
Witty and delightful book containing some
incisive observations on diplomacy by a career
officer who served as a chief-of-mission under
several presidents.
Grew, Joseph C. Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary
Record Drawn From the Diaries and Private and
Official Papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States
Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942. New York: Simon
and Schuster, Inc., 1944.
Provides only a partial glimpse of Grew's
diplomacy, as Waldo Heinrichs notes in his
biography of Grew.
Hooker, Nancy Harvison, ed. The Moffat Papers:
Selections From the Diplomatic Journals of Jay
Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1956.
Valuable "inside" account of the Foreign
Service from a respected and perceptive member of
the "club.”
Hoover, Herbert. Memoirs of Herbert Hoover. 3 vols.
London: Hollis and Carter, 1952.
Hoover indicates his preference for profes
sionals over amateurs as chiefs-of-mission, although
he— like presidents before and since— managed to
reward political supporters with plum posts.
Ickes, Harold L. The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes.
Vol.
The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936. New
York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1953.

I:

________ . The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes.
The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939. New York:
and Schuster, Inc., 19 54.

Vol. II:
Simon
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________ . The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes. Vol. Ill:
The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941. New York:
Simon
and Schuster, Inc., 1954.
Fascinating comments on FDR's choice of
diplomats and on the State Department by the Pres
ident's highly-opinionated secretary of the interior.
Israel, Fred L. , ed. The War Diary of Breckinridge
Long: Selections From the Years 1939-1944. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1966.
Valuable biographical introduction by Israel,
who notes that most of Long's diary for the 193 0s
has been lost.
Johnson, Walter, ed. Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic
Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945. 2 vols. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952.
Useful for the development of the career
Foreign Service and on Grew's ambassadorship to
Japan.
Kennan, George F. From Prague After Munich:
Diplomatic
Papers, 1938-1940. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1968.
Extremely perceptive reporting by one of
America's premier diplomatists. Useful, too, in
placing the reports signed by Wilbur J. Carr, the
minister to Czechoslovakia, into perspective along
side those of his staff and the events they faced.
Kilpatrick, Carroll, ed. Roosevelt and Daniels: A
Friendship in Politics. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1952.
An important source for studying Josephus
Daniels.
Loewenheim, Francis L.
Langley, Harold, D,;
Manfred, eds.
Roosevelt and Churchill:
Wartime Correspondence. New York: E.
& Co., Inc., 1975.
Valuable in pointing, once again,
distrust of professional diplomats.

and .Jonas,
Their Secret
P. Dutton
to FDR's

Mills, Walter, ed. The Forrestal Diaries. New York:
Viking Press, 1951.
Useful for asides on Truman's view of the
State Department and diplomats.
Morison, Elting E., ed. The Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt. Vol. IV. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1951.
Contains TR's disparaging comments on diplo
mats, which were not altogether inaccurate in the
early years of the twentieth century.
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Nixon, Edgar B., ed. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign
Affairs. Vol. I: January 1933-February 1934.
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1969.
________ . Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs.
Vol. II: March 1934-Auqust 1935. Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969.
________ . Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs.
Vol. Ill: September 1935-January 1937. Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969.
Indespensible. Covers FDR's first term.
Contains rich material on FDR and the Foreign Service.
Roosevelt, Elliot, ed. F. D. R . : His Personal Letters,
1905-1928. 2 vols. New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1948.
No mention of Foreign Service or professional
diplomacy in these volumes.
________ , ed. F. D. R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945.
2 vols. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950.
Contains a smattering of useful information on
some of FDR's diplomatic appointees.
White, Theodore H., ed. The Stilwell Papers. New York:
W. Sloan Associates, 1948.
A master of acerbic wit, "Vinegar" Joe Stilwell
held professional diplomats in high regard, while
acutely noting the general public's distaste for
them.
Wilson, Hugh R . , Jr., ed. A Career Diplomat: The
Third Chapter, The Third Reich. New York: Vantage
Press, 1960.
________ , ed. Disarmament and the Cold War in the
Thirties. New York: Vantage Press, 1963.
________ , ed. For Want of a Nail: The Failure of the
League of Nations in Ethiopia. New York: Vantage
Press, 1959.
Letters and diary entries of Hugh Wilson
revealing a great deal about his views of the
Foreign Service, Nazi Germany, and the events of
the 1930s.
2. Memoirs
Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in
the State Department. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
Inc., 1969.
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A superb source, whatever one's views of this
participant in the early days of the Cold War.
Valuable here for the author's comments on the rela
tionship of presidents to the State Department.
Allison, John M. Ambassador From the Prairie or Allison
Wonderland. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973.
Little substance in this sometimes frivolous
account by a man who joined the Foreign Service in
1930.
Beaulac, Willard. F. Career Ambassador. New York:
Macmillan Co/, 1951.
Contains interesting material on life in the
Foreign Service, especially in the 1920s, from the
perspective of a twenty-seven year career veteran.
Biddle, Cordelia Drexel. My Philadelphia Father.
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955.
Nothing of value on her brother, A. J. Drexel
Biddle, Jr., an ambassador under FDR.
Bohlen, Charles.
York: W. W.
Valuable
diplomacy and

Witness to History, 1929-1969. New
Norton & Co., Inc., 1973.
on several aspects of New Deal
the Foreign Service.

Bowers, Claude. My Life: The Memoirs of Claude Bowers.
New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1962.
________ . My Mission to Spain:
Watching the Rehearsal
for World War II. New York: Simon and Schuster,
Inc., 1954 .
\
Bowers' self-evaluation in his memoirs, does
not always comport with the official documents,
many of which he authored.
Bowles, Chester. Promises to Keep: My Years inj Public
Life, 1941-1969. New York: Harper & Row, 11971.
Praises FDR's administrative methods i|n sharp
contrast to criticisms voiced by many othef State
Department officials.

j

Braden, Spruille. Diplomats and Demogogues:
The
Memoirs of Spruille Braden. New Rochelle, N.Y.:
Arlington House, 1971.
Some unwitting information on the appointment
of this Montana-born copper-mining magnate as one
of FDR's ambassadors to Latin America.
Briggs, Ellis. Farewell to Foggy Bottom: The Recollec
tions of a Career Diplomat. New York: David
McKay, 1964.
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Representative of many memoirs by former
career officers who feel compelled to indict those,
like FDR, who are unappreciative and ignorant of
professional diplomacy.
Campbell, John Franklin. The Foreign Affairs Fudge
Factory. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.
A delightful, wholly irreverent account by a
deceased, modern-era Foreign Service Officer.
Critical of FDR, reflecting, perhaps, an oral tradi
tion passed down through generations of officers.
Childs, J. Rives. Foreign Service Farewell: My Years
in the Near East. Charlottesville, Va.: University
Press of Virginia, 1969.
Reveals a tone of bitterness that is absent in
the author's earlier history of the Foreign Service
published in 1948. Contains some useful information
on some of the lesser known diplomats of the 193 0s.
Cudahy, John. The Armies March: A Personal Report.
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941.
________ . The Case for the King of Belgium. New York:
no publisher, 194 0.
Accounts by FDR's "playboy" ambassador to
Poland which apologize for the behavior of the King
of Belgium upon the invasion of his nation by
Hitler and reveal the author's inclination towards
isolationism.
Curley, James M. I'd Do It Again. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957.
Contains material on Curley's abortive
appointment to the embassy in Rome.
Danelski, David J., and Tulchin, Joseph S., eds. The
Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.
Reaffirms Secretary of State Hughes' known
support of the career Foreign Service.
Daniels, Josephus.
Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947.
Informative memoir of the author's ambassador
ship to Mexico. Mined thoroughly by Daniels'
biographers.
Davies, John Paton, Jr. Dragon by the Tail: American,
British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters With
China and One Another. New York: W. W. Norton
& Co., Inc., 1972.
Biting memoir-history of a diplomat purged
from the Foreign Service during the McCarthy era.
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Contains some useful and often satirically incisive
observations of America's China policy and diplomats.
Dodd, Martha. Through Embassy Eyes. New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1939.
An astute memoir that compliments Ambassador
Dodd's diary.
Dunham, Donald. Envoy Extraordinary. New York: John
Day Co., 1944.
Interesting comments about consular work, but
does not mention the various chiefs-of-mission under
whom the author served.
Einstein, Lewis. A Diplomat Looks Back. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968.
Of the many memoirs on diplomatic life prior
to 1930, this is perhaps the best.
Farley, James A. Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt
Years. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill
Book C o ., 1948.
By FDR's dispenser of patronage. Useful on
only a few diplomatic appointments.
Feis, Herbert.
1933: Characters in Crisis. Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
Excellent sketches of some of the more impor
tant diplomats by a well-known court-historian.
Fischer, Louis. Men and Politics: An Autobiography.
London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1941.
Superficial comments on many diplomats by a
foreign correspondent for the New York Post.
Flynn, Edward J. You're The Boss. New York: The
Viking Press, 1947.
Useful on the maneuvering that preceeded the
appointment of Dodd to Berlin.
Harriman, Florence Jaffray. From Pinafores to Politics.
New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932.
________ . Mission to the North. Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1941.
Provides biographical information on the
author's patrician life and appointment as minister
to Norway. Also indicates both the author's wil
lingness to delegate responsibility to her subor
dinates, all career officers, and their cordial
relations with her.
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Harriman, W. Averell, and Abel, Elie. Special Envoy to
Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946. New York: Random
House, 1975.
Beyond the time frame of this thesis, but con
tains perceptive comments on FDR and the State
Department.
Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols.
New York: Macmillan Co., 1948.
Of chief importance here are Hull1s recol
lections of how envoys were selected. Hull's role
in appointments was limited but his loyalty to his
subordinates is obvious.
Kennan, George F. Memoirs. Vol. I: 1925-1950.
Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967.
Contains shrewd and discerning sketches of
various diplomats by the well-known diplomat-scholar
as well as incisive commentary on American diplomacy.
Krock, Arthur. Memoirs:
Sixty Years on the Firing Line.
New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968.
Contains some information on Kennedy's
appointment to London.
Moley, Raymond. After Seven Years.
Brothers, 1939.

New York:

Harper

________ . The First New Deal. New York:
Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1966.
Provides good information on many of FDR's
diplomatic appointments and Moley's battles with
the career officers.
^
Murphy, Robert D. Diplomat Among Warriors. Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1964.
By a career officer and personal emissary for
FDR. Notes the lack of coordination between the
State Department and the President, as well as
FDR's distrust of career diplomats.

j

Patterson, Jefferson. Diplomatic Duty and Diversion.
Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1956.
A useful memoir by a career officer, who,
among other assignments, served in the Foreign
Service Division of Protocol during the 193 0s.
Phillips, William. Ventures in Diplomacy. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1952.
A decidedly discreet yet revealing account
befitting a professional diplomat. Nostalgia for
the early Foreign Service is apparent.
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Roosevelt, Elliott, and James Brough. An Untold Story:
The Roosevelts of Hyde Park. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 19 73.
________ . A Rendezvous With Destiny; The Roosevelts of
Hyde Park. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1975.
Much is promised and little is delivered.
Roosevelt, Nicholas. A Front Row Seat. Norman: Univer
sity of Oklahoma Press, 1953.
Critical view of FDR by a Republican Roosevelt
cousin.
Roper, Daniel C. Fifty Years of Public Life. New York:
Greenwood Press, 1968.
Useful on Dodd's appointment to Berlin and the
author's sudden and unexpected appointment to Canada.
Russell, William. Berlin Embassy. New York: E. P.
Dutton & Co., 1941.
Ambassadors Dodd and Wilson are not treated
in this account by a clerk in the Berlin immigra
tion department of the American consulate.
Schlesinger, Authur, Jr. A Thousand Days: John F .
Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1965.
The author mimics the usual criticisms of
career diplomats, and, not surprisingly, finds
FDR's and JFK's views compatible with his own.
Thayer, Charles W. Bears in the Caviar.
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1951.

Philadelphia:

________ . Hands Across the Caviar. Philadelphia:
J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1952.
Lively and witty accounts of only marginal
value by a career officer who served under Ambas
sador Bullitt, among others.
The New Dealers. [John F. Carter] New York:
Simon and
Schuster, Inc., 1934.
Remarkably accurate portraits of FDR and many
of his entourage, including diplomats and State
Department staffers, by a contemporary listed only
as the "Unofficial Observer."
Tocqueville, Alexis d e . Democracy In America. 2 vols.
New York: Schocken Books, 1970. Originally
published in English in 1835.
Contains the French aristocrat's insightful
and oft-quoted observations on the conduct of
foreign policy in a democracy.
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Wehle, Louis B. Hidden Threads of History: Wilson
Through Roosevelt. New York: Macmillan, 1953.
A marginally useful account by a relatively
minor confidant of FDR's.
Indicates that FDR made
many appointments without much consultation with
his advisors.
Welles, Sumner. The Time For Decision.
Harper & Brothers, 1944.

New York:

________ . Seven Decisions That Shaped History.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951.
Generally self-effacing accounts by FDR's
closest foreign-policy advisor. The first account
contains Welles' self-laudatory but inaccurate
evaluation of his ambassadorship to Cuba. The
second notes FDR's distaste for career diplomats.
Wheeler, Post, and Hallie Erminie Rives (Mrs. Post
Wheeler). Dome of Many-Colored Glass. Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955.
A curiosity. A schizophrenic account by a
career officer who came to detest the Foreign
Service.
Wiley, Irena. Around the Globe in Twenty Years. New
York: David McKay Co.,inc., 1962.
A gay account of life abroad by the wife of
John Wiley, a career officer.
Wilson, Hugh R. Diplomat Between Wars. New York and
Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1941.
________ . Education of a Diplomat. New York and
Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938.
Valuable in discerning the nostalgia felt
by one career diplomat for a serene and elitist
Foreign Service that existed prior to 1930.

II.

Secondary Materials— Published
A.

General, Topical, and Monographic Works

Adler, Selig, The Uncertain Giant:
1921-1941, American
Foreign Policy Between the Wars. New York:
Macmillan Co., 1965.
A general work that lends some perspective to
the conduct of diplomacy during the 19 30s.
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Aguilar, Luis E. Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.
A highly critical treatment of Ambassador
Welles' mission to Cuba in 1933.
Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1971.
A fine analytical study with broad usefulness
in viewing bureaucratic politics.
Andrew, Arthur. Defence By Other Means: Diplomacy for
the Underdog. Ontario: John Degell Ltd., 1970.
Contains a sound chapter on diplomatic practice
Baer, George. W. The Coming of the Italo-Ethopian War .
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967 .
Concentrates upon the maneuvering among
European diplomats.
Barnes, William, and Morgan, John Heath. The Foreign
Service of the United States: Origins, Development
and Functions. Washington, D.C.: Historical
Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of
State, 1961.
An official, well-researched, and sympathetic
history of the Foreign Service.
Barron, Gloria J. Leadership in Crisis: FDR and the
Path to Intervention. Port Washington, N.Y.:
Kennikat Press, 1973.
Thin in content and shallow in analysis.
Bendiner, Robert. The Riddle of the State Department.
New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942.
A critical account, heavily dependent upon
gossip, by a veteran journalist.
Bennett, Edward M. Recognition of Russia: An American
Foreign Policy Dilemma. Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell
Publishing, 1970.
Bullitt is treated more generously here than
he deserves.
Beschloss, Michael P. Kennedy and Roosevelt: The
Uneasy Alliance. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
Inc., 1-980.
Adds some interesting details to the story of
Kennedy's ambassadorship.

-405-

Borg, Dorothy. The United States and the Far Eastern
Crisis of 1933-1938; From the Manchurian Incident
Through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared SinoJapanese War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1964 .
What is lacking in writing style is more than
compensated for by superb research.
Borg, Dorothy, and Okamoto, Sumpei, eds. Pearl Harbor
as History: Japanese-American Relations, 19311941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.
An excellent collection of essays. Useful to
generalist and specialist alike.
Bowers, Claude. Jefferson in Power: The Death Struggle
of the Federalists. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1936.
________ . The Spanish Adventures of Washington Irving.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940.
Two books Ambassador Bowers completed in
Madrid, indicating that he, in part, successfully
accomplished that which he originally intended to
do as an ambassador.
Braeman, John; Bremner, Robert H.; and Brady, David, ■
eds. Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy.
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971.
Contains an excellent article by Waldo
Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in
the Development of American Career Diplomacy."
Briggs, Ellis. Anatomy of Diplomacy: The Origin and
Execution of American Foreign Policy. New York:
David MCKay Co., Inc., 1968.
An indictment of the amateurism that prevails
in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
Buhite, Russell D. Nelson T. Johnson and American
Policy Toward China. 1925-1941. East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1968.
A credible but thin and uninspiring biography,
leading one to suspect that the Johnson papers
may be meager.
Bullitt, William C. The Great Globe Itself: A Preface
to World Affairs. New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1946.
An anti-Soviet polemic revealing of Bullitt's
transformation since 1917.
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Bullock, Alan. Hitler, A Study in Tyranny. New York:
Harper & Row, 1962.
Still the best biography of Hitler.
Important for an understanding of Nazi foreign
policy.
Burns, James McGregor. Roosevelt. Vol. I: The Lion
and the Fox. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
Inc., 1956.
________ . Roosevelt. Vol. II:
The Soldier of Freedom.
New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1970.
Justifiably acclaimed as one of the best of
the Roosevelt biographies.
Burns, Richard Dean, and Bennett, Edward M . , eds.
Diplomats in Crisis: United States-ChineseJapanese Relations, 1919-1941. Santa Barbara:
American Bibliographical Center-— Clio Press, Inc.,
1974.
Contains solid essays on American and Far
Eastern diplomats. Useful for evaluating Grew
and Johnson.
Callcott, Wilfrid Hardy. The Western Hemisphere:
Its
Influence on United States Policies to the End of
World War II. Austin: University of Texas Press,
1968.
A fine survey of U.S.-Latin American
relations.
Cambon, Jules M. The Diplomatist. London: Philip
Allen, 1931. Originally published in 1926 as
Le Diplomate.
Shrewd commentary on the art of diplomacy by
a well-known French diplomat and scholar.
Cardozo, Michael H. Diplomats in International
Cooperation:
Stepchildren of the Foreign Service.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962.
Notes the generally negative public attitude
toward diplomats and contends that the traditional
view of the qualities of the ideal diplomat are
still applicable to the sound conduct of diplomacy.
Cartwright, William H., and Watson, Richard L., Jr.,
eds. The Reinterpretation of American History
and Culture. Washington, D.C.: National Council
for the Social Sciences, 1973.
Provides useful bibliographical essays on
industrialization and trade expansionism, the
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progressive reformers, the Great Depression, and
the diplomacy of the 1930s.
Childs, J. Rives. American Foreign Service. New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1948.
Recites the case for the conduct of diplomacy
by professionals.
Clapper, Olive Ewing. Washington Tapestry. New York:
Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1946.
A columnist's view of the Washington scene,
which includes information on Joe Davies and his
relationship with FDR.
Cline, Howard. The United States and Mexico. New York:
Atheneum, 1968. Originally published in 1963.
A general, yet thorough survey of AmericanMexican relations.
Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: An
Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971.
A sound introductory history containing useful
information relating to Ambassador Johnson.
Compton, James V. The Swastika and the Eagle: Hitler,
the United States, and the Origins of World War II.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967.
Cursory account with only brief comments on
Dodd and Hugh Wilson.
Craig, Gordon A., and Gilbert, Felix, eds. The
Diplomats:
1919-1939 . Princeton:
Princeton
University Press, 1953.
A generally excellent work, containing solid
essays on Dodd, Bullitt, and Kennedy.
Crane, Katharine. Mr. Carr of State: Forty-Seven Years
in the State Department. New York:
St. Martin's
Press, 1960.
A poorly written biography, which nevertheless
contains much useful information about Carr and the
development of the Foreign Service from Carr's
private papers.
Cronon, E. David. Josephus Daniels in Mexico. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1960.
Well-written, sympathetic treatment of FDR's
ambassador to Mexico.
Current Biography: Who's News and Why.
The A.W. Wilson Co., 1940-1953.

New York:
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Provides useful biographical information on
some of the diplomats of the 193 0s.
Dallek, Robert. Democrat and Diplomat: The Life of
William E. Dodd. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1968.
A well-researched, adequately-written, and
sympathetic treatment of Dodd.
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign
Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979.
A balanced treatment. Focuses upon the
domestic and foreign constraints FDR faced.
Contains little on FDR and the Foreign Service.
Davies, Joseph E. Our Soviet Ally in War and Peace.
New York: The National Council of AmericanSoviet Friendship, 1944.
A work of propaganda by a former U.S.
ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
Davis, Kenneth S. FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny,
1882-1928, A History. New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1971.
Biography by a popular biographer of many
subjects. Not particularly revealing.

\

Invincible Summer: An Intimate Portrait
of the Roosevelts Based on the Recollections of
Marion Igickerman. New York: Atheneum, 1974.
A few interesting sidelights about a couple
of FDR's diplomats appear in this volume.

DeNovo, John A. American Interests and Policies in
j the Middle East, 1900-1939. Minneapolis:
Univer) sity on Minnesota Press, 1963.
|
Contains only scanty information on American
I diplomats to Middle Eastern countries.
De Santis, Hugh. The Diplomacy of Silence: The American
Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold
War,, 1933-1947. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1981.
Destler; I. M. Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign
Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
A decent study, highlighting bureaucratic
politics and past failures at organizational
reform of the foreign affairs machinery.

-409-

Diggins, John R. Mussolini and Fascism: The View from
America. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1972.
Misguided fascination with Mussolini was not
confined to diplomats.
Divine, Robert A. The Illusion of Neutrality. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962.
Solid work on American neutrality. Contains
little on individual diplomats.
________ . Roosevelt and World War II. Baltimore:
Pelican Books, 1970. Originally published in 1969.
An excellent, short introduction to FDR's
foreign policy.
Dodd, William E. Statesmen of the Old South. New York:
Macmillan Co., 1926.
An example of Dodd's fervent Jeffersonianism.
Dugan, James, and Lafore, Laurence. Days of Emperor
and Clown: The Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936.
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 19.73.
A thought-provoking, sweeping and ably-written
volume that concentrates upon European and Ethiopean
figures.
Ellis, Lewis Ethan. Republican Foreign Policy,
1921-1933. Nsv Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1968.
A good synthesis of published materials
foreshadowing the New Deal era.
Etzold, Thomas H. The Conduct of American Foreign
Policy: The Other Side of Diplomacy. New York:
New Viewpoints, 19 77.
Brief but sound survey with a good annotated
bibliography. A good place to begin a study of
the Foreign Service.
Farnsworth, Beatrice. William C. Bullitt and the Soviet
Union. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press,
1967.
Covers Bullitt's career from 1933-1936. Not
uncritical but perhaps more sympathetic to Bullitt
than future accounts might be.
Feingold, Henry. The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt
Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1941.
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970.
A reasonable though not dispassionate account.
As in other accounts on the same subject, Breckinridge
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on Washington life, including that of career
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